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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the relationship between distress and 
credit and the role this relationship has in determining corporate investment and economic activity. 
The first essay studies the supply of credit during the recent financial crisis. It shows that distress 
in the banking sector led to bank credit rationing, which a portion of nonfinancial borrowers 
palliated by migrating to the public market for credit. The overall reduction in credit, however, 
was followed by a severe drop in corporate investment, which in time led to a fall in the levels of 
aggregate production. 
The second essay examines how distress in the banking sector affects credit supply in two 
separate events: the credit crunch of early 1990s and the financial crisis of late 2000s. While the 
former is broadly thought of as a relatively mild crisis when compared with the latter, the fall in 
bank credit that they carried is comparable by certain measures. Government intervention, the 
paper argues, accounts for the comparatively short duration of and fast recovery from the second 
crisis. 
The third essay investigates the role of aggregate economic distress on the maturity of debt, 
which ultimately affects investment in long-term assets. The paper predicts and shows that 
increases in the aggregate distress lead lenders to prefer shorter maturities. This effect can be 
empirically observed in changes in maturity of new debt issues. Moreover, it is strong enough to 
modify the temporary financial structure of nonfinancial corporations. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three essays that relate distress and credit. The first essay 
studies the supply of corporate credit during the recent financial crisis. In an aggregate of market 
of bank and public corporate credit, I show that banks ration credit as a response to their distress 
and in the search to grow liquidity. A fraction of firms react substituting public for bank credit; 
another fraction is rationed out entirely. This substitution is incomplete because investors are not 
fully prepared to resolve the information asymmetry problems banks can resolve. A direct result 
of bank credit contraction is the fall in corporate investment, effect that is particularly strong 
among firms that borrow from distressed banks. 
The second essay is motivated by the far-reaching effects of credit disruptions documented 
in the first essay. In this second work I explore the impact of government interventions on the 
duration and severity of credit crises, as well as the pace of recovery from these crises. I compare 
the credit crunch of early 1990s with the financial crisis of late 2000s. I show that while the former 
is often considered a mild crisis, it brought a long-lasting contraction in the bank credit market 
with a total fall in corporate loans that is comparable to that of the latter. The credit crunch, 
however, had its focus on small- and mid-size banks, while the financial crisis was particularly 
severe among large banks, which had significant off-balance sheet exposures. The systemic 
importance of the banks affected in the financial crisis provided incentives for sizeable government 
intervention, which shortened the duration of the crisis and contributed to a relatively swift 
recovery in the bank credit market. 
The third essay explores the role of aggregate economic distress in determining the 
maturity of credit. I argue that periods of higher volatility increase the probability of borrower 
failure, and this makes creditors prefer shorter maturities as an optimal strategy that allows them 
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to reduce credit risk exposure and increase the opportunities of screening. Using over twenty years 
of data, I show that the maturity of new bank and public debt issues decreases when aggregate 
riskiness increases, and vice versa. Moreover, the effect is strong enough to result in significant 
changes in maturity of debt outstanding in the balance-sheet of nonfinancial public corporations. 
The three essays are subtly intertwined. The common thread to the stories they tell is 
distress and its impact on credit outcomes and corporate investment. The focus switches at times 
from financial intermediaries to arms-length investors to nonfinancial corporations, keeping 
always at sight the implications of aggregate economic distress on the evolution of the real 
economy.   
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 ESSAY 1: FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE SUPPLY OF CORPORATE CREDIT
1
 
J. Santiago E. Barraza, Wayne Y. Lee, and Timothy J. Yeager 
A. ABSTRACT 
Analyzing syndicated loan and public debt originations by publicly traded U.S. firms 
between 2004 and 2011, we document a sharp migration from bank borrowing to either no 
borrowing or public debt issuance in the crisis years.  A significant portion of the migration was 
driven by overall distress in the banking industry and a subsequent tightening of lending standards.  
To conserve liquidity, banks that were relatively more distressed curtailed credit further.  Matching 
each firm with its lead bank, we provide direct evidence for the bank lending channel by showing 
the migration in debt funding outcomes was more prominent for firms that had established 
relationships with lead banks that became relatively more distressed during the crisis.  The ability 
of many publicly traded firms to promptly disintermediate and issue their own debt provided 
important financial flexibility.  The damage to the broader economy from the bank lending channel 
was large, nevertheless, potentially accounting for nearly two-thirds of the decline in 
                                                 
1 We are grateful for financial support from the Bank of America Research Fund, and to the 
Arkansas Bankers Association Chair funds, which sponsored access to Thompson Reuters 
DealScan and Global New Issues databases.  We also thank seminar participants at the University 
of Arkansas, the 2012 FMA Annual Meeting, INFINITI Conference 2013, and the 2013 FMA 
European Conference for helpful comments. We thank especially Allen Berger, Bruce Dixon, John 
Duca, Elyas Elyasiani, Alexey Malakhov, Ralf Meisenzahl, Felipe Restrepo Gomez, John 
Sedunov, Gregory Udell, and Kangzhen Xie for their comments. All errors remain our own. 
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nonresidential fixed investment and half of the decline in GDP in 2009.  Sticky interest rates and 
a surge in loan commitment drawdowns suggest that bank credit rationing was prevalent during 
the crisis.  Many firms originated public debt at interest rates far higher than syndicated loan rates.   
Keywords: financial crisis, bank lending channel, credit rationing, financial flexibility. 
JEL Codes: G12, G21, G32. 
B. INTRODUCTION 
The most important role of financial institutions is to channel funds from savers to 
borrowers, which facilitates aggregate consumption and investment.  Historically, commercial 
banks have been the primary intermediaries.  When bank lending is interrupted, the consequences 
can be grave.  Bernanke (1983) makes a convincing case that the U.S. economy slipped from a 
typical recession into the Great Depression only when banks failed in large numbers, which 
disrupted lending relationships and caused a large contraction in aggregate demand.  In a centuries-
long study of financial crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that banking crises were followed 
by particularly long and extreme contractions in economic activity. 
Conventional wisdom that a sharp contraction in credit provided by U.S. banks during the 
2008-2009 financial crisis contributed to a severe and prolonged recession has conceptual merit.  
Federal Reserve data show that bank lending dropped by 10.2% in 2009 and 5.8% in 2010.  Absent 
drawdowns on existing loan commitments, the decline in bank lending would have been 
significantly worse.2  Large banks were accused of accumulating cash and curtailing lending 
                                                 
2 Loan data are from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Table H.8, “Assets and Liabilities 
of Commercial Banks in the United States.”  Total unused commitments at commercial banks 
declined by one fourth from $7.2 trillion at year-end 2007 to $5.4 trillion at year-end 2009.  Federal 
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despite billion dollar infusions of capital through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).3  
But U.S. financial markets are much deeper and wider than in the 1930s and firms have far more 
financial flexibility.  Even if banks rationed credit subsequent to the bursting of the housing bubble, 
nonbank intermediaries could potentially take up the slack and offset the decline in bank lending.  
Further, a decrease in demand for bank loans could account for some or all of the decrease in bank 
lending either because firms tapped internal funds or voluntarily reduced investment.   
Using firm-level contract data on syndicated loans and public debt issues, this study 
examines the importance of the U.S. bank lending channel to corporate financing and investment 
during the financial crisis.  We find that the contraction in bank lending played a distinctly 
important role in the aggregate allocation of credit in 2008, which led to an economically large 
reduction in the investment of firms in 2009 and thereby contributed to the Great Recession.    
Following the subprime housing bubble burst in 2007, banks responded to the heightened 
threat of insolvency by reducing loan growth and increasing liquidity in 2008 and 2009.  The credit 
contraction led to a sharp increase in the number of firms that did not borrow at all or migrated to 
the public debt markets.  Steady-state dynamics derived from transition matrices of corporate debt 
funding in crisis-years 2008-2009 and pre-crisis years 2005-2006 suggest the crisis induced a 24 
percentage point decline in the number of firms using bank debt, approximately half of whom 
obtained no credit at all and the remaining half issued public debt.  Controlling for the attributes 
                                                 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics on Depository Institutions. 
3 See, for example, Matthias Rieker, Marshall Eckblad, and Joe Bel Bruno, “Bank Executives to 
Tell Congress: ‘We’re Lending’,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2009; and Steffy, Loren, “You 
bail me out, I’ll bail you out,” Houston Chronicle, December 30, 2009. 
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of firms that influence debt funding choice as well as the characteristics of bank and public debt 
contracts, logistic regressions of pre-crisis and crisis debt funding outcomes affirm that firms were 
far less likely to obtain syndicated bank loans and far more likely to issue public debt during the 
crisis.  Compared to pre-crisis years 2004-2006, the likelihood that firms obtained syndicated bank 
loans fell by 4% (9%) in 2008 (2009); and the likelihood that firms obtained public debt rose by 
19% (27%) in 2008 (2009).  The differences in debt funding outcomes at the firm level were 
coincident with a tightening of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending standards by commercial 
banks. 
The primary empirical challenge in bank lending channel studies is to distinguish between 
demand and supply shifts.  We address this issue by identifying the lead arranger of each firm and 
noting the ensuing debt funding outcomes of each firm as the relative financial distress of the lead 
arranger changes.  We conjecture that banks, which became relatively more distressed during the 
crisis contracted lending the most (Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez 2011), and as a consequence, 
made it more difficult for firms with relationships to these banks to obtain credit.  Indeed, 
multinomial regressions show that firms who borrowed in 2007 from bank lenders that 
subsequently became more distressed in 2008 were less likely to borrow in 2008. 
Firms that either did not borrow or had relationships with distressed lenders in 2008 were 
also less likely to invest in 2009, and the effect was economically large.  In multivariate 
regressions, which account for factors that can influence a firm’s demand for investment, we 
estimate the contraction in bank lending reduced firm investment in 2009 by 24%.  The reduction 
in firm investment accounts for approximately two-thirds of the decline in nonresidential fixed 
investment, and translates into a decrease in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 1.5%, more than 
half of the GDP contraction of 2.8% in 2009. 
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Evidence from loan commitment drawdowns and sticky loan rates suggest that banks chose 
to ration credit rather than raise interest rates.  C&I drawdowns under commitments a year and 
older as a proportion of total C&I loans increased unexpectedly in late 2008.  Firms drew heavily 
on existing lines and were unable to obtain new lines under comparable borrowing terms.  At the 
same time, average interest rate spreads on bank loans, which were not statistically different from 
bond spreads in non-crisis years, were 137 (67) basis points lower than on bond debt in the crisis 
year 2008 (2009); differences that are both economically and statistically significant.  All things 
equal, given the significantly lower cost of bank debt during the crisis, firms would have preferred 
to borrow from banks.  We suppose the rapid deterioration in bank capital from a substantial 
decline in subprime asset values did not allow banks the opportunity to raise additional capital at 
reasonable cost nor provide the time needed to reduce credit volume through higher interest rates.   
To the best of our knowledge, no other paper has quantified the real effects of bank distress 
and the consequent contraction in bank lending during the financial crisis on the U.S. economy, 
accounting simultaneously for a number of demand and supply factors.  Our analysis shows a large 
contraction in investment, even though many firms were able to draw down cash and migrate to 
public debt markets in response to the reduction in bank credit.  Our results roughly coincide with 
Kahle and Stulz (2013) findings regarding the timing of this impact on firm investment.  Although 
the financial crisis started in late 2007 and peaked in 2008, the strongest effect of the bank credit 
channel on firm investment only occurred in 2009.   
Our study corroborates the importance of the bank lending channel during periods of 
financial crisis (Bernanke 1983) and the relatively limited substitutability of credit sources.  The 
destruction of credit relationships that result when banks fail takes time to rebuild.  The resulting 
reduction in aggregate demand can be acute even in an otherwise robust economic environment 
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(Ashcraft, 2005).  Using the Russian crisis in the fall of 1998 as an adverse shock to the health of 
some U.S. banks, Chava and Purnanandam (2011) note that borrowers dependent on credit from 
affected banks experienced significantly higher valuation losses.  Gan (2007) examines the 
bursting of the real estate bubble in Japan.  The reduction in credit by banks with greater real estate 
exposure accounted for one-third of the contraction in lending and one-fifth of the decline in 
investment.  Jiminez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012) find that contractionary monetary 
policy in Spain during the 2000s led to more severe credit contraction by banks with lower capital 
and liquidity.  Neither of these countries, however, had public bond markets as deep as in the U.S., 
which makes the debt migration dynamics in our study unique.  Lastly, Lemon and Roberts (2010) 
observe that after 1989, some firms managed to switch to bank loans and other financing sources 
when the high-yield public debt market was adversely affected by a number of shocks.  However, 
given the limited substitutability of the sources of funding, corporate investment deteriorated 
considerably over the same period. 
Our results also advance the literature on bank demand for liquidity by showing that a 
crisis-induced increase in insolvency risk encourages liquidity hoarding and credit contraction.  
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011) report that banks that entered the crisis with high 
liquidity risk – that is, exposure to undrawn loan commitments and wholesale funding withdrawals, 
added liquidity and extended less credit than banks with less liquidity risk.  Acharya and Skeie 
(2011) argue that a bank’s willingness to lend in the short-term inter-bank market is determined 
by its own rollover risk.  The aversion to rollover risk should be more pronounced with longer-
term lending.  Finally, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) point out that financial intermediaries 
become self-protective and amass liquidity when the aggregate quantity of liquidity is limited and 
agents face Knightian uncertainty with immeasurable risks. 
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Lastly, our study concludes that credit rationing occurred during the crisis and was more 
prevalent when banks were in severe distress.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) rationalize credit rationing 
as a possible equilibrium outcome.  When lenders have imperfect information about the credit risks 
of borrowers, interest rate setting may not be an optimal market clearing mechanism.  Raising the 
rate of interest can either attract a riskier pool of potential borrowers (adverse selection effect) or 
induce firms to increase the riskiness of existing projects (incentive effect).  Empirically 
documenting credit rationing is challenging.  Berger and Udell (1992) test two key predictions of 
this theory.  First, rationing requires that the fraction of new loans disbursed under prior existing 
commitments rises when credit spreads are high because non-commitment borrowers can readily 
be rationed but commitment borrowers cannot.  Using data from the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors Survey of Terms of Business Lending, we show that the quarterly ratio of C&I loans 
originated under commitment to all C&I loans rose steadily between 2007 and 2010, coinciding 
with a period of extremely high interest rates for corporate credit.  Second, sticky interest rates 
provide evidence of credit rationing absent alternative explanations such as implicit interest rate 
insurance or re-contracting with troubled borrowers.  We can directly rule out the first alternative 
because interest rate insurance is achieved through disbursements from existing loan contracts; the 
syndicated loans in our dataset are new originations.  We rule out re-contracting with troubled 
borrowers because very few of the sample firms have ratings at the lowest end of the scale, such 
as CC or D. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II makes a case for a fall in 
the proportion of loan to bond originations in a financial crisis that threatens bank solvency.  
Section III documents the migration from loans to bonds, especially in 2008 and 2009, and shows 
that debt migration was at least partly driven by shifts in the supply of bank credit.  Section IV 
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examines corporate debt funding outcomes during the financial crisis and the impact of bank 
distress.  Section V evaluates the effect of a contraction in bank lending on corporate investment.  
Section VI documents that banks rationed credit.  Firms migrated to bond markets even though 
lending banks provided credit at lower interest rates.  Section VII concludes. 
C. CREDIT MIGRATION IN A FINANCIAL CRISIS 
In this section, we provide a conceptual rationale for, and empirically document the 
migration of credit from syndicated bank loans either to public debt or no debt during the financial 
crisis.  Although credit migration applies to all corporate loan and bond issues, reliable firm-level 
origination data are available only on syndicated loans and public bond issues.  The scope of our 
empirical study is limited accordingly. 
1. Credit Migration 
Severe distress at the largest banks can trigger credit migration.  Rollover risk, loan 
commitment drawdowns, and speculative cash motives affect the liquidity preferences of banks.  
A solvency crisis increases the chance that banks will not be able to roll over their liabilities 
(Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie, 2011).  Although insured deposits 
are unlikely to flee, on average only about 39% of the liabilities of large bank are FDIC insured.4  
In contrast, uninsured funding can depart overnight.  Moreover, even the use of collateralized debt 
is uncertain when asset values underlying the collateral deteriorate.  As Gorton and Metrick (2012) 
show, REPO markets ceased to function as the value of subprime mortgages collapsed.  
Furthermore, in a crisis, banks also confront an increased demand for liquidity by firms.  Loan 
                                                 
4 FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions, March 2013. 
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commitments are drawn down more aggressively when firms anticipate an increased need for cash 
either because they may not be able to obtain new loans quickly or because the crisis has a direct 
impact on their own cash flows (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).  Lastly, Acharya, Shin, and 
Yorulmazer (2011) find that fire sales of failed banks during crises induce healthy banks to hold 
higher levels of liquidity in order to profit from acquisition opportunities.  
Curbing loan originations is a rational reaction by banks to conserve liquidity.  This action, 
which slows or reverses asset growth, also assists banks in satisfying regulatory capital 
requirements.  The decline in originations can be implemented either through a rise in interest rates 
or by rationing the volume of credit.  We hypothesize that in the short run, banks ration credit 
when the need to retain liquidity outweighs the marginal foregone interest revenue from raising 
interest rates.  The adverse selection rationale for credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) where 
higher interest rates increase the riskiness of the pool of borrowers is consistent with our story. 
The effect of a contraction in loan supply on firms depends on their reliance on bank loans 
for debt financing.  On the one hand, opaque firms and smaller privately held firms – namely, 
firms that equity and bond markets know little about, must rely on bank expertise in resolving 
information asymmetry through screening and monitoring.  On the other hand, publicly traded 
firms are relatively more transparent, which lessens the need for bank intermediation, because 
investors confront lower uncertainty about project outcomes (Besanko and Kanatas, 1993).  
Moreover, sufficiently large firms can rely on reputation or certification by third party credit rating 
agencies to aid investors in assessing credit risks.  Cantillo and Wright (2000) find that firms that 
finance through the public debt market are generally larger, safer, more profitable, and have 
relatively more cash and collateral.  These findings are broadly consistent with Houston and James 
(1996); Johnson (1997); Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999); and Denis and Mihov 
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(2003). 
In a financial crisis, as distressed banks curtail lending, firms with access to public debt 
markets are much more likely to substitute public for bank debt.5  The total volume of debt 
origination may not increase relative to the pre-crisis period, however, both because debt 
substitution is imperfect and because a slowing economy reduces firms’ demand for credit.  Bank-
dependent borrowers are more likely to be priced or rationed out of the credit market altogether.  
The proportion of bank loan to bond originations should fall in a financial crisis.  Indeed, Becker 
and Ivashina (2014) observe that declines in the proportion of bank loans to bond originations 
ensue at times characterized by tight lending standards. 
  [Insert Figure 1 here.] 
Our crisis migration story is illustrated succinctly in Figure 1.  The initial equilibriums in 
the bank and public debt markets occur at EB,O and EP,O, respectively, at which credit funds are 
competitively priced in both markets.6  The uncertainty triggered by the crisis decreases the 
                                                 
5 Equity issuances by firms is possible.  However, stock prices tend to be depressed during a crisis 
because future cash flows are more uncertain, which exacerbates the asymmetric information 
problem between firms and investors.   
 6Our univariate analysis in Table 1 provides some evidence that bank debt can be slightly more 
expensive than public debt during normal times. This could reflect the additional monitoring costs 
banks incur, as well as the ability of banks to extract monopolistic rents, consistent with Diamond 
(1984); Sharpe (1990); Rajan (1992).  Our multivariate analysis in Table 10 does not show, 
however, that these pricing differences are statistically significant after controlling for contract and 
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willingness of all lenders to extend credit, as they perceive higher credit, liquidity, and solvency 
risks.  The supply curve for bond debt provided by institutional and retail investors shifts left from 
SP,0 to SP,1. Banks simultaneously curtail lending even to well-qualified borrowers, shifting the 
supply curve left from SB,0 to SB,1. Distressed banks account for most of the contraction in bank 
credit.  In addition, credit rationing by banks cause a backward bend in the supply curve as banks 
become unwilling to lend even at higher interest rates.  Reflecting a weaker economy, the demand 
curve for bank debt also shifts left from DB,0 to DB,1.  The price of bank debt does not clear the 
bank debt market because the credit volume supplied at CB,1 is less than the credit volume 
demanded at a higher interest rate, rB,1.
7  With the contraction in loan supply, otherwise well-
qualified borrowers migrate to the public debt market, shifting the demand curve rightward from 
DP,0 to DP,1.  The public debt market clears at a higher loan volume, CP,1 > CP,0, but at a higher rate 
of interest than on bank debt, rP,1 > rB,1.  Because the migration from bank credit to bond credit is 
incomplete and aggregate demand for credit declines, the total volume of credit in the economy 
falls such that CB,1+ CP,1 < CB,0 + CP,0.  Crisis outcomes in the markets for bank and public debt 
are denoted by EB,1 and EP,1 respectively. 
2. Data Sample 
In recent years, syndicated loans have replaced traditional commercial and industrial bank 
                                                 
firm characteristics. 
7 We could call this a Walrasian partial disequilibrium.  But authors Stigliz and Weiss (1981) and 
Keeton (1979) argue that a non-clearing price can also be compatible with a market equilibrium in 
credit markets. 
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loans in importance because syndication allows banks to diversify their loan portfolios, achieve 
transactional economies of scale, and secure liquidity in the secondary market for syndicated loans.  
In a syndicated loan transaction, a lead bank (or banks) plays the central role of screening the 
borrower, negotiating the deal structure ex ante, and monitoring the loan ex post (Ivashina, 2009).  
The loan is marketed to a diverse group of banks and investors and the level of investor interest in 
the deal determines the eventual yield spread over a benchmark rate.  Because firms that borrow 
in the syndicated loan market are relatively larger in size and more transparent to investors, many 
of these firms also have the ability to borrow in public debt markets. 
We examine originations of syndicated bank loans and non-convertible public debt by 
publicly traded non-financial firms between January 2004 and December 2011.8  We define 2004-
2006 as the pre-crisis years, 2008-2009, as the crisis years, and 2010-2011 as the post-crisis years; 
based on the annual aggregate data, 2007 can be considered a transition year.  Data on syndicated 
loan originations were obtained from Thomson Reuters DealScan, and data on public debt 
originations come from Thomson Reuters Securities Data Commission (SDC) Platinum.  We point 
out that the syndicated loans dataset includes loans marketed through distribution methods other 
than syndication.  Although syndication accounts for almost 90% of the sample, the sample also 
includes 0.11% in bilateral loans, 0.21% in club deal loans, and 10.54% in sole lender loans.  We 
include these loans in our data sample because our study focuses on the importance of bank lending 
and lender-client relationships rather than the specific distribution method employed to market the 
credit.  
We use LIBOR data from the Bloomberg S23 US Dollars Swaps curve to compute yields 
                                                 
8 We exclude financial firms in Standard Industrial Classification codes 6000 through 6999. 
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on loans that use LIBOR as a base rate.  Similarly, we employ Treasury constant maturity rates 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website to compute loan and bond spreads 
over the risk-free rates. 
3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the number, volume, and characteristics of loan 
originations and bond issues by year.  The number of loans declined by more than half during the 
crisis years.  Volume declined from an average $930 billion in pre-crisis years to $412 billion in 
crisis years.  In contrast, the volume of public debt issues increased 153% from an average $99 
billion in pre-crisis years to $252 billion in crisis years.  Loans as a share of aggregate credit 
declined as well.  In pre-crisis years, loans accounted for 90% of the aggregate number of contracts 
and credit volume; during the crisis these shares averaged 70% and 62%, respectively, before 
partially recovering in 2010 and 2011.  Moreover, even though average firm size was large, nearly 
90% of firms borrowed only from banks in the pre-crisis years, and the share declined to 78% in 
2008 and 65% in 2009.  At the same time, the number of firms that only issued bonds increased 
from an average 4% in the pre-crisis years to 15% in 2008 and 25% in 2009.  Clearly the bond 
market was a more important source of credit in the crisis years compared to the pre-crisis years, 
both in absolute and relative terms. 
 [Insert Table 1 here.] 
In general, banks specialize in financing short-term and medium-term debt, and public debt 
markets specialize in long-term debt.  Consistent with a higher preference for liquidity and lower 
tolerance for credit risk by debt providers, the maturities on loans and public debt shortened in the 
crisis years.  In the pre-crisis years, the average maturity on loan contracts was 55 months 
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compared to an average 159 months on bond contracts.  By 2009, the average maturity on loans 
fell by 33% to 37 months, and the average maturity on bonds fell by 19% to 129 months. 
Public debt markets cater predominantly to creditworthy investment-grade firms (BBB and 
above); banks, in contrast, extend credit across the entire credit risk spectrum.  During the crisis, 
the relative share of loan originations declined across every ratings category B and above, and the 
decline was particularly severe for investment grade firms, which were more likely to migrate to 
the bond market.  In pre-crisis years, banks originated the majority of debt contracts across all 
credit ratings, including firms rated AA- and above.  But in 2009, banks originated only 35% of 
debt contracts to firms rated AA- and above and just 30% of debt contracts to firms rated BBB.  
Even non-investment-grade firms relied relatively more heavily on public debt markets during the 
crisis.  The public debt share of BB firms reached 30% in 2009 from a high of 9% pre-crisis. 
The pattern of yield spreads in Table 1 are consistent with banks choosing to ration credit 
rather than raise interest rates to clear the bank credit market during the crisis.  Pre-crisis, yield 
spreads on loan and bond originations were not statistically different.  But in 2008, yield spreads 
on investment and non-investment grade loans were well below corresponding yield spreads on 
bond issues.  In 2009, yield spreads on the high end of investment-grade loan and bond issues 
converged.  However, yield spreads on the low end of investment-grade and, specially, on non-
investment-grade loans remained substantially lower than yield spreads on bonds.  Banks appeared 
to continue rationing speculative credit rated firms.  Post crisis, yield spreads on loans rose and 
were significantly higher than corresponding yield spreads on bonds. 
4. Dynamics of Debt Funding 
The pattern of loan and bond originations in Table 1 reflect a significant switch from bank 
to public debt during the crisis.  To substantiate migration, we compute (Markov) transition 
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matrices of corporate debt funding; dividing the years 2004-2011 into seven overlapping two-year 
periods (2004-2005 through 2010-2011) and tracking the debt choices of each firm at year t and 
t+1 in each rolling two-year window.9  We classify firms in the first and second years into one of 
four possible states; namely, the firm originated: (i) no debt; (ii) loans only; (iii) bonds only; or 
(iv) both loans and bonds.  We define aggregate credit markets each year by the distribution of 
debt financing summarized in a four-dimensional state vector 𝒙[𝑥𝑖], where 𝑥𝑖 : 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4 represent 
the percentages of firms that fall into each of the four states.   
The changes in the state distribution between the first and second year reflect the dynamics 
of debt choices by firm.  Assuming changes follow a Markov process, a four-by-four dimensional 
transition matrix, 𝑻[𝑡𝑖𝑗], describes the passage of firms to state i  in the second year from state j in 
the first year.  𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑐𝑖𝑗/ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑖  for every column j, where cij  is the count of firms that fall into state 
i in the second year and state j in the first year, respectively, and ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑖 = 1  for every j column.  
𝑡𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 represents the conditional probability that a firm migrates to final state i in the second year 
from initial state j in the first year.  
For a regular time-invariant transition matrix T, there exists a matrix A such that 
                                                 
9 The pool of firms in each two-year window (t to t+1) are firms that borrowed sometime over 
the three-year period t-1 to t+1.  This restriction on the pool of borrowing firms, and thereby the 
implied size of debt markets, allows for the possibility that firms that did not borrow in t also did 
not borrow in t+1.  The potential bias introduced by this restriction on transition matrices is 
relatively minor because only the corner element 1,1 in the transition matrix is impacted.  The 
results presented herein are robust to alternative specifications of the window and implied debt 
market size. 
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lim𝑛→∞ 𝑻
𝑛 = 𝑨.  The column vectors u of A[u] are identical and each represents the steady-state 
distribution of debt financing where 𝑢𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 and ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑖 = 1 for every j.  Independent of the initial 
state x, it holds that lim𝑛→∞ 𝑻
𝑛 𝒙 = 𝑨𝒙 = 𝒖. 
Consider the firms that borrowed in the two-year period 2004-2005.  The state vectors 
𝒙2004 and 𝒙2005 characterize the distribution of debt financing in 2004 and 2005, and the transition 
matrix T2004,2005 describes the changes in debt choice by firms between 2004 and 2005. 
𝑥2005 = 𝑻2004,2005𝑥2004 
[
. 424
. 520
. 020
. 037
] = [
. 333 . 509 . 333 . 182
. 639 . 456 . 133 . 398
. 013 . 011 . 333 . 068
. 015 . 024 . 200 . 352
] [
. 397
. 546
. 019
. 038
] 
The steady state distribution of debt financing over the 2004-2005 period is 
lim𝑛→∞ 𝑻2004,2005
𝑛 𝒙 = 𝑨2004,2005𝒙 = 𝒖2004,2005. 
𝒖2004,2005 = [
. 420
. 524
. 021
. 036
] 
The 2004-2005 debt funding dynamics imply a long-run equilibrium where: 42% of firms 
will not borrow; 52.4% will obtain bank debt; 2.1% will obtain public debt; and the remaining 
3.6% will obtain both bank and public debt. 
The results of the Markov transition analysis are summarized in Table 2.10  Panel A reports 
                                                 
10 To ensure firms that disappeared over the sample period do not drive our results, we restrict our 
Markov chain analysis to include only firms that were in business between t-1 and t+1 in each 
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the seven steady state distributions of debt financing derived from two-year rolling windows over 
the years 2004-2011.  The debt funding dynamics in the pre-crisis years – 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 
2006-2007, imply that: an average 48.5% of firms will secure bank loans only; 3.2% will secure 
bonds only; and 4.5% will secure both loans and bonds.  Over the entire 2004-2007 pre-crisis 
period, the proportion of firms that will borrow from banks is 6.9 times the number of firms that 
will borrow from public bond markets.  Roughly 4/9 of firms will not borrow at all in any given 
year. 
 [Insert Table 2 here.] 
In contrast to pre-crisis years, in the crisis years of 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, debt funding 
dynamics imply that: just an average 28.5% of firms will secure bank loans only; 11% will secure 
bonds only; and 3.9% will secure both bank and public debt.  For every two firms that will borrow 
from a bank, one firm will borrow from the public debt market; a sharp divergence from pre-crisis 
years.  More than 5/9 of firms will not borrow at all in the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 periods.  
Further, in 2007-2008, 57.8% of firms will not borrow at all, significantly lower than the 1989-
2011 average; and in 2008-2009, the proportion of firms borrowing bank (public) debt only is 
significantly lower (higher) than the 1989-2011 average. 
The post-crisis years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 show a clear recovery in credit markets.  
The proportion of firms that will only borrow from banks is higher than in the crisis years and 
close in magnitude to the pre-crisis years.  The proportion of firms that will only issue bonds are 
                                                 
two-year rolling window.  We report results using this specification although the results are robust 
to the removal of this filter. 
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lower than in the crisis years, and again, close to magnitudes in the pre-crisis years.  The proportion 
of firms that will not borrow at all is extremely low; lower than in the pre-crisis years and 
significantly lower than the 1989-2011 average.  Post-crisis, more firms will seek to diversify their 
sources of debt funding.  Almost 10% will borrow from both bank and public debt markets in 
2010-2011 compared to a peak of 5.3% in the pre-crisis years and a trough of 2.8% in the crisis 
years; and the proportion that borrow from both bank and public debt markets in 2010-2011 is 
significantly higher than the 1989-2011 average. 
The conditional probabilities reported in Panel B corroborate our thesis that a contraction 
in bank lending will trigger a shift from bank to public debt.  On the one hand, the probability of 
securing bank debt conditional on securing public debt in the same year ranges between 25% and 
29% in the crisis years in contrast to peaks of 64% in the pre-crisis years 2004-2005 and 72% in 
the post-crisis years 2010-2011.  On the other hand, the probability of securing public debt 
conditional on securing bank debt in the same year is as high as 11% in the pre-crisis years 2006-
2007, but reaches as high as 17%, in the crisis years 2008-2009.  Firms with access to public debt 
markets will substitute public for bank debt in the crisis years, and thereby, will be less adversely 
affected by a contraction in bank lending in crisis years. 
The average transition matrices in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post crisis years presented in 
Panel C of Table 2 provide further insights on debt funding dynamics.  The columns describe the 
(average) initial debt funding outcome; the rows describe the final debt funding outcome.  Consider 
the second column in the average transition matrix over the pre-crisis years.  In pre-crisis years, 
for firms that initially borrow from banks; in the subsequent period: an average 54.2% will not 
borrow at all, 40.3% will secure bank debt only, 1.9% will switch from bank to public debt, and 
3.6% will obtain both bank and public debt.  But in crisis years, for firms that initially borrow from 
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banks; in the subsequent period: an overwhelming average 74.7% will not borrow at all, just 19.4% 
will secure bank debt only, 3.1% will switch from bank to public debt, and 2.7% will obtain both 
bank and public debt.  
In pre-crisis years, for firms that initially issue public bonds, in the subsequent period an 
average 34.4% will not borrow at all, 23.3% will switch from public bonds to loans only, 26.7% 
will secure public bonds only, and 15.6% will obtain both bank and public debt.  But in crisis 
years, for firms that initially issue public debt, in the subsequent period an average 41.4% will not 
borrow at all, just 7.3% will switch from public bonds to loans only, a stunning 43% will secure 
public bonds only, and 8.3% will obtain both bank and public debt. 
Taken together, debt funding dynamics predict a larger adverse impact on bank-dependent 
firms from a contraction in bank lending.  Firms that initially borrow from banks will subsequently 
be relatively less likely to borrow from banks, and more likely to issue public debt in crisis years 
than pre-crisis years.  Firms that initially issue public debt will also subsequently be relatively less 
likely to borrow from banks and more likely to issue public debt in crisis years than pre-crisis 
years.  Firms with clear access to public debt markets will be able to substitute public debt for bank 
loans.  In other words, the percentage of firms that initially borrow from banks and subsequently 
switch to public debt will be considerably higher in crisis years than pre-crisis years.  And the 
percentage of firms that initially issue public debt and subsequently continue to issue public bonds 
will also be considerably higher in crisis years than pre-crisis years.  
D. CONTRACTION IN BANK CREDIT  
Taking the credit demand of firms into consideration, we show in this section that a 
tightening of lending standards by banks lowered the likelihood that firms received bank credit 
during crisis years.  Moreover, the reduction in the supply of bank credit was driven in part by a 
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desire of banks to increase liquidity.  Lastly, we match firms to their lead arrangers and find that 
an increase in bank distress during crisis years contributed to the migration of firms from bank to 
public debt markets.   
1. Firm Attributes and Debt Funding Choice  
Because firms differ in their funding needs, it is important to control for the attributes that 
influence their choice of debt funding.  Table 3 presents summary statistics on borrower firm 
attributes grouped by debt funding choice are presented in Table 3.11   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Over the entire sample period 2004 to 2011, firms that obtained debt through syndicated 
bank loans rather than public debt issues: were less profitable (ROA); held fewer assets and fewer 
(tangible) fixed assets; held more cash; had weaker credit ratings (ratings are numbered 1 to 22 
with higher values representing better ratings); and younger.  The Tobin Q of firms that obtained 
bank credit was also higher than on firms that relied on public debt issues in the pre-crisis period, 
but the reverse was true in the crisis and post-crisis periods.  Overall, higher creditworthy firms 
participated in the bond market.  De Fiore and Uhlig (2012) note similar patterns for non-financial 
firms in European markets. 
2. Demand and Supply Influences on Debt Funding Outcomes 
Using contract level data, we estimate a prediction model of debt funding choice for the 
pre-crisis years 2004-2006 to assess how potential shifts in credit demand and supply influence 
                                                 
11 Firm attributes are from the Compustat database.  For public debt, we matched the SDC 
Platinum database directly with Compustat by Cusip.  For syndicated loans, we matched 
DealScan with Compustat using the linking table from Chava and Roberts (2008). 
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the observed change in debt funding outcomes of firms that borrowed during the crisis years.  The 
coefficient estimates from the pre-crisis model are used to establish the normal probability that an 
observed contract-firm pair in a given year corresponds to a bank loan or a bond issue.  The same 
model specification is also utilized to estimate, for each year between 2004 and 2011, the imputed 
probability that an observed contract-firm pair corresponds to a bank loan or a bond issue.  The 
excess probability is the difference between the imputed and normal probabilities that an 
observed contract-firm pair corresponds to a syndicated bank loan or bond issue.  We report the 
average excess probability across contract-firm pairs for each year between 2004 and 2011.   
Our estimates of excess probabilities employ two alternative specifications.  The Base 
Model includes only contract and firm characteristics, which control primarily for the impact of 
demand factors on contract type.  The Full Model includes, additionally, a proxy for bank credit 
supply conditions.  To the extent that firm and contract variables accurately capture the debt 
funding choices of firms, the differences in excess probabilities computed from the Base and Full 
Models reflect the effect of supply constraints on debt funding choices by firms. 
The general form of the logistic regression, which closely follows Denis and Mihov (2003), 
is: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑪𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑭𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑆𝑡 + ε𝑗,𝑡  (1) 
Where Contract Type j,t is a binary variable that equals 1 if a credit contract j of borrower i is a 
bank loan in a given year t, and 0 if it corresponds to a bond; α is an intercept; C j,t and F i,t-1 are 
vectors of contract and firm characteristics, respectively; St is a measure of bank credit supply 
conditions during t; and εj,t is the error term.  Contract variables include the contract amount and 
maturity.  Firm variables include proxies for firm investment opportunities, profitability, size, asset 
tangibility, liquidity, financial leverage, and credit risk, in addition to its borrowing history.  The 
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proxy for bank credit supply conditions is the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey (SLOOS) index, which reflects changes in C&I tightening standards for large and middle-
market firms. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the logistic regression for the Base Model; and 
Panel B, for the Full Model.  During the 2004-2006 pre-crisis years, larger and more liquid firms, 
and firms with higher credit risk were more likely to secure bank debt than to issue bonds.  The 
persistence of borrowing is denoted by a 5-year debt funding history dummy variable; firms that 
obtained loans (bonds) in the past continued to do so in subsequent years.  During the crisis years, 
most of the coefficient signs are consistent with those from pre-crisis years, but the magnitudes 
and statistical significances differ.  Bank loans were larger in amount, shorter in maturity, and 
extended even to firms with weak credit ratings.  In addition, firms with a history of bank debt 
funding were still more likely to obtain bank credit during the crisis but the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant for 2008.  In most years, an increase in tightening standards reduced the 
likelihood that firms acquire bank loans but the coefficient is statistically significant only in 2008. 
   [Insert Table 4 here.]    
Estimated coefficients from the logistic model for the 2004-2006 pre-crisis years, as well 
as coefficients from the logistic models estimated for each year between 2004 and 2011, are used 
to compute the probabilities that firms will either obtain loans or issue bonds.  Specifically, the 
odds ratio is 𝑝 𝑞⁄ = 𝑒𝛼+𝛾𝐶+𝜑𝐹+𝜓𝑆+𝜀, and because 𝑝 + 𝑞 = 1, it follows that 𝑝 = (𝑝 𝑞⁄ )/(1 + 𝑝 𝑞⁄ ), 
where p and q are the estimated probabilities that an observed contract-firm pair corresponds to 
loan or bond financing, respectively.  Excess probabilities for the Base Model are then computed 
as (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝2004−2006|𝑪, 𝑭), and for the Full Model as (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝2004−2006|𝑪, 𝑭, 𝑆). 
Table 5 reports average excess probabilities by model, contract type, and year.  Top and 
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bottom portions of the table present the Base Model and Full Model results; left-hand and right-
hand columns report excess probabilities for obtaining bank loans and issuing bonds.  The Base 
Model shows a lower likelihood of securing a bank loan of 8% (10%) in 2008 (2009) compared 
with pre-crisis years 2004-2006.  Similarly, the probability of securing bond financing of 28% 
(36%) is higher in 2008 (2009) compared with pre-crisis years 2004-2006.  The aggregate excess 
probability measures are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 [Insert Table 5 here.] 
Bank credit supply conditions played an important part in explaining debt funding 
outcomes, especially in 2008.  In the Full Model, the likelihood that a firm will secure a bank loan 
in 2008 (2009) fell by 4% (9%).  An increase in tightening standards by banks in the crisis year 
2008 accounted for half of the reduced likelihood of obtaining a bank loan by an otherwise similar 
firm.  In contrast, the likelihood of acquiring bond financing in crisis years rose considerably by 
19% (27%) in 2008 (2009).  Overall, the results support the hypothesis that changes in the supply 
of bank credit during the financial crisis encouraged many firms to migrate to the public debt 
market.12   
                                                 
12 Our excess probability tests assume that the specific yearly distribution of contracts reflects 
underlying credit conditions and is not simply a product of chance.  Consider for a moment this 
assumption is incorrect.  Then any random temporal distribution of the contracts could potentially 
yield excess probability results that resemble those presented in Table 5.  We test this possibility 
by randomly assigning observations (debt contracts) to each year.  Next, we estimate the prediction 
models, and compute the normal, imputed, and excess probabilities in the same fashion as in Tables 
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3. Bank Distress, Liquidity Growth, and Credit Supply 
As Edlin and Jaffee (2009) observe, the contraction in bank credit during the crisis was 
coincident with an extraordinary accumulation of bank excess reserves held at the Federal Reserve 
following governmental asset relief programs that infused significant liquidity into the banking 
system.  The uncharacteristically high levels of excess reserves, we argue, is symptomatic of 
liquidity hoarding during the crisis in response to a heightened threat of insolvency particularly for 
distressed banks.  Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011) find that banks with high 
liquidity risk exposure at the onset of the crisis subsequently increased liquidity and contracted 
credit during the crisis.  The accumulation of liquidity not only slowed asset growth and assisted 
banks in satisfying regulatory capital requirements but also allowed banks to fund cash drawdowns 
from outstanding loan commitments as well as wholesale funding withdrawals.  We include in this 
subsection a first examination to the effect of bank distress on liquidity growth and credit 
contraction. 
We use expected default frequency (EDF) to proxy for insolvency risk.  Distance to default 
(DD) is the difference between the firm’s market value of assets and its liabilities payable within 
one period, divided by a one standard deviation change in the market value of assets.  The market 
value of assets and the volatility of assets returns are, however, not directly observable.  
                                                 
4 and 5.  We repeat this experiment 100 times (we also ran trials of 1,000 and 10,000) and capture 
the mean excess probability by year, contract type, and trial.  Table A.1 in the Appendix reports 
the average of the mean excess probability and standard error across the 100 trials.  None of the 
mean excess probability estimates are statistically different from zero.  This finding shows that our 
results are unlikely to be driven by chance. 
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Recognizing that equity is a call option on the underlying market value of a firm, we can use option 
pricing models to compute a firm’s DD solely from a firm’s market value of equity, equity 
volatility, and book value of debt (Merton, 1974).  Higher values of DD imply lower default 
probabilities.  Applying a probability distribution to DD yields the EDF.  As described by Crosbie 
and Bohn (2003), we use the Black-Sholes option pricing model and translate one year DD into 
EDFs using a normal distribution.13 
We explore the influence of bank distress on liquidity and loan growth with a series of 
univariate OLS regressions.  The primary explanatory variable is EDF at time t, and the primary 
dependent variables are quarterly liquidity and loan growth rates in the subsequent period (t to 
t+1).  Liquidity is defined as cash and balances due from depository institutions plus securities, 
Federal Funds sold, and securities purchased under agreements to resell.  The regression sample 
includes all BHCs that filed FR Y-9C regulatory reports between 2004 and 2011.   Table 6 reports 
the regression results across three different time periods.  Note that each coefficient represents a 
unique regression.  Intercepts are not reported. 
                                                 
13 Note that our EDF estimates differ from those of KMV because KMV uses a proprietary option 
pricing model and an historical default dataset to map distance to default into EDF.  We compute 
equity volatility using 12 lagged monthly returns.  We follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) and define the relevant portion of liabilities to be debt in current 
liabilities plus one-half of long term debt.  Also as in Bharath and Shumway (2008), we seed the 
volatility of asset returns as a function of the volatility of equity returns and the ratio of equity to 
assets.  Quarterly accounting data come from Compustat, and monthly stock price data are from 
CRSP. 
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 [Insert Table 6 Here] 
Table 6 reveals three key patterns.  First, only in the crisis period do banks with higher 
EDFs increase liquidity growth.  In both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, higher EDF lowered 
liquidity growth.  Because average EDF values were exceptionally high in the crisis period, the 
impetus to accumulate liquidity was likely more critical than in other periods.  Second, loan 
creation is always negatively related to bank distress in prior periods and the adverse impact of 
bank distress is larger in magnitude and more significant during crisis.  Third, although loan and 
liquidity growth are contemporaneously unrelated in the pre-crisis period, the relation is negative 
and significant during the crisis and post-crisis periods.  Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
in crisis periods when insolvency and systemic risks are high, distressed banks reduce credit and 
accumulate liquidity as precautionary measures (Strahan, 2010) until the crisis ebbs and capital 
can be restored though profits and share issuances.  Interestingly, asset growth is negative 
following a period of bank distress because the contractionary effects of loan chargeoffs and credit 
tightening outweigh a bank’s efforts to accumulate liquidity. 
4. Lead Arranger Condition and Borrower Migration 
a. Bank Distress 
 In this subsection, we provide direct evidence for the bank lending channel by linking a 
firm’s debt funding outcome to the distress of its lead bank.  Banks are defined as lead banks if 
they receive lead arranger credit in DealScan or their roles in the syndication match a list of bank 
roles identified by Ivanshina (2009) as lead banks.  These roles are administrative agent, agent, 
arranger, bookrunner, lead arranger, lead bank, and lead manager.  We hand match each lead bank 
in the DealScan database with the ultimate parent bank holding company extending the loan using 
the organizational data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s National 
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Information Center website.  A relatively small number of observations where a loan deal has more 
than one lead arranger is excluded to capture the undiluted effect of borrowing relationships with 
distressed and healthy banks on debt funding outcomes. 
We estimate multinomial logit regressions to assess the impact of firm attributes, overall 
banking industry distress, and lead bank distress on a firm’s debt funding outcome.  Each 
regression takes the following form: 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝜑𝑭𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑏𝑙,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 (2) 
Where 𝛼 is a constant term, 𝑭𝑖𝑡 is a vector of firm i controls at year t, 𝐵𝑡+1 is the banking industry 
distress proxy in year t+1, 𝑏𝑙,𝑡+1 is the lead bank distress or liquidity at time t+1, and 𝜀 is the error 
term.  In (2), the debt funding outcomes of firms in year t+1 are conditional on firms obtaining 
bank loans in year t.  The limited dependent variable takes on values of 1 to 4 representing a 
migration at t+1 to no debt, bank debt only, public debt only, or bank and public debt, 
respectively.14   
The relatively few number of observations with complete data combined with the degrees 
of freedom required to estimate multinomial logit regressions make yearly cross-sectional 
regressions infeasible.  Instead, we estimate pooled regressions over the 2004-2011 period which 
control for lead bank as well as banking industry conditions and cluster errors by firms.  The 
financial health of lead banks and the banking industry in t+1 are measured using two alternative 
proxies of distress.  Moreover, to ensure that cross-sectional variations in lead bank distress are 
uncorrelated with temporal changes in banking industry distress, we pay careful attention to 
                                                 
14 We run a Test for Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on these four outcomes and cannot 
reject the null that they are independent. 
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eliminating any time trends from the lead bank distress measures.  
The first proxy for a bank distress, EDF Bracket, is the annual average percentile bracket 
associated with the lead bank’s EDF.  For each month in the sample, we compute each bank’s EDF 
and the EDFs in a given month are used to sort banks into 20 groups; each bracket contains 5% of 
the sample.  Each bank is assigned a value of 1 to 20 with higher values corresponding to higher 
levels of lead bank distress.15  For each bank, we average the monthly EDF brackets each year.  
Because each bracket represents a percentile score, the annual EDF bracket value reflects a lead 
bank’s relative distress in a given year and is unrelated to the overall industry EDF level.  
The second proxy for a bank distress is a set of two dummy variables whose values depend 
on changes in a bank’s S&P long-term issuer credit rating from one year to the next. For each pair 
of years (t, t+1), we compute the annual average rating at t and the annual average rating at t+1.  
Ratings Downgrade is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the average rating at t+1 is lower than 
the average rating at t, and 0 otherwise.  Ratings Upgrade is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
average rating at t+1 is higher than the average rating at t, and 0 otherwise.  We treat bank 
downgrades and upgrades separately because their effects on a firms’ debt funding outcomes are 
likely to be asymmetric.  Although we can expect a downgrade will significantly limit a bank’s 
                                                 
15 Sorting bank EDFs into 20 brackets parallels the categorization of ratings.  Like ratings, this 
approach does not assume a monotonic relationship between bank EDF and distress.  We also used 
bank EDFs directly without sorting, as well as changes in bank EDF between pre-crisis and crisis 
periods, as alternative distress proxies.  Additionally, we considered the maximum annual EDF 
instead of the annual average.  In all cases, these alternative distress measures produce results 
qualitatively similar to the ones we report here.  
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ability to extend new credit, it is unlikely that an upgrade will significantly stimulate bank lending.  
Ideally, we would use the absolute change in a lead bank’s rating between t and t+1 as the distress 
measure rather than dummy variables.  The relative severity of downgrades in 2008 and 2009, 
however, causes the temporal averages in ratings changes to be correlated with overall banking 
industry distress.  
In addition to controlling for individual lead bank distress, we also account for aggregate 
banking industry distress using two alternative proxies based on EDF and S&P ratings changes.  
Industry EDF is the average EDF value across all BHCs for which EDFs can be computed, and 
Industry Ratings Change is the average change in S&P ratings across all BHCs with ratings.  As 
expected, these proxies for banking industry distress are highly correlated. 
The influence of a bank lending channel on debt funding outcomes should be most 
prevalent when banks are acutely distressed; that is, we expect 𝑏𝑙 to affect debt funding outcomes 
only during the crisis years.  Interacting 𝑏𝑙 with year dummies in 2008 and 2009 captures the 
impact of the crisis.  For firms that borrowed from a lead bank in a given year t, the coefficient on 
𝑏𝑙 for EDF Bracket or Ratings Downgrade, embodies the average effect of lead-bank distress on 
debt funding outcomes across all the years; the coefficient on the interaction 𝑏𝑙  𝑥 2008(2009) 
embodies the marginal effect of the lead bank’s distress only in 2008 (2009).  F-statistics on the 
sum of the lead bank average and marginal coefficients in a given year, 𝑏𝑙  + 𝑏𝑙  𝑥 2008(2009), are 
used to test whether the total effects of lead bank distress are statistically significant in that year.   
The multinomial logit regression results are reported in Table 7.  Firms that migrate from 
bank debt at t to bank debt only at t+1 serve as the reference funding outcome.  The first three 
columns report results from Model (1), which uses EDF as the proxy for banking industry and lead 
bank distress.  In column (1), the limited dependent value equals 1 if a borrower migrated from 
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bank debt in t to no debt in t+1, and 0 if the borrower continued to borrow bank debt in t+1.  Firm 
attribute variables indicate that firms more likely to migrate to no debt in t+1 have lower ROA, 
fewer fixed assets, less financial debt, no recent history of securing a revolving loan from a bank, 
no credit rating, and higher cash holdings – a result consistent with Kahle and Stulz (2013) who 
suggest firms relied heavily on internal financing during the crisis.  Banking industry conditions 
matter as well.  Higher banking industry EDF increases the likelihood that a firm migrates from 
bank debt at t to no debt at t+1. 
 [Insert Table 7 here.] 
The key result in column (1) is that firms who borrowed in 2007 from lead banks that 
became distressed in 2008 were even more likely not to secure debt during that year.  The 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.048 is direct evidence that a bank lending channel 
contributed to the credit crunch in 2008.  This result complements evidence from Santos (2011) 
and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011).  Santos (2011) shows that banks with higher 
chargeoffs created smaller loan contracts during this period.  Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez 
(2011) analyze a sample of banks from 15 countries (including the United States) and show that 
during the crisis banks with higher expected default frequencies had lower growth rates of balance 
sheet loans. 
Interestingly, the positive but statistically insignificant coefficient on EDF Bracket x 2009 
suggests that the bank credit crunch was short-lived, perhaps because of the extensive government 
stabilization policy interventions begun in October 2008. 
Column (2) considers the migration of firms from bank debt at t to public debt at t+1.  
Firms more likely to migrate to public debt at t+1 have higher ROA, more assets, higher asset 
tangibility, lower financial leverage, recent experience tapping the public debt market, and an 
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investment grade credit rating.  The banking industry EDF coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, reflecting an increased likelihood that firms migrate from bank debt to public debt.  
EDF Bracket average and marginal coefficients in 2008 are positive though statistically 
insignificant; however, the sum of the average and marginal coefficients, which captures the total 
effect of lead bank distress in 2008, is statistically significant.  Lead bank distress contributed to 
the migration of firms to public debt in 2008. 
The results in column (3), which reflect the migration of firms from bank debt at t to 
securing both bank and public debt at t+1, are similar to those in column (2).  Banking system 
distress is positively related to the likelihood that firms obtain a diversified package of bank and 
public debt funding.  Lead bank distress also makes a diversified debt funding outcome more likely 
on average; the marginal effects in 2008 and 2009 are negative but statistically insignificant. 
The results of Model 2, which use changes in the S&P credit ratings changes as proxies 
for banking industry and lead bank distress, are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 7.  Results are 
generally consistent with those reported under Model 1 in terms of signs, coefficient estimates, 
and statistical significance.  Banking industry ratings changes remain a significant determinant of 
the likelihood that firms migrate from bank debt at t to no debt as well as to both bank and public 
debt.  As with Model 1, the Ratings Downgrade x 2008 coefficient in column 4 is positive and 
statistically significant.  Firms with relationships to more distressed lead banks are less likely to 
be successful in securing any debt funding.  Ratings Downgrade x 2009 is positive but statistically 
insignificant; and the average and marginal coefficients sum for this year is also insignificant.  
Interestingly, in column 5, banking industry ratings changes only trigger a statistically insignificant 
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migration to public debt.16   
b. Liquidity Hoarding 
As shown in Table 6, liquidity growth and loan creation are unrelated in the pre-crisis 
period, but negatively and significantly related in the crisis and post-crisis periods.  The results 
substantiate our thesis that in normal times, liquidity does not impinge upon the willingness of 
banks to undertake the credit risks associated with loan creation.  Rather, additions of liquid assets 
complement and support asset growth associated with lending.  But in times of crisis, a heightened 
threat of insolvency incites banks to contract credit and expand liquidity.  High liquidity growth, 
we will show, diminishes the likelihood that firms receive bank credit.    
Recognizing that a bank’s normal liquidity growth is driven by asset growth that is both 
bank-specific and industry-wide, we identify abnormal liquidity growth as the idiosyncratic 
deviation from the average cross-sectional liquidity growth controlling for asset growth.  We refer 
to this abnormal liquidity growth as liquidity hoarding.  As in Table 6, liquidity is defined as cash 
and balances due from depository institutions plus securities, Federal Funds sold, and securities 
purchased under agreements to resell.  Further, to account for possible seasonal effects in bank 
liquidity needs, we compute liquidity growth as the quarterly year-over-year percent change; asset 
                                                 
16 Two comments apply here.  First, this coefficient is significant at 10% using a one-tailed test 
under the null hypothesis, which is better aligned with our conjecture, that “banking industry 
distress does not increase (as opposed to does not affect) the probability of migration”.  Second, 
from the average transition matrices in Panel C of Table 2, we know this outcome in the 
multinomial regression is particularly challenged by sample size.  A larger sample size will likely 
reduce standard errors and strengthen the results of tests on coefficient significance.  
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growth is computed similarly.  
Using data from FR Y-9C reports of bank holding companies, each quarter between 2004 
and 2011 we estimate a cross-sectional regression of the form:  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 = ∝ +𝛽𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (3) 
?̂?𝑖 = ∝̂+ ?̂?𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 characterizes the quarterly predicted liquidity growth for bank i after 
controlling for the cross-sectional marginal effect of asset growth on liquidity growth and a 
constant term.  Our proxy for bank i’s liquidity hoarding is 𝜀𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖, which 
is the cross-sectional mean-zero idiosyncratic component of liquidity growth.17 
The multinomial logit regression Models 3 and 4 reported in Table 7 test the hypothesis 
that changes in the liquidity holdings of lead banks contributed to a credit contraction during the 
crisis.  Model 3 uses EDF as the control for banking industry distress; Model 4 uses S&P ratings 
changes instead.  The change in lead bank liquidity variable is the annual average of quarterly 
values.  Like Models 1 and 2, we include an average effect and marginal effects for 2008 and 2009. 
In Columns 1 and 4 of Models 3 and 4, the respective coefficients -0.164 and -0.174 
associated with changes in lead bank liquidity, indicate that in normal times high liquidity growth 
accommodates the ability of banks to expand credit and reduces the likelihood that firms will not 
be able to secure debt funding.  In 2008, the respective marginal lead bank liquidity-year 
coefficients are 2.114 and 2.792.  The respective coefficient sums of1.950 and 2.618, which 
                                                 
17 We also consider an alternative proxy for liquidity hoarding as the regression residual in (3) 
where the covariate is the growth rate in total assets net of liquid assets since liquid assets constitute 
a part of total assets.  Results are qualitatively the same as the ones reported here. 
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capture the total effect of liquidity growth, are significantly different from 0 at the 5% and 1% 
levels.  In crisis times, there is a higher likelihood that firms do not secure debt funding, consistent 
with our thesis that heightened insolvency risk constrains loan creation.  Similarly, taking the 
average and marginal effects in 2009 together, higher lead bank liquidity prods firms to obtain 
public debt, but not a diversified portfolio of bank and public debt. 
Taken together, Table 7 shows that the financial health of the banking system and 
idiosyncratic distress of banks in 2008 contributed to the severity of the corporate credit 
contraction during the crisis.18 
c. Bank Distress and Liquidity Hoarding 
                                                 
18 We point out that the possibility of survival bias from the disappearance of lead banks through 
our sample period is small.  The survival bias is small because we track firms, not banks, over each 
two-year period.  All that is required for an observation to be part of our tests is at least one data 
point from the disappearing bank during t+1.  When the bank does not exist at all in t+1, the 
observation is excluded from the regression.  Moreover, the survival bias, to the extent it exists, 
goes against finding evidence of a bank lending channel.  A missing lead bank observation implies 
a higher ex-ante probability that the associated firm will not obtain a bank loan at t+1 precisely 
because the banking relationship is disrupted, biasing our results against finding statistically 
significant migration from bank debt towards other debt outcomes.  Additionally, we require each 
firm to be in the universe of public firms from t-1 through t+1 to avoid misclassifying a firm 
disappearing at t+1 as a rationed out firm.  Again, this is a conservative approach which potentially 
works against finding evidence of the bank lending channel; e.g. when a firm chooses to go private 
and as a result is rationed out. 
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Table 6 shows that the relation between bank insolvency risk and subsequent liquidity 
growth becomes positive and significant during the financial crisis, coinciding with a significant 
reduction in loan creation.  Because liquidity lessens the potential for a bank run on a distressed 
bank, we expect more distressed banks to hoard more liquidity during a crisis.  We use our measure 
of liquidity hoarding to test this hypothesis.  For every quarter t in our sample, we estimated the 
following cross-sectional regression:  
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 =  γ + 𝜙𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡  (4) 
Where γ is a constant term,  𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖,𝑡−3 is the three-month lagged expected default frequency bracket 
of bank i, and 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 is the error term.  𝜙 is the cross-sectional marginal effect of bank distress on 
subsequent liquidity hoarding, our parameter of interest.  Figure 2 presents the estimates of 𝜙 and 
the 95% confidence intervals through time and shows that bank distress induces liquidity hoarding 
during the crisis. 
E. EFFECT OF LOAN CONTRACTION ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT 
In this section, we examine the effect of a contraction in bank credit supply on firm 
investment.  If some portion of the impact on the real economy from the crisis is through the bank 
lending channel, then bank-dependent borrowers will decrease investment when banks curtail 
lending because financing through public bond issues is not an option.  In time, reduced investment 
intensifies downward pressures on economic growth. 
The impact on corporate investment of bank credit contraction during the crisis should be 
most evident for firms that initially borrowed from a bank and were subsequently unsuccessful in 
securing any debt financing.  We define corporate investment as capital expenditures to total 
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assets.19  Summary statistics on corporate investment of firms that obtained bank debt at t and did 
not borrow during t+1, classified by year and the financial fragility of its lead banks, is presented 
in Table 8.  We expect investment rates to be lower during the crisis years for firms with 
relationships with distressed lenders because it is more likely they were denied credit despite 
having otherwise similarly acceptable investment opportunities.  For this table only, we classified 
lead banks as distressed if their S&P long term domestic issuer credit rating was downgraded more 
than the median downgrade for BHCs during the financial crisis.  The key rows in Table 8 are 
t+1=2008 and t+1=2009.   
 [Insert Table 8 here.] 
As expected, capital investment was lower for firms that borrowed from distressed lead 
banks.  In 2008, investment was 70 basis points lower than for firms that borrowed from banks 
that were not distressed, but the difference is not statistically significant.  In 2009, the gap widened 
to 90 basis points, and the difference is significant at the 11% level.  A complete reversal in 2010 
suggests the impact of credit contraction on investment was short-lived. 
Table 9 reports the results of least-squares regressions of capital expenditure to assets 
during t+1 on firm characteristics at t and proxies of lead bank distress or liquidity at t+1 for firms 
that borrowed bank debt in period t from a unique lead bank.20   The general model has the 
                                                 
19 In unreported results we define investment as the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total 
assets. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
20 Firms that borrowed both bank and public debt are in the regression sample as well, as long as 
they had a unique lead bank lender at t.  In unreported tests, we ran the regressions on the 
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following form: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝜑𝑭𝑖,𝑡 + μ𝑴𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑏𝑙,𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝒀𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1  (5) 
Where 𝛼 is a constant term, Fi,t is a vector of controls for firm i and for year t, Mi,t+1 is a vector 
representing whether the firm migrates to no debt, bank debt, public debt, or both bank and public 
debt during period t+1, bl,t+1 is a proxy of lead bank distress or liquidity during t+1, Y is a vector 
of year fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 is the error term.  The reference outcome is the set of firms that 
borrowed bank debt in period t and continued to borrow bank debt in t+1.  Year fixed effects 
control for unobserved macroeconomic conditions that affect firm investment.   
We present six model specifications.  Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 focus on the impact of lead 
bank distress on firm investment, and Models 3 and 6 focus on the impact of bank liquidity 
hoarding.  Models 1 and 4 use the lead bank’s EDF Bracket as the distress proxy, and Models 2 
and 5 use Ratings Downgrade.  Additionally, Models 1 and 2 include both the average effect of 
the bank’s distress on firm investment, and the marginal effect for years 2008 and 2009.  Models 
4 and 5 present only the average effects of bank distress over the entire sample period. 
 [Insert Table 9 here.] 
The results support the hypothesis that lead bank distress reduced firm investment.  The 
EDF Bracket x 2008 coefficient of 0.019 in Model 1 is insignificant, but the Ratings Downgrade 
x 2008 coefficient of -0.668 in Model 2 is statistically significant.  Further, the EDF Bracket x 
2009 coefficient of -0.123 in Model 1 and the Ratings Downgrade x 2009 coefficient of -1.273 in 
                                                 
subsample of firms that only borrowed bank debt during period t.  The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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Model 2 are both statistically significant at the 1% level. 
A firm’s debt funding outcome in year t+1 also affects investment across all the model 
specifications.21  Relative to firms that continue to borrow from banks in t+1, firms that do not 
borrow at all reduce investment by about 43 basis points.  There is no statistically significant 
change in investment for firms that migrate to public debt, but a statistically significant increase 
in investment of more than 1.5 percentage points for firms that migrated to a diversified funding 
package of bank and public debt.  These results highlight the importance of financial flexibility, 
which enabled firms to avoid many of the adverse consequences of a contraction in bank lending.  
Further, the large positive and statistically significant coefficient on cash balances suggests that 
the access of firms to internal funding provided strong support for investment. 
Models 4 and 5 exclude the marginal distress variables in 2008 and 2009.  The EDF 
Bracket coefficients in Models 1 and 4 are both close to zero and statistically insignificant; average 
effects are uncorrelated with marginal effects in crisis years.  Note however that the Ratings 
Downgrade coefficient -0.699 in Model 5 is nearly three times larger in magnitude than the 
equivalent coefficient of -0.242 in Model 2 and the difference is significant at the 1% level.  Bank 
                                                 
21 Our interpretation of the migration coefficients should be qualified.  Borrowing outcomes are 
introduced as explanatory variables in order to assess the impact of credit supply conditions on 
corporate investment.  There is, however, a potential endogeneity between the decisions of firms 
to invest/borrow and the quality of their investment opportunities.  For instance, all things equal, 
a firm with poorer investment opportunities will be more likely to both invest less, and as a 
consequence, choose a no debt outcome in t+1.  Although we do control for investment 
opportunities through a lagged Q, this proxy might not be sufficient to eliminate endogeneity. 
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distress had a distinctly significant adverse impact on firm investment. 
We approximate the effect of the bank lending channel on investment and GDP in 2009, 
recognizing of course, that any point estimate is subject to wide forecasting errors.  Kahle and 
Stultz’s (2013) observe that the significant decline in investment occurred in 2009 since many 
investment projects were well underway when the crisis peaked in September 2008.  Moreover, 
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) document that CFOs in credit constrained companies 
planned significant cuts in investment for 2009.  Our Table 9 result substantiates that lead bank 
distress had a statistically significant impact on investment in 2009.  Estimating Model 1 as a cross-
sectional regression for the year 2009 yields an EDF Bracket coefficient of -0.155, which implies 
that, all else equal, a firm’s investment rate declines by 15.5 basis points when its lead bank’s EDF 
percentile grouping moves one bracket higher.  EDF Bracket=0 represents a lead bank with no 
distress, and the estimated investment rate for firms borrowing from this group of banks is 6.59%.  
Moreover, because investment rates decline by an additional 15.5 basis points for each increase in 
EDF Bracket, the expected decline in the investment rate for a given bracket is simply EDF 
Bracket *(-15.5bp).  For each bracket, the anticipated decline in investment rate is multiplied by 
the percentage of sample firms with lead banks in that particular bracket.  Summing the values 
across the brackets yields -1.59% as the predicted reduction in the rate of investment in 2009 due 
to bank distress. 
For our sample of firms, a decrease of 1.59 percentage points in the ratio of capital 
expenditures to 1-year lagged assets denotes a reduction in investment of $27.2 billion in 2009, or 
a 25.6% decline from the amount of investment undertaken in 2008.  Table 2 shows that about 
50% of firms in our sample originate bank loans in a typical non-crisis year.  Hence the 25.6% 
decline in investment of half the firms translates to a reduction of 12.8% in 2009 nonresidential 
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fixed investment, representing about 82.1% of the decline in nonresidential fixed investment in 
2009.22  Further, since nonresidential fixed investment in 2008 accounted for 13% of GDP, an 
educated guess of the 2009 decline in GDP from the bank lending channel is 1.67%, or 59.6% of 
the 2.8% GDP contraction in 2009.23  
Despite the economically large point estimate of the bank lending channel, our estimate 
may be downward biased for two reasons.  First, the firms in our sample are large and publicly 
traded; small and medium sized businesses that are more dependent on bank credit surely 
experienced a larger decline in investment from a contraction in bank credit.  Second, our analysis 
focuses only on corporate credit.  Given the deterioration in household balance sheets from the 
housing crisis, many creditworthy households would have been denied credit by distressed banks 
as well, which would reduce consumption and residential investment. 
Finally, we analyze the impact of lead bank liquidity hoarding on firm investment.  Model 
3 of Table 9 includes both an average effect and marginal effects for 2008 and 2009; and Model 6 
includes only an average effect.  The average effect coefficients, 2.952 and 2.399 in Models 3 and 
6 respectively, are positive and statistically significant.  Higher bank liquidity accommodates 
higher loan creation that facilitate higher levels of investment by firms.  Model 3 shows that the 
                                                 
22 Federal Reserve Economic Data series PNFICA “Real Private Nonresidential Fixed 
Investment.” 
23 Federal Reserve Economic Data series PNFICA “Real Private Nonresidential Fixed 
Investment” and GDPCA “Real Gross Domestic Product.”  We considered several other scenarios 
as robustness checks, with consistent results.  Importantly, the point estimate from the Ratings 
Downgrade coefficient in the 2009 cross-sectional regression is 63% of the decline in GDP. 
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interacted bank liquidity hoarding measure for 2008 is close to zero and insignificant, while for 
2009 it is negative, large, and significant at 1% level.  Liquidity hoarding resulted in loan 
contraction and this contraction in bank credit reduced corporate investment in 2009.  The 
combined average and marginal effects, which are positive and significant, lend credence to the 
argument that significant infusions of liquidity helped to prevent a banking system failure that 
might have triggered another Great Depression. 
F. SUPPLY CURVE SHIFT OR CREDIT RATIONING? 
Credit rationing to enhance liquidity is a rational response for distressed banks that seek to 
reduce the risk of a run when there is little or no opportunity to raise capital at a reasonable cost 
and the requisite time needed to effect a reduction in its loan volume through higher interest rates 
is lacking.  Creditworthy firms who wish to borrow from banks at prevailing interest rates are 
denied loans.  In this section, we present evidence which shows that banks as a whole chose to 
reduce lending through volume adjustments rather than through higher rates of interest during the 
crisis.   
Anecdotal evidence abounds consistent with banks rationing credit.  News media 
surrounding the crisis suggests that many firms, encountering difficulties in obtaining bank loans, 
borrowed through public bond issues despite considerably higher rates in the public debt market 
than in the loans market. 
One firm that issued a five-year note at the height of the crisis was El Paso Corporation, a 
natural gas producer, which operates a large pipeline system.  On December 09, 2008, Ms. Dena 
Aubin of Reuters quoted Mr. Andy DeVries, an analyst at Credit Sights, as saying “El Paso is 
facing large funding needs, including about $US900 million of debt coming due next year.”  
Reporting on this deal, Mr. Bryan Keogh of Bloomberg quoted Mr. Jill Fields, a managing director 
44 
 
at Babson Capital Management LLC, as saying “More high-yield companies may come to the 
market in the coming months to refinance debt that will mature in 2009 because banks don’t have 
a lot of liquidity to offer.… Good companies will have access to the market, especially if yields 
are attractive.” 
 Altria Group Inc., a tobacco industry leader, entered into a syndicated bridge loan 
agreement on December 19, 2008 to partially finance the acquisition of UST Inc., a leader in the 
smokeless tobacco market.  The loan amount was $US4.3 billion with a maturity of 12 months, at 
LIBOR + 225 basis points or a yield of roughly 4.7%.  But a day earlier, on December 18, 2008, 
the firm issued $US775 million in notes maturing in 18 months and at a 7.125% yield, a cost 
considerably higher than on the syndicated loan.  If the firm had had unrestricted access to bank 
funding, it seems safe to assume securing the extra $US755 million at 4.7% from banks would 
have been preferable. 
If credit contraction is an equilibrium outcome, the quantity of loans demanded and 
supplied should be equal at the prevailing interest rate.  Yield spread stickiness, reflected in yield 
spread differences between bank loans and public bonds, concomitant with a surge in the ratio of 
drawdowns under existing commitment to all drawdowns, are indicative of credit rationing.  
Table 10 reports the results of yearly OLS regressions of yield spreads on bank loans and 
public debt.  The general equation we use for contract j of firm i in year t is as follows: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼 + η𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑪𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑭𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  (6) 
Where α is an intercept; 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the contract j of year 
t is a bank loan, and 0 if it is a bond issue; 𝑪𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑭𝑖,𝑡−1 are vectors of contract and (lagged) firm 
characteristics, respectively; εj,t is the error term.  Spread, in basis points, is the difference between 
contract yield and a reference risk-free rate determined by matching maturities to the Treasury 
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constant maturity rates.  For bonds, contract yield is the offered yield to maturity.  For fixed-rate 
bank loans, contract yield is the fixed rate; for floating-rate bank loans, yield is the sum of base 
rate, margin, and facility fees.24 
For every month in our sample we create a 360-data point term structure for Treasury 
constant maturity and LIBOR rates to obtain parsimonious estimates of the contract yield spread.  
The raw data series contain somewhere between 11 and 16 data points for maturities ranging 
between 1 and 30 years.  From these raw data points we construct term structures of monthly 
maturities using a natural growth rate function.  Specifically, from two contiguous raw interest 
rates it and iT, where t and T stand for maturities measured in months and 𝜏𝑇 = 𝑇 − 𝑡 ≥ 2, we 
calculate the natural growth rate between them as r = ln [(𝑖𝑇 𝑖𝑡⁄ )
1 𝜏𝑇⁄ ].  Next we use the natural 
growth rate to interpolate interest rates in the term structure for all maturities ranging from t+1 to 
T-1; i.e., 𝑖𝑘 = 𝑖𝑡 ∗ exp (𝑟 ∗ 𝜏𝑘) where 𝜏𝑘 = 𝑘 − 𝑡 ≥ 1 and 𝜏𝑘 < 𝜏𝑇.  For those few contracts whose 
maturity is longer than 30 years, we use 30-year interest rate estimates.25 
 [Insert Table 10 here.] 
The results in Table 10 show that the cost of debt is consistently lower for more profitable 
                                                 
24 The vast majority of syndicated bank loans employ LIBOR as the base rate and we restrict our 
analysis to these contracts.  We use the all-in spread drawn when available, which is the amount 
the borrower pays over LIBOR for each dollar drawn. 
25 This simplification should not produce any significant bias given that these contracts represent 
only 0.58% of the sample and the term structure is typically flat between maturities of 30 and 50 
years. 
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firms and higher for firms with higher financial leverage.  The coefficients on S&P ratings show 
that a one notch increase in the credit rating reduces the cost of debt by more than 20 basis points.  
Importantly, the coefficient on the bank loan indicator variable shows that the spreads between 
bank and public debt are not statistically different from each other in normal years.  During the 
crisis years, however, banks lent at substantially lower interest rates than bond investors.  For the 
years 2008 and 2009, yield spreads on bank loans were 137 and 68 basis points lower, respectively, 
consistent with interest rate stickiness, a stylized feature associated with bank credit rationing. 
Loan commitment drawdowns also suggest that credit rationing played a role during the 
crisis.  As Berger and Udell (1992) note, when banks ration credit, the pace at which firms will 
draw on existing loan commitments will exceed the pace of new loan originations.  Consequently, 
the proportion of drawdowns under existing commitments to all drawdowns will rise.  
Furthermore, the increased proportion of drawdowns under existing commitments will coincide 
with higher open market interest rates. 
Using data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Survey of Terms of Business 
Lending, we plot in Figure 3 for 2006 through 2010, the quarterly loan commitment drawdown 
ratio, which is all commercial and industrial (C&I) loans originated by domestic banks under 
commitment where the loan terms and pricing were set more than 365 days in the past, divided by 
all C&I loans originated by domestic banks.  The ratio hit a trough in November 2006 and trended 
upward through February 2010, consistent with credit rationing.  As banks became reluctant to 
book new credits, firms took advantage of existing lines to meet liquidity needs.  The increase in 
the loan commitment drawdown ratio effectively coincided with rising rates on bond issues, as 
illustrated by the Moody’s Baa spread over Treasuries.  From Table 10, we know the average yield 
spread on bank loans rose by a smaller magnitude than on public bonds in crisis years.  Firms 
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without existing commitments were forced to go to the more expensive public bond issue market 
for financing, or be left out without credit.  The evidence strongly suggests that banks did not use 
increases in the interest rates to clear the loan market during the crisis years of 2008 and 2009. 
 [Insert Figure 3 here.] 
We established that yield spreads on bank and public debt increased during the crisis, but 
the rise in yield spreads on public debt were significantly greater.  We also expect to observe loan 
pricing heterogeneity across banks.  If higher liquidity is a safeguard against a heightened 
insolvency risk during the crisis, relatively higher needs for liquidity at distressed banks should 
lead them to increase yield spreads more than healthier banks.  Santos (2011) documents that banks 
with higher chargeoffs during the financial crisis lent at higher spreads.   
[Insert Table 11 here.] 
Controlling for contract and borrower attributes, Table 11 reports the results of regressions 
of syndicated loan yield spreads on lead bank distress three months prior to loan origination as 
well as lead bank liquidity hoarding in the same quarter the loan is originated.  Columns (1) and 
(2) show that EDF has no statistically significant effect on yield spreads pre-crisis, but during the 
crisis, banks with higher EDFs charged higher yield spreads.  Columns (3) and (4) show similar 
results for Ratings Change.  Recall that positive (negative) changes in lead bank’s S&P domestic 
long-term issuer credit rating fifteen and three months prior to the syndicated loan origination are 
associated with downgrades (upgrades).  Banks with more severe ratings downgrades charged 
higher yield spreads.  Specifically, a one-notch downgrade resulted in 32 basis point higher yield 
spreads.  Finally, the positive and significant coefficients on lead bank liquidity hoarding in 
Columns (5) and (6) indicate that higher abnormal growth in lead bank liquidity resulted in higher 
costs of credit to borrowers.  Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients show that yield 
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spreads are 3.5 times more sensitive to changes in lead bank liquidity during the crisis than pre-
crisis periods. 
G. CONCLUSION 
We examine the empirical significance of the bank lending channel on corporate credit and 
investment during the financial crisis that peaked in late 2008 and early 2009.  We show that banks 
reduced their supply of credit in the crisis years to conserve liquidity.  Many publicly traded firms 
with credit ratings were able to migrate to the public debt market, but many other firms were left 
without access to credit.  Moreover, firms with lead banks that became distressed relative to other 
banks were even more likely to migrate or to lose access to credit altogether, direct evidence of 
the adverse consequences of bank credit contraction.  Furthermore, firms that were shut out of 
credit markets experienced the largest reduction in investment, which contributed to the severity 
of the Great Recession, especially in 2009.  The result was an economy that in 2014 is still healing 
from the crisis induced downturn in 2008.  
Clearly the bank lending channel remains important in crisis because loans and bonds are 
not perfect substitutes.  The ability of many publicly traded firms to promptly disintermediate and 
issue their own debt, however, provided important financial flexibility that allowed firms to 
withstand financial shocks to the banking sector.  This flexibility makes the U.S. economy less 
dependent on bank financing than during the Great Depression, which all things equal, reduces the 
systemic risk that banking crises have on the U.S. economy. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Loan and Bond Contracts 
Loans and bonds correspond to syndicated bank debt and public debt issues, respectively, by 
publicly traded non-financial firms.  Data on syndicated bank debt, which span the period 2004 to 
2011, were obtained from DealScan and on public debt issues from Thomson Reuters Securities 
Data Commission (SDC) Global New Issues.  †, ††, ††† denote annual averages by number of 
contracts, volume, and number of firms, respectively. 
 Panel A  
  Pre-Crisis Transition 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
  Total % Total % Total % Total % 
Contract Type†           
Loan 2,787 91% 2,613 92% 2,340 89% 2,307 86% 
Bond 291 9% 236 8% 287 11% 363 14% 
Total 3,078  2,849  2,627   2,670   
Credit Volume††($B)           
Loans 826 92% 940 93% 1,023 87% 1,203 86% 
Bonds 75 8% 74 7% 149 13% 194 14% 
Total 901  1,015  1,172   1,397   
Firm Debt Choice†††           
Loans Only 1,543 92% 1,393 91% 1,288 89% 1,167 86% 
Bonds Only 46 3% 47 3% 71 5% 80 6% 
Loans and Bonds 90 5% 85 6% 95 7% 108 8% 
Total 1,679   1,525   1,454   1,355   
Maturity (Months) Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds 
Mean 51 134 56 180 57 164 60 174 
Standard deviation 22 110 19 126 20 128 20 127 
25% percentile 36 60 48 84 48 60 59 84 
Median 60 120 60 120 60 120 60 120 
75% percentile 60 144 60 360 62 355 72 360 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Loan and Bond Contracts (Cont.) 
 Panel A (Cont.)  
  Crisis Post-Crisis 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 
  Total % Total % Total % Total % 
Contract Type†           
Loan 1,115 75% 836 63% 1,307 75% 1,891 80% 
Bond 366 25% 485 37% 439 25% 486 20% 
Total 1,481  1,321   1,746  2,377  
Credit Volume††($B)    
       
Loans 482 69% 341 54% 609 72% 1,115 80% 
Bonds 216 31% 287 46% 240 28% 276 20% 
Total 698  627   850  1,392  
Firm Debt Choice†††    
       
Loans Only 690 78% 518 65% 757 74% 1,069 82% 
Bonds Only 129 15% 199 25% 160 16% 70 5% 
Loans and Bonds 62 7% 78 10% 107 10% 165 13% 
Total 881   795   1,024   1,304   
Maturity (Months) Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds 
Mean 46 139 37 129 48 150 57 139 
Standard deviation 22 113 19 98 18 112 15 114 
25% percentile 33 60 24 61 36 72 55 60 
Median 48 120 36 120 48 120 60 120 
75% percentile 60 121 48 121 60 124 60 121 
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Table 1 (Continued):  Summary Statistics on Loan and Bond Contracts 
Panel B 
 Pre-Crisis Transition 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Credit Rating†  Total % 
Loan 
Total % 
Loan 
Total % 
Loan 
Total % 
Loan AA- ~ AAA 71 41% 58 71% 54 54% 56 59% 
A- ~ A+ 282 67% 241 65% 214 58% 243 47% 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 424 78% 426 75% 413 69% 386 61% 
BB- ~ BB+ 424 91% 448 95% 384 92% 357 89% 
B- ~ B+ 428 99% 410 100% 412 98% 506 97% 
CCC- ~ CCC+ 31 100% 32 100% 29 100% 25 100% 
D ~ CC 6 100% 2 100%        
Total 1,666   1,617   1,506   1,573   
Spread (basis 
points) 
Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds 
AA- ~ AAA 51 59 94 74 94 77 97 102 
A- ~ A+ 82 75 95 78 89 93 94 130 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 126 107 122 114 115 135 133 149 
BB- ~ BB+ 245 228 211 189 214 254 222 259 
B- ~ B+ 341 451 317 543 323 338 324 352 
CCC- ~ CCC+ 538  447  407   343   
D ~ CC 421   796           
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Table 1 (Continued):  Summary Statistics on Loan and Bond Contracts 
Panel B (Cont.) 
 Crisis Post-Crisis 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Credit Rating†  Total % 
Loan 
Total % 
Loan 
Total % 
Loan 
Total % 
Loan AA- ~ AAA 44 43% 71 35% 57 42% 51 47% 
A- ~ A+ 206 24% 177 19% 184 38% 333 43% 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 264 44% 318 30% 342 44% 516 60% 
BB- ~ BB+ 154 88% 142 70% 233 76% 313 88% 
B- ~ B+ 111 97% 148 83% 245 88% 314 94% 
CCC- ~ CCC+ 5 100% 20 100% 16 100% 6 100% 
D ~ CC 2 100% 4 100%    6 100% 
Total 786   880   1,077   1,539   
Spread (basis 
points) 
Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds Loans Bonds 
AA- ~ AAA 134 206 271 207 180 62 133 51 
A- ~ A+ 161 265 234 226 214 87 142 112 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 216 320 337 369 260 184 185 180 
BB- ~ BB+ 340 444 407 614 309 403 258 380 
B- ~ B+ 432 931 496 693 449 531 367 521 
CCC- ~ CCC+ 734  733   501  384  
D ~ CC 378   875       819   
56 
 
Table 2:  Transition Matrices of Debt Funding Outcomes 
Panel A reports the steady state distributions of syndicated bank and public debt issues imputed 
from transition matrices computed for each of six overlapping two-year periods between 2004 and 
2010.  Loans are syndicated bank debt issues and bonds are public debt issues.  In each year, we 
classify firms into one of four groups based on whether the firm obtained: (i) no debt; (ii) bank 
debt only; (iii) public debt only; or (iv) both bank and public debt.  The proportions of firms in 
each group at the beginning and end of each two-year period characterize an initial and a final state 
vector and a Markov transition matrix describes the passage of firms to state i in period t+1 from 
state j in period t.  The steady state distributions are the long-run equilibriums implied by each set 
of two-year market dynamics.  Panel B report the conditional probabilities of obtaining bank 
(public) debt conditional on securing public (bank) debt previously.  Panel C shows the average 
transition matrices for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.  * denotes a value that is 
significantly different from the average transition matrices between 1989 and 2011 at 10% or 
better. 
Panel A: Steady State Dynamics of Aggregate Debt Financing 
  
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
No Debt 0.420 0.438 0.457 0.578 * 0.554 0.464    0.373 * 
Loans Only 0.524 0.482 0.449 0.325    0.246 * 0.380 0.495 
Bonds Only 0.021 0.034 0.042 0.069    0.150 * 0.089 0.037 
Loans and Bonds 0.036 0.045 0.053 0.028 0.050 0.068    0.095 * 
Panel B: Conditional Probabilities of Funding Choice 
  
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
Prob.(Bonds | Loans) 0.064 0.086 0.106 0.080 0.169 0.152 0.160 
Prob.(Loans | Bonds) 0.636 0.570 0.561 0.288 0.249 0.434 0.718 
 
  
57 
 
Table 2:  Transition Matrices of Debt Funding Outcomes (Cont.) 
Panel C: Average Transition Matrices 
Final State 
Initial State 
No Debt Loans Only Bonds Only Loans and Bonds 
Pre-Crisis Average Transition Matrix (2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006-2007) 
No Debt 0.353 0.542 0.344 0.231 
Loans only 0.607 0.403 0.233 0.327 
Bonds only 0.019 0.019 0.267 0.138 
Loans and Bonds 0.021 0.036 0.156 0.305 
Crisis Average Transition Matrix (2007-2008, 2008-2009) 
No Debt 0.525 0.747 0.414 0.321 
Loans only 0.380 0.194 0.073 0.139 
Bonds only 0.070 0.031 0.430 0.312 
Loans and Bonds 0.025 0.027 0.083 0.227 
Post-Crisis Average Transition Matrix (2009-2010, 2010-2011) 
No Debt 0.274 0.609 0.305 0.213 
Loans only 0.614 0.322 0.263 0.314 
Bonds only 0.059 0.017 0.214 0.175 
Loans and Bonds 0.052 0.052 0.218 0.298 
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Table 3:  Attributes of Corporate Borrowers 
Table reports average values on key attributes of the publicly traded firms in our sample.  The 
values are categorized by whether the firm obtained bank or public debt during the year.  Q is the 
ratio of Market Value of Assets to Total Assets.  Return on Assets (ROA) is the ratio of Net Income 
to Total Assets.  Total Assets are expressed in billion dollars.  MVA is the Market Value of Assets 
= Total Assets + Outstanding Common Shares at Fiscal Year Closing Share Price - Book Value of 
Equity - Deferred Taxes.  Fixed Assets are Net Property, Plant and Equipment.  Financial Debt is 
the sum of Debt in Current Liabilities and Long Term Debt.  Cash are Cash and Short-term 
investments.  Firm S&P Rating is the annual average of the monthly S&P domestic long term 
issuer credit ratings.  Age is the difference between a given year and the year in which the firm 
first appears in the Compustat Fundamentals Annual data set.  ***, **, * denote p-values equal to 
or less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for comparisons across contract types in the same 
period.  †††, ††, † denote p-values equal to or less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for 
comparisons between a given year and the 2006 pre-crisis year. 
  
 2004 2005 
 Loan Bond Loan Bond 
Q 1.89 ** 1.63 1.76 * 1.60 
ROA 0.02 *** 0.05 0.03 *** 0.05 
Total Assets ($B) 6.33 *** 17.17 8.45 ** 13.55 † 
MVA ($B) 9.92 *** 32.64 12.50 ** 22.50 † 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.33 *** 0.50 0.33 *** 0.47 
Cash/Total Assets 0.09 *** 0.05 0.08 *** 0.04 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 0.33 0.35       0.32 0.31 
Firm S&P Rating 12.17 *** 14.73 12.15 *** 15.05 †† 
Age 22.60 *** 36.97 23.18 *** 39.37 
 2006 2007 
 Loan Bond Loan Bond 
Q 1.83 *** 1.63 1.83 *** 1.63 
ROA 0.03 *** 0.05 0.03 *** 0.05 
Total Assets ($B) 8.28 *** 19.59 8.28 *** 19.59 
MVA ($B) 12.42 *** 31.66 12.42 *** 31.66 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.33 *** 0.46 0.33 *** 0.46 
Cash/Total Assets 0.09 *** 0.04 0.09 *** 0.04 
Financial Debt/Total Assets       0.33 0.33       0.33 0.33 
Firm S&P Rating 12.02 *** 14.46 12.02 *** 14.46 
Age 23.51 *** 37.24 23.51 *** 37.24 
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Table 3:  Attributes of Corporate Borrowers (Cont.) 
 
 2008 2009 
 Loan Bond Loan Bond 
Q 1.38      †††      1.46 †† 1.38      †††      1.46 †† 
ROA -0.09 *** ††   0.05 -0.09 *** ††   0.05 
Total Assets ($B) 7.13 ***   22.09 7.13 ***   22.09 
MVA ($B) 8.45 *** † 38.22 8.45 *** † 38.22 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.34 *** 0.49 0.34 *** 0.49 
Cash/Total Assets 0.10 *** † 0.05 0.10 *** † 0.05 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 0.30 * † 0.33 0.30 * † 0.33 
Firm S&P Rating 12.31 *** 15.10 †† 12.31 *** 15.10 †† 
Age 23.34 *** 41.87 †† 23.34 *** 41.87 †† 
 2010 2011 
 Loan Bond Loan Bond 
Q    1.54 ** ††† 1.67 1.58 ††† 1.65 
ROA 0.03 *** 0.06 0.04 *** 0.06 
Total Assets ($B) 9.39 *** 18.67 9.78 *** 22.99 
MVA ($B) 13.37 *** 31.19 13.07 *** 39.97 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.35 *** † 0.42 0.35 *** †† 0.43 
Cash/Total Assets     0.10 †     0.09 ††† 0.09    0.08 ††† 
Financial Debt/Total Assets    0.31 0.33 0.31 0.32 
Firm S&P Rating 11.77 ***   13.84 †† 12.17 *** 14.49 
Age 26.56 *** ††† 36.90 28.46 *** ††† 38.64 
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Table 4:  Predicting Debt Contract Type 
Contract type is a limited dependent variable which takes a value of 1 if Bank Debt, and 0, if Public 
Debt.  Bank debt are syndicated bank loans and public debt are non-convertible debt issues 
purchased by non-financial institutions and general investing public.  The sample combines 
syndicated bank loans and public debt issues reported monthly on the DealScan and Thomson 
Reuters Securities Data Commission (SDC) Platinum databases respectively over the period 2004-
2006 where the borrowing firms can be identified and financial statement data are available.  
Amount is the size of the debt issue in billions of dollars.  Maturity is the contract length at issue 
in months.  All firm characteristics are lagged one period.  Q is the ratio of Market Value of Assets 
(MVA) to Total Assets where MVA = Total Assets + Outstanding Common Shares at Fiscal Year 
Closing Share Price - Book Value of Equity - Deferred Taxes.  ROA is the ratio of Net Income to 
Total Assets.  Fixed Assets are Net Property, Plant and Equipment.  Total Assets are in billions of 
dollars.  Financial Debt is the sum of Debt in Current Liabilities and Long Term Debt.  Cash are 
Cash and Short-Term Investments.  Bank-Funded and Public-Funded Last 5 Years are dummy 
variables that take on a value of 1 if the firm obtained bank debt and public debt respectively in 
the past 5 years and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, Revolver Line Last 5 Years is a dummy variable that 
takes on value 1 if the firm obtained a revolver syndicated loan during the last 2 years and 0 
otherwise.  Firm S&P Rating is an integer between 1 and 22 where 1 corresponds to a D and 22 
to an AAA domestic long term issuer credit rating respectively by S&P.   ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Base Model 
Limited Dependent Variable: Bank Debt = 1 / Public Debt = 0 
 2004-2006 2007 2008 
Constant 
 
9.749 *** 9.781 *** 12.073 *** 
Amount 1.403 *** 0.990 *** 2.567 *** 
Maturity -0.064 *** -0.057 *** -0.081 *** 
Q 0.161 0.332 * 0.362 
ROA -1.815 -4.316 ** -15.278 *** 
Total Assets 0.003 *** 0.001 -0.055 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.078 -0.838 0.588 
Cash/Total Assets 2.815 ** -1.285 2.384 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 0.522 1.522 * -1.949 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years 1.952 *** 1.327 ** 1.426 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.742 *** -0.465 * -1.298 *** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years -0.337 -0.463 -0.747 
Firm S&P Rating -0.418 *** -0.432 *** -0.467 *** 
Observations 3,136 1,035 560 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.56 0.56 0.71 
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Table 4:  Predicting Debt Contract Type (Cont.) 
Panel A: Base Model (Cont.) 
Limited Dependent Variable: Bank Debt = 1 / Public Debt = 0 
 2009 2010 2011 
Constant 
 
11.722 *** 14.355 *** 9.707 *** 
Amount 0.676 ** 1.639 *** 1.837 *** 
Maturity -0.117 *** -0.112 *** -0.063 *** 
Q -0.426 -1.291 *** -0.062 
ROA -1.995 2.503 * -7.590 *** 
Total Assets 0.004 ** -0.001  -0.008 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 1.119 -1.014 0.593 
Cash/Total Assets 4.477 -1.584 0.676 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 1.313 0.948 1.006 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years 3.205 *** 1.965 *** 2.003 *** 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.854 ** -1.959 *** -1.958 *** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years -0.921 ** 0.355 -0.166 
Firm S&P Rating -0.640 *** -0.505 *** -0.437 *** 
Observations 674 775 1,118 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.74 0.70 0.59 
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Table 4 (Continued):  Predicting Debt Contract Type 
Panel B are logistic regressions of contract type on firm attributes and contract characteristics 
taking the supply of bank loans into account.  SLOOS C&I tightening standards, reported quarterly 
in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, reflect lender tightening trends on 
commercial and industrial loans.  All other data are annual.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel B: Full Model 
Limited Dependent Variable: Bank Debt = 1 / Public Debt = 0 
 2004-2006 2007 2008 
Constant      9.523 ***     9.846 ***  15.543 *** 
Amount      1.419 ***     0.993 ***    2.786 *** 
Maturity      -0.064 ***      -0.057 ***     -0.090 *** 
Q 0.162   0.305 * 0.396 
ROA -1.658    -4.240 **   -17.131 *** 
Total Assets      0.003 *** 0.001 -0.059 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.046 -0.793 0.779 
Cash/Total Assets      2.908 **    -1.234 2.928 
Financial Debt/Total Assets  0.470 1.515 **   -2.603 ** 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years   1.936 ***    1.329 ** 0.793 
Public Funded Last 5 Years     -0.751 ***  -0.460 * -1.172 ** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years     -0.299    -0.484 -0.794 * 
Firm S&P Rating     -0.421 ***    -0.438 ***   -0.513 *** 
SLOOS C&I Tightening Standards    -0.014 0.014   -0.030 *** 
Observations 
 
3,136 1,035 560 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.56 0.56 0.72 
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Table 4 (Continued):  Predicting Debt Contract Type 
Panel B: Full Model (Cont.) 
Limited Dependent Variable: Bank Debt = 1 / Public Debt = 0 
 2009 2010 2011 
Constant  11.963 ***  13.730 ***   9.719 *** 
Amount 0.663 ** 1.654 *** 1.837 *** 
Maturity   -0.116 ***      -0.112 ***  -0.063 *** 
Q  -0.425  -1.283 *** -0.062 
ROA    -2.098 2.396 *  -7.587 *** 
Total Assets  0.004 ** -0.001   -0.008 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets    1.152 -1.069 0.592 
Cash/Total Assets    4.441 -1.803 0.672 
Financial Debt/Total Assets  1.142 1.010  1.006 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years     3.078 ***     1.918 ***      2.003 *** 
Public Funded Last 5 Years   -0.832 **      -1.969 ***     -1.957 *** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years    -0.895 **  0.344 -0.166 
Firm S&P Rating     -0.634 ***   -0.513 ***  -0.437 *** 
SLOOS C&I Tightening Standards -0.006 -0.096 0.001 
Observations 
 
674 775 1,118 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.74 0.71 0.59 
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Table 5:  Excess Probability 
Excess probabilities, expressed in percentages, examine whether firms which successfully 
obtained bank (public) debt in the crisis year will be more or less successful in obtaining bank 
(public) debt in the pre-crisis period.  The Base Model only accounts for contract characteristics 
and firm attributes; the Full Model takes the tightening of bank credit conditions into consideration 
as well.  Specifically, we estimate logistic regressions where contract type is the limited dependent 
variable.  A Base (Full) Model is estimated over the pre-crisis period 2004-2006, and similarly, in 
each year between 2004 and 2011.  The results are reported in Table 4.  We use the estimated Base 
(Full) Model associated with the pre-crisis period 2004-2006 and the crisis year to compute the 
likelihoods that firms which borrowed in the crisis year were also likely to receive bank (public) 
debt in the pre-crisis year. 
 Contract Type = Bank Debt 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-statistic p-value 
Number of 
Observations 
Base Model      
2004 0.01 0.05 9.29 0.00 931 
2005 0.01 0.05 7.41 0.00 912 
2006 -0.03 0.05 -15.93 0.00 829 
2007 -0.02 0.05 -12.94 0.00 786 
2008 -0.08 0.14 -9.34 0.00 317 
2009 -0.10 0.15 -11.73 0.00 316 
2010 -0.07 0.13 -12.39 0.00 457 
2011 -0.07 0.12 -15.28 0.00 764 
Full Model      
2004 0.01 0.05 7.46 0.00 931 
2005 0.01 0.06 5.83 0.00 912 
2006 -0.02 0.05 -11.75 0.00 829 
2007 -0.01 0.06 -4.59 0.00 786 
2008 -0.04 0.11 -5.61 0.00 317 
2009 -0.09 0.14 -11.42 0.00 316 
2010 -0.07 0.12 -11.99 0.00 457 
2011 -0.07 0.12 -15.08 0.00 764 
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Table 5:  Excess Probability (Cont.) 
 Contract Type = Public Debt 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-statistic p-value 
Number of 
Observations 
Base Model      
2004 0.04 0.08 5.44 0.00 136 
2005 0.02 0.10 2.42 0.02 146 
2006 0.02 0.07 2.96 0.00 186 
2007 0.03 0.07 6.46 0.00 249 
2008 0.28 0.28 15.76 0.00 245 
2009 0.36 0.30 22.71 0.00 359 
2010 0.28 0.25 19.91 0.00 318 
2011 0.19 0.19 18.81 0.00 354 
Full Model      
2004 0.04 0.08 6.13 0.00 136 
2005 0.03 0.11 2.99 0.00 146 
2006 0.01 0.07 1.36 0.17 186 
2007 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.32 249 
2008 0.19 0.24 12.60 0.00 245 
2009 0.27 0.26 19.98 0.00 359 
2010 0.27 0.24 19.59 0.00 318 
2011 0.18 0.18 18.71 0.00 354 
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Table 6:  Impact of Bank Distress on Liquidity, Loan, and Asset Growth 
Table reports OLS coefficient estimates of: (i) lagged bivariate regressions of the quarterly (t, t+1) 
growth rates in Liquidity, Loans, and Assets on Expected Default at quarter t; (ii) contemporaneous 
bivariate regressions of the quarterly growth rates in Loans and Assets on the quarterly growth rate 
in Liquidity; and (iii) contemporaneous bivariate regressions of the quarterly growth rate in Assets 
on the quarterly growth rate in Loans.  Growth rates in the regressions are expressed as percentages 
and include (unreported) constant terms.  Financial data on bank holding companies (BHCs) were 
obtained from FR Y9C quarterly reports corresponding to the period 2004 through 2011.  Liquidity 
is Cash and balances due from depository institutions plus securities, Federal Funds sold, and 
securities purchased under agreements to resell.  Loan is Total Loans.  Asset is Total Assets.  
Growth rates are Winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. 
  Dependent Variable 
  %∆Liquidityt,t+1 %∆Loanst,t+1 %∆Assetsst,t+1 
Panel A: 2004 - 2006 
EDFt 
Coefficient -0.074 -0.021 -0.042 
p-value 0.011 0.044 0.000 
%∆Liquidityt,t+1 
Coefficient  -0.002 0.215 
p-value  0.739 0.000 
%∆Loanst,t+1 
Coefficient   0.661 
p-value   0.000 
No. of Observations    4,080 
Panel B: 2007 - 2009 
EDFt 
Coefficient 0.049 -0.048 -0.031 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
%∆Liquidityt,t+1 
Coefficient  -0.018 0.156 
p-value  0.000 0.000 
%∆Loanst,t+1 
Coefficient   0.664 
p-value   0.000 
 
No. of Observations 
   3,803 
Panel C: 2010 - 2011 
EDFt 
Coefficient -0.017 -0.041 -0.036 
p-value 0.021 0.000 0.000 
%∆Liquidityt,t+1 
Coefficient  -0.025 0.188 
p-value  0.000 0.000 
%∆Loanst,t+1 
Coefficient   0.590 
p-value   0.000 
No. of Observations    2,473 
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Table 7:  Migration of Corporate Debt Funding Outcomes – Model 1 
Table reports multinomial logit regressions of the debt choices of firms that obtained some or all 
of its debt through syndicated loans by a single lead bank in a given year t between 2004 and 2010.  
The dependent variable is an indicator variable which represents one of four possible borrowing 
outcomes at t+1: no debt, bank debt only, public debt only, both bank and public debt.  The debt 
choice at t+1 used as reference is bank debt only.  S&P rated takes a value of 1 if the firm had an 
S&P long term debt or subordinated debt rating in period t, and 0 otherwise.  S&P investment 
grade takes a value of 1 if the firm had an S&P long-term debt or subordinated debt rating equal 
to or better than BBB- in period t, and 0 otherwise.  Firm and bank attributes used as controls are 
period t and t+1 values, respectively.  Banking industry EDF is the annual average of the monthly 
EDF averages across all BHCs where EDFs can be computed.  EDF Bracket is the annual average 
percentile bracket associated with the lead bank’s monthly EDF.  Higher brackets represent higher 
EDFs.  Estimated coefficients in the years 2008 and 2009 capture the impact of the lead bank 
distress on the borrowing outcome of firms during the crisis.  Banking industry Ratings Change is 
the average of S&P Distress across all BHCs with ratings.  BHC S&P distress reflects changes in 
the condition of the lead bank as the difference between its highest S&P long term issuer credit 
rating in t and its lowest rating in t+1.  S&P Upgraded (Downgraded) is an indicator variable that 
takes on value 1 if the average S&P long term issuer credit rating of the bank in t+1 is higher 
(lower) than that in t, and 0 otherwise. Estimated coefficients capture the average effects and the 
additional impact of distress (downgrade) in 2008 and 2009.  Standard errors are clustered by 
borrower.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  †Sum of the 
lead bank average distress coefficient and lead bank marginal distress coefficient in the given year 
are greater than zero and statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
Period t Period t+1 
Migration from Bank Debt or 
Bank and Pubic Debt 
No Debt Public Debt 
Only 
Bank & 
Public Debt 
Constant 1.184 *** -6.580 *** -6.629 *** 
Borrower Attributes (t)    
Q -0.036 0.118 0.156 
ROA -0.521 * 2.094 *** 1.393 * 
Total Assets -0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.417 ** 2.370 *** 1.954 *** 
Cash/Total Assets 1.309 ** 0.284 -2.854 
Financial Debt/Total Assets -0.504 * -2.462 ** -0.443 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years 0.021 -0.805 -0.763 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.092 1.106 *** 1.059 *** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years -0.353 *** 0.079 0.364 
S&P Rated -0.619 *** 1.774 ** 1.678 *** 
S&P Investment Grade -0.162 1.627 *** 0.705 * 
Banking Industry Distress (t+1)  
Industry EDF 1.748 ** 6.892 ** 7.443 *** 
Lead Bank Distress (t+1)    
EDF Bracket 0.000 0.048 0.094 ** 
EDF Bracket x 2008 0.048† *** 0.029† -0.023† 
EDF Bracket x 2009 0.020 -0.033 -0.105 
Observations  2,376   
Pseudo R-Squared   0.14   
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Table 7:  Migration of Corporate Debt Funding Outcomes (Cont.) – Model 2 
 
Period t Period t+1 
Migration from Bank Debt or 
Bank and Pubic Debt 
No Debt Public Debt 
Only 
Bank & 
Public Debt 
Constant 1.170 *** -5.782 *** -5.097 *** 
Borrower Attributes (t)    
Q -0.035 0.111 0.167 
ROA -0.553 ** 2.138 *** 1.277 * 
Total Assets -0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.448 ** 2.365 *** 1.841 *** 
Cash/Total Assets 1.356 *** 0.455 -3.000 
Financial Debt/Total Assets -0.476 * -2.405 ** -0.403 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years -0.030 -0.859 -0.842 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.080 1.075 *** 0.967 *** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years -0.346 *** 0.209 0.461 
S&P Rated -0.615 *** 1.832 ** 1.819 *** 
S&P Investment Grade -0.149 1.606 *** 0.669 * 
Banking Industry Distress (t+1)  
Industry Ratings Change 0.455 *** 0.729 1.074 ** 
Lead Bank Distress (t+1)    
Ratings Upgrade 0.146 -0.144 -0.212 
Ratings Downgrade -0.051 -0.017 -0.737 
Ratings Downgrade x 2008 0.848† *** 0.754† 0.270 
Ratings Downgrade x 2009 0.062 0.578 -0.213 
Observations   2,423   
Pseudo R-Squared  0.13   
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Table 7 (Continued):  Migration of Debt Funding Outcomes (Cont.) – Model 3 
Table reports a multinomial logit regression of the debt outcomes of firms that obtained some or 
all its debt through syndicated loans by a single lead bank in a given year t between 2004 and 2010.  
The dependent variable is an indicator variable which represents one of four possible borrowing 
outcomes at t+1: no debt, bank debt only, public debt only, both bank and public debt.  The debt 
choice at t+1 used as reference is bank debt only.  Firm and bank characteristics used as controls 
are period t and t+1 values respectively.  Bank liquidity is cash and balances due from depository 
institutions plus securities plus Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to 
resell.  Bank liquidity hoarding is represented by idiosyncratic residuals on cross-sectional 
regressions of liquidity growth on asset growth across banks estimated each quarter; residuals are 
averaged over four quarters to annualize the measure.  Coefficients estimated on interacted year 
2008 and 2009 dummies capture the impact of lead bank liquidity during the crisis.  Standard 
errors are clustered by borrower. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  †Sum of the average lead bank and marginal lead bank distress coefficients or 
average lead bank liquidity and marginal lead bank liquidity coefficients in the given year are 
statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
Period t Period t+1 
Migration from Bank Debt or 
Bank and Pubic Debt 
No Debt Public Debt 
Only 
Bank & Public 
Debt 
Constant 1.205*** -6.022*** -5.330*** 
Borrower Attributes (t)    
Q -0.021 0.121 0.125 
ROA -0.665** 2.145*** 1.424* 
Total Assets -0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.477** 2.339*** 1.976*** 
Cash/Total Assets 1.254*** 0.276 -2.712 
Financial Debt/Total Assets -0.455* -2.409** -0.336 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years -0.067 -0.926 -0.694 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.069 1.111*** 1.039*** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years -0.329*** 0.180 0.272 
S&P Rated -0.575*** 1.964** 1.841*** 
S&P Investment Grade -0.160 1.618*** 0.733** 
Banking Industry Distress (t+1)  
Industry EDF (t+1) 2.575*** 5.749*** 3.595*** 
Liquidity Hoarding (t+1)    
Bank Liquidity Hoarding -0.164 1.113 -0.273 
Bank Liquidity Hoarding x 2008 2.114†** -0.401 0.965 
Bank Liquidity Hoarding x 2009 0.037 1.455† 0.639 
Observations 2,599   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.13   
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Table 7 (Continued):  Migration of Debt Funding Outcomes (Cont.) – Model 4 
 Model 4 
Period t Period t+1 
Migration from Bank Debt or 
Bank and Pubic Debt 
No Debt Public Debt 
Only 
Bank & Public 
Debt 
Constant 1.229*** -5.990*** -5.349*** 
Borrower Attributes (t)    
Q -0.020 0.136 0.142 
ROA -0.657** 2.081*** 1.389* 
Total Assets -0.001 0.002*** 0.001 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.470** 2.326*** 1.957*** 
Cash/Total Assets 1.226** 0.002 -2.890 
Financial Debt/Total Assets -0.460* -2.410** -0.385 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years -0.075 -0.964 -0.736 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.081 1.096*** 1.035*** 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years -0.321*** 0.240 0.310 
S&P Rated -0.570*** 1.963** 1.857*** 
S&P Investment Grade -0.165 1.619*** 0.733** 
Banking Industry Distress (t+1)    
Industry S&P Distress (t+1) 0.418*** 0.999*** 0.696*** 
Liquidity Hoarding (t+1)    
Bank Liquidity Hoarding -0.174 1.182 -0.180 
Bank Liquidity Hoarding x 2008 2.792†*** 1.067 1.803 
Bank Liquidity Hoarding x 2009 0.182 1.697† 0.588 
Observations 2,599   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.13   
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Table 8:  Lead Bank Distress and Corporate Investment 
Table reports the impact of lead bank distress in the crisis on capital expenditures (investment) of 
firms that did not borrow in year t+1 but obtained some or all of its debt through syndicated loans 
in the prior year t scaled by total assets.  For example, 2008 to 2009 represent the investment in 
2009 of firms that did not borrow in 2009 but borrowed in 2008.  Columns labeled S&P Distressed 
Lead Bank report investment of firms that borrowed in year t through a lead bank whose S&P 
long term domestic issuer credit rating was downgraded more than the median downgrade (of 1 
notch) for BHCs during the crisis.  Columns labeled Non-Distressed Lead Bank report investment 
of firms that borrowed in year t through a lead bank whose rating change was less than or equal to 
the median change.  Summary statistics on investment are Winsorized at 5% and 95% each year. 
Investment in Year t+1 for Firms that Migrated from Bank Debt in t to No Debt in t+1 
Conditioned on the Distress of the Lead Bank 
 
S&P Non-Distressed 
Lead Bank 
S&P Distressed Lead 
Bank 
 
t to t+1 Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Diff. t-stat p-val 
2004 to 2005 0.058 0.068 221 0.064 0.066 212 -0.007 -1.037 0.300 
2005 to 2006 0.076 0.090 199 0.065 0.069 203 0.011 1.338 0.182 
2006 to 2007 0.074 0.085 182 0.070 0.076 168 0.004 0.446 0.656 
2007 to 2008 0.069 0.080 165 0.062 0.067 207 0.007 0.937 0.349 
2008 to 2009 0.051 0.049 128 0.042 0.039 157 0.009 1.599 0.111 
2009 to 2010 0.036 0.049 58 0.048 0.056 102 -0.012 -1.370 0.173 
2010 to 2011 0.055 0.057 76 0.073 0.079 94 -0.017 -1.675 0.096 
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Table 9:  Debt Funding Outcome and Corporate Investment 
This table examines the impact of corporate debt choice on corporate investment decisions taking 
into account the distress of lead banks, particularly in the crisis years 2008 and 2009.  Investment 
is capital expenditures expressed as percentages of 1-year lagged total assets.  Panel regressions 
control for firm attributes and year fixed effects.  Sample are firms, which in a given year t between 
2004 and 2010, obtained some or all of its debt through syndicated loans by a single lead bank.  
The reference group are firms, which migrated from acquiring all or some of its debt through 
syndicated bank loans in t, to bank debt only in t+1.  Indicator variables Migrated to No Debt, 
Public Debt, and Bank & Public Debt account for the three remaining mutually exclusive debt 
outcomes.  Other explanatory variables are previously defined.  S&P Domestic LT Issuer Rating 
are the ratings of firms at December year-end.  Standard errors are clustered by year.  ***, **, * 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  †Sum of the average lead bank and 
marginal lead bank distress coefficients in the given year are less than zero and statistically 
significant at the 10% level or better. 
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Table 9:  Debt Funding Outcome and Corporate Investment (Cont.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.666* 1.214 1.297 
Borrower Attributes (t)    
Q 1.009*** 1.003*** 1.033*** 
ROA 0.059 0.088 -0.094 
Total Assets 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 21.496*** 21.522*** 21.716*** 
Cash/Total Assets 3.422* 3.260* 3.633** 
Financial Debt/Total Assets -4.822*** -4.664*** -4.752*** 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years -0.652 -0.533 -0.709 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.421 -0.383 -0.473 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years 0.545*** 0.437*** 0.435*** 
Age -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
S&P Rated 0.291 0.198 0.300 
S&P Investment Grade -1.554*** -1.428** -1.555** 
Migrated from Bank Debt in t    
to: 
No Debt in t+1 -1.014*** -1.050*** -0.934*** 
Public Debt in t+1 0.422 0.415 0.395 
Bank & Public Debt in t+1 3.331*** 3.127*** 3.246*** 
Lead Bank Distress and Liquidity Hoarding (t+1)  
EDF Bracket -0.011   
EDF Bracket x 2008 0.088   
EDF Bracket x 2009 -0.112†**   
Ratings Upgrade  0.640**  
Ratings Downgrade  0.221  
Ratings Downgrade x 2008  -1.226†*  
Ratings Downgrade x 2009  -1.831†**  
Bank Liquidity Hoarding   2.592** 
Bank Liquidity Hoarding x 2008   0.072 
Bank Liquidity Hoarding x 2009   -2.145** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,371 2,418 2,593 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.52 0.52 0.52 
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Table 9:  Debt Funding Outcome and Corporate Investment (Cont.) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 1.623* 1.226 1.312 
Borrower Attributes (t)    
Q 1.010*** 1.002*** 1.036*** 
ROA 0.064 0.056 -0.091 
Total Assets 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 21.484*** 21.534*** 21.729*** 
Cash/Total Assets 3.427* 3.289* 3.557** 
Financial Debt/Total Assets -4.777*** -4.644*** -4.793*** 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years -0.644 -0.549 -0.715 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -0.418 -0.393 -0.477 
Revolver Line Last 2 Years 0.533*** 0.452*** 0.438*** 
Age -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.064*** 
S&P Rated 0.281 0.175 0.313 
S&P Investment Grade -1.544*** -1.401** -1.555** 
Migrated from Bank Debt in t    
to: 
No Debt in t+1 -1.008*** -1.038*** -0.934*** 
Public Debt in t+1 0.473 0.427 0.380 
Bank & Public Debt in t+1 3.350*** 3.104*** 3.243*** 
Lead Bank Distress and Liquidity Hoarding (t+1)    
EDF Bracket -0.008   
Ratings Upgrade  0.630**  
Ratings Downgrade  -0.582*  
Bank Liquidity Hoarding   2.399** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,371 2,418 2,593 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.52 0.52 0.52 
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Table 10:  Credit Spreads and Debt Funding Choice 
Table reports cross-sectional regressions of credit spreads against issue characteristics taking 
differences across firms and industries into account.  The costs of syndicated bank and public debt, 
expressed in basis points, are the spreads over Treasuries with the same maturity.  Amount is the 
size of the syndicated bank or public debt issue in billions of dollars.  Maturity is the tenor of the 
syndicated bank or public debt in months.  Bank debt is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 
1 if syndicated bank loan, and 0, if public debt.  Firm attributes are defined in Table 4 and lagged 
by a year.  All cross-sectional regressions control for industry fixed effects using the Fama and 
French 17-industry classification.  Standard errors are clustered by industry in the year by year 
regressions, and clustered by year in the regression for all years.  ***, **, * stand for significance 
at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
Constant 391.50 *** 431.56 *** 423.75 *** 376.89 *** 
Bank Debt 13.60 10.88 -5.32 -3.70 
Amount -7.91 -3.23 -4.06 *** 2.36 
Maturity 0.05 0.04 0.09 * 0.13 ** 
Borrower Attributes     
Q -2.94 -5.30 -3.09 2.02 
ROA -335.34 *** -204.24 *** -203.88 ** -274.32 ** 
Total Assets 0.07 0.22 ** 0.13 * 0.09 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -3.35 -2.08 5.23 -45.63 ** 
Cash/Total Assets 121.59 122.37 60.19 10.08 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 107.53 *** 32.07 79.13 18.95 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years 10.41 -21.00 -23.13 19.49 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -4.61 -0.24 -2.65 -7.87 
Firm S&P Rating -20.99 *** -20.05 *** -19.23 *** -15.37 *** 
2005     
2006     
2007     
2008     
2009     
2010     
2011        
Observations 1,005 970 913 961 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.56 0.46 0.50 0.41 
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Table 10:  Credit Spreads and Debt Funding Choice (Cont.) 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 All Years 
Constant 651.60 
*** 
744.32 
*** 
539.81 
*** 
499.45 
*** 
460.67 
*** Bank Debt -137.35 
*** 
-66.72 * 9.31 -16.43 -20.04 
Amount -2.77 3.67 -8.67 -0.08 -1.62 
Maturity -0.29 * -0.26 * -0.03 0.09 -0.03 
Borrower Attributes      
Q -14.11 -80.67 *** -17.94 *** -6.26 -9.07 * 
ROA -122.46 -165.40 -54.98 -195.24 ** -205.42 
*** Total Assets -0.07 -0.25 0.21 ** 0.04 0.11 ** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 1.07 -56.44 -36.00 ** -8.67 -11.33 
Cash/Total Assets 181.06 220.21 5.17 143.39 * 76.52 ** 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 102.64 124.01 
*** 
69.73 *** 44.42 * 67.01 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years 25.71 -34.04 30.53 ** 7.85 -1.42 
Public Funded Last 5 Years 1.01 6.21 -3.03 19.34 0.18 
Firm S&P Rating -24.03 *** -20.44 *** -25.66 *** -25.89 *** -21.25 *** 
2005     -13.13 *** 
2006     -7.37 *** 
2007     8.79 *** 
2008     132.05 
*** 2009     195.42 
*** 2010     64.11 *** 
2011         29.64 *** 
Observations 511 606 708 987 6,682 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.22 0.33 0.61 0.52 0.50 
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Table 11:  Bank Distress and Syndicated Loan Yield Spreads 
Two lead bank distress variables are used.  EDF is the expected default frequency of the lead bank 
three months prior to the syndication of the bank loan.  Rating Change is the difference between 
the lead bank’s S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating fifteen and three months prior to 
the syndication of the bank loan.  Ratings changes are positive (negative) when the lead bank was 
downgraded (upgraded), and 0 when the rating of the lead bank remained unchanged.  Bank 
liquidity is cash and balances due from depository institutions plus securities plus Federal funds 
sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell.  Bank liquidity hoarding is represented 
by idiosyncratic residuals on cross-sectional regressions of liquidity growth on asset growth across 
banks estimated each quarter.  Standard errors are clustered by industry.  ***, **, * stand for 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Lead Bank Distress 
 2004-2006 2008-2009 2004-2006 2008-2009 
Constant 434.74*** 600.51*** 438.27*** 400.97*** 
Amount -23.26** -56.62* -5.59 -53.38** 
Maturity 0.21 -0.32 0.07 -0.11 
Borrower Attributes     
Q -0.78 -27.00 1.22 -16.13 
ROA -353.73*** -190.28 -374.15** -248.88* 
Total Assets 0.10* -0.08 0.04 -0.05 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -26.05 29.98 -14.89 36.70 
Cash/Total Assets 43.32 161.35 46.21 309.69 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 67.53** 133.84*** 54.41** 113.96** 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years -18.13 -11.79 -18.46 0.16 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -4.99 28.97 -5.15 54.10 
Firm S&P Rating -19.07*** -15.78*** -20.14*** -15.16*** 
Lead Bank Distress and Liquidity Hoarding 
EDF -365.08 160.09**   
Ratings Change   -1.282 32.463** 
Observations 674 167 750 168 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.47 0.42 0.45 0.40 
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Table 11:  Bank Distress and Syndicated Loan Yield Spreads (Cont.) 
 Lead Bank Liquidity 
 2004-2006 2008-2009 
Constant 436.14*** 544.67*** 
Amount -5.18 -54.96** 
Maturity 0.05 -0.12 
Borrower Attributes   
Q 0.98 -32.56 
ROA -369.29** -311.89** 
Total Assets 0.05 0.04 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets -12.02 71.71 
Cash/Total Assets 57.28 323.71 
Financial Debt/Total Assets 57.52** 127.78*** 
Bank Funded Last 5 Years -17.47 -49.17 
Public Funded Last 5 Years -7.53 46.23 
Firm S&P Rating -20.14*** -15.66*** 
Lead Bank Distress and Liquidity Hoarding   
Liquidity Hoarding 51.28* 181.02* 
Observations 779 171 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.46 0.40 
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Figure 1: Migration from bank to public debt credit during crisis.  The initial equilibriums in 
bank and public debt markets occur at EB,0 and EP,0, respectively, where credit is competitively 
priced.  The uncertainty triggered by a crisis decreases the willingness of all lenders to extend 
credit as a result of higher perceived credit, liquidity, and solvency risks.  The supply of credit 
provided by institutional and retail investors shifts left from SP,0 to SP,1.  Banks simultaneously 
curtail lending even to well qualified borrowers, shifting supply from SB,0 to SB,1.  In addition, 
banks choose to ration credit rather than lend at higher rates of interest.  Reflecting a weaker 
economy, the demand for bank debt shifts left from DB,0 to DB,1.  The price of bank debt does not 
clear – the supply of credit at CB,1 is less than the demand for credit at a higher interest rate, rB,1.  
Given the contraction in bank lending, otherwise well qualified borrowers migrate to the public 
debt market, shifting demand from DP,0 to DP,1.  The public debt market clears at a higher volume, 
CP,1 > CP,0, but also at a higher rate of interest than on bank debt, rP,1 > rB,1.  Because the migration 
from bank to public debt is incomplete, the total volume of credit in the economy falls, CB,1 + CP,1 
< CB,0 + CP,0.  Crisis induced outcomes in bank and public debt are denoted by EB,1 and EP,1 
respectively.  
Bank Debt  Public Debt 
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EB,1 
CB,0 CP,1 
r r 
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Volume Volume 
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DB,0 
CP,0 
Bank Debt to Public Debt 
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Figure 2. Bank Distress and Liquidity Hoarding.  This figure plots the quarterly estimates of 
𝜙, the cross-sectional marginal effect of bank EDF bracket at month t-3 on liquidity hoarding at 
month t, and its 95% confidence intervals. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is computed as 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 − (α̂ +
β̂𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡), where ?̂? and ?̂? are also quarterly cross-sectional estimates. 
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Figure 3. Commitment Drawdowns and Moody's Baa Spread.  This figure plots the 
quarterly loan commitment drawdown ratio between 2006 and 2010 computed as all commercial 
and industrial (C&I) loans originated by domestic banks under commitment where the loan terms 
and pricing were set more than 365 days in the past, divided by all C&I loans originated by 
domestic banks.  The data are smoothed by averaging values from t-1, t, and t+1.  In addition, we 
plot the Moody’s Baa spread over Treasuries.  An increase in the loan commitment ratio is 
consistent with credit rationing – demand for bank credit expands faster than new credit 
originations when bond spreads are rising. 
Source:  Federal Reserve Board of Governors Survey of Terms of Business Lending - E.2. 
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I. APPENDIX I 
 
Table A.1:  Randomly Generated Excess Probability 
The excess probabilities reported in this table are computed based on a bootstrap procedure where 
firm-contracts are randomly assigned to each year.  The table are the results from 100 trials.  Mean 
and Standard Error refer to the average of the mean excess probabilities each year across trials and 
the standard error of the average estimates, respectively.   
 Contract Type = Bank Debt Contract Type = Public Debt 
 Mean S.E. Trials t-stat p-val Mean S.E. Trials t-stat p-val 
Base Model          
2004 0.00 0.01 100 0.21 0.83 0.01 0.02 100 0.38 0.70 
2005 0.00 0.01 100 0.11 0.91 0.01 0.02 100 0.55 0.58 
2006 0.00 0.01 100 0.27 0.79 0.01 0.02 100 0.33 0.74 
2007 0.01 0.01 100 0.39 0.70 0.01 0.02 100 0.33 0.74 
2008 0.01 0.01 100 0.46 0.65 0.01 0.02 100 0.31 0.76 
2009 0.01 0.01 100 0.49 0.63 0.00 0.03 100 0.16 0.88 
2010 0.00 0.01 100 0.24 0.81 0.01 0.02 100 0.36 0.72 
2011 0.00 0.01 100 0.27 0.79 0.01 0.02 100 0.43 0.67 
Full Model          
2004 0.00 0.01 100 0.20 0.84 0.01 0.02 100 0.47 0.64 
2005 0.00 0.01 100 0.06 0.96 0.01 0.02 100 0.55 0.59 
2006 0.00 0.01 100 0.35 0.72 0.00 0.02 100 0.25 0.80 
2007 0.01 0.01 100 0.41 0.68 0.01 0.02 100 0.30 0.76 
2008 0.01 0.01 100 0.48 0.63 0.01 0.02 100 0.33 0.74 
2009 0.01 0.01 100 0.54 0.59 0.00 0.03 100 0.14 0.89 
2010 0.00 0.01 100 0.24 0.81 0.01 0.02 100 0.38 0.70 
2011 0.00 0.01 100 0.25 0.80 0.01 0.02 100 0.43 0.67 
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 ESSAY 2: BANKING CRISES: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND THE 
RECOVERY OF THE BANK CREDIT MARKET 
J. Santiago E. Barraza, Wayne Y. Lee, and Timothy J. Yeager 
A. ABSTRACT 
We assess the effectiveness of the extraordinary government and central bank intervention 
on bank lending during the 2007-2009 financial crisis by comparing lending patterns from that 
crisis with the banking credit crunch of 1990-1992. Although the financial crisis was by every 
measure more severe than the credit crunch, the supply of bank credit rebounded two years sooner.  
We show that government and central bank intervention accounts for the differing dynamics in 
bank credit markets.  Our results confirm that expansionary monetary and fiscal policy aimed at 
easing bank distress following a banking crisis can alleviate the damaging effects from the 
contraction in bank lending. 
Keywords: financial crisis, government intervention, resolution mechanisms, credit supply 
JEL Codes: G12, G21, G32 
B. INTRODUCTION 
The most crucial role of financial intermediaries (FI) is to facilitate the flow of funds from 
net savers to net borrowers. A disruption in this service can lead to a sudden contraction in output 
from reduced levels of consumption and investment (Bernanke, 1983; Gan, 2007; Jiménez, 
Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2012; Barraza, Lee, Yeager, 2014). The ability of FI to add value in 
this process depends on their financial strength; the risk –and potential cost- posed by distressed 
FI can outweigh the benefit derived from their special ability to resolve information asymmetry 
problems and liquidate assets. In the event of FI’s general distress, governments can decide to 
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either engage or not in improving their conditions. The higher the systemic risk the banking distress 
poses, the greater the incentives for government to act. 
In this paper we analyze the banking crises of 1990-1992 and 2007-2009. We show that 
the government’s significant efforts to strengthen the banking sector in the recent financial crisis 
made the bank lending crisis to be relatively short-lived despite the acuteness of the sector general 
distress. In contrast, the lack of government intervention in the early 1990s episode of banking 
distress resulted in a long-lasting credit crunch. We show that while the proportion of distressed 
banks was comparable across both crisis, the size and systemic importance of the banks affected 
in the recent financial crisis was significantly higher. This provided a set of incentives for massive 
government intervention. 
1. The Early 1990s Banking Crisis 
The early 1990s witnessed a period of distress in the banking sector that resulted in a bank 
credit crunch. In a sense, the distress in the banking industry was a continuation of that initiated in 
1985 with the savings and loans (S&L) associations. However, the fall in commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans provided by commercial banks was a distinctive feature of the first years of 
the 1990s. Berger and Bouwman (2013) refer to the period between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4 as a 
banking crisis, yet it is more commonly referred to as credit crunch (e.g. Bernanke and Lown, 
1991) or capital crunch (e.g. Syron, 1991), provided the role bank capital shortages allegedly 
played in the credit crunch.  
The financial literature has explored several potential causes leading to this crisis. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Syron (1991) have argued that a bank capital crunch drove the 
credit crunch. The former authors assert that the combination of sustained bank losses during the 
86 
 
late 1980s and the implementation of the Basel Accord likely forced banks to restrain asset growth 
–and with it credit growth- in order to satisfy capital requirements. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp. (FDIC) (1997) and Hall (1993) also argue that the implementation of risk-based capital 
requirements could have caused the credit crunch. Distinctively, Hall (1993) suggests that the 
lower capital requirements on securities led banks to substitute securities for loans on their 
portfolios of assets, thus reducing the supply of credit. 
Despite regional heterogeneity in both the size and origin of the loan losses, researchers 
generally agree that the Northeast area of the United States was the most affected one, given 
substantial losses derived from real estate loans. Peek and Rosengren (1995) document a 
significant capital crunch in New England -where real estate loan losses were particularly sizeable- 
and present evidence consistent with a credit crunch –yet not definitive in their own words. 
Bankers and politicians have also blamed overzealous regulators for the credit crunch. 
However, researchers have found little evidence to support this hypothesis, as we can learn from 
Bernanke and Lown (1991), Clair and Tucker (1993) and Darin and Walter (1994). 
Studies on systemic banking crises have been relatively silent on the early 1990s episode. 
This is probably partly due to the fact that the definition of such events often requires significant 
government intervention to identify the episode. This is the case, for instance, of Laeven and 
Valencia (2013) who do refer to 1988 as a borderline case of systemic banking crisis however. 
2. The Late 2000s Banking Crisis  
The late 2000s crisis started with the spike in the defaults on subprime mortgages, which 
led to the fallout of the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the second half of 2007. 
A run on Countrywide, a leading subprime originator in the United States, marked an early 
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milestone for a nascent crisis in August of 2007. In the fourth quarter of 2007, banks with 
significant stakes in the MBS market became exposed to significant potential losses, largely as a 
result of absorbing the structured investment vehicles that had marketed the MBS. Bear Stearns, 
with a substantial exposure to collateralized debt obligations (CDO), had come under distress as 
early as June of 2007 and resulted absorbed by JP Morgan in March of 2008 in a Federal Reserve-
assisted transaction. 
Gorton and Metrick (2012) thoroughly describe the dynamics and key transmission 
mechanisms of this crisis. Initiated with defaults on subprime mortgages, the crisis developed via 
the freezing of several short-term credit markets, which had become an indispensable source of 
financing for large and systemically important financial institutions. September and October of 
2008 saw the height of the crisis, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac being taken over by the 
Federal government, Washington Mutual seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), AIG heavily assisted by the Federal Reserve, Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy, the 
Congress passing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), and the nine largest banks in the 
U.S. recapitalized by the Treasury. 
The reach and severity of the financial crisis prompted to government to intervene 
decisively. And the magnitude of the government assistance programs has probably precedents 
only in the Great Depression.   
C. DIFFERING SEVERITY OF CRISES 
1. Differing Severity of Crises: Banking System Conditions 
We have mentioned above that while the early 1990’s crisis affected mostly small- and 
mid-size banks, the late 2000s crisis hit with particular virulence the largest banks in the financial 
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system, making it a systematically important crisis. Moreover, while the former was moderate and 
protracted, the latter was acute and short-lived. We argue that the fact that the latter was short-
lived is chiefly the result of the massive government intervention -which contrasts with the lack of 
assistance in the earliest crisis.  
Figure 1 shows this aspect of the both crises. We use data from the FDIC bank failures or 
assistances to show that while the proportion of distressed banks was similar across crises –as 
shown by the small-dot line-, the assets of failed or assisted banks where considerably larger in 
the recent crisis –as shown by the large-dot line. The continuous line plots the asset-weight average 
expected default frequency of financial firms –standard industry codes 6000 through 6999- in the 
Compustat Annual and CRSP databases, and highlights the considerably larger magnitude of the 
recent crisis.  
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
2. Differing Severity of Crises: Fall in Bank Loans and Economic Growth 
The literature on both of these crises has established a tight relationship between banks’ 
capital and solvency conditions and their ability to supply credit. Evidence from the early crisis 
includes Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Hancock and Wilcox (1998) while evidence from the 
recent crisis includes Barraza, Lee, and Yeager (2014) and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez 
(2011). Becker and Ivashina (2014) also provide evidence from time series tests that encompass 
both episodes.  
The sizeable government programs to recapitalize banks and provide them with liquidity 
during the recent financial crisis contributed to a fast recovery of the bank credit market when 
compared to the credit crunch. Figure 2 below shows that while the 1990s crisis brought four years 
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of bank credit fall, the 2000s crisis only carried two years of fall, despite its considerably higher 
severity. 
To build this figure we use the monthly stock of C&I loans from all commercial banks in 
the U.S., provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.26 We adjust the 
series to 2010 US dollars using the consumer price index for all items from the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).27 The loan series shows that after reaching a 
peak in September 1989, C&I started a long and steady decrease through December 1993. During 
the 51 months of fall the volume of outstanding C&I dropped by 21.9% in real terms. In contrast, 
during the recent financial crisis loans peaked in November 2008, declined sharply through 
November 2010 –particularly sharply through the first quarter of 2010- and in all the stock of C&I 
fell by 26.4% in real terms in only 24 months.28 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
Furthermore, the changes in economic activity that accompanied both crises are also 
different. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) the economy reached 
a peak in July of 1990 and went into recession through March of 1991. The drop in real gross 
                                                 
26 FRED data series BUSLOANS. 
27 FRED data series CPALTT01USM661S. 
28 The series BUSLOANS series also shows a significant drop during the early 2000s, which we 
omit in this analysis provided this is widely thought to correspond to fall on demand for credit, 
both in the bank and public markets. 
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domestic product between 1990:Q3 and 1991:Q1 was 1.32% and by 1991:Q4 had already 
surpassed its 1990:Q3 level –i.e. little after a year later. For the recent crises, the economy reached 
a peak in December of 2007, and went into recession through June of 2009. The drop in real gross 
domestic product between 2007:Q4 and 2009:Q2 amounted to 4.26% and only in 2011:Q2 
surpassed the level of 2007:Q4 –i.e. three and a half years later. Figure 3 shows the quarterly 
evolution of real gross domestic product between 1986 and March 2014. 
[Insert Figure 3 here.] 
D. THE CRISES: TIMING, SEVERITY, AND RESPONSES  
In this section we present further details on the timing, severity, policy response, and pace 
of recovery from both crises using data on bank loans and public markets instruments. Table 1 
presents two panels with robust insights using data from different sources. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
Dating banking crises is a challenging process that requires not only objective data but also 
judgment calls, as has been noted by authors such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Laeven and 
Valencia (2013), and Laeven and Valencia (2014). For instance, distress can spread unevenly 
across different types of financial intermediaries or regions, displaying some of them clearly 
identifiable crisis characteristics, but not the others. It becomes then handy to rely on easily 
identifiable events that pertain to crises, such as government interventions. However, this 
identification strategy can miss episodes of banking distress with real consequences in the banking 
sector, and such is the case of the 1990s credit crunch, typically omitted among the banking crises.  
Provided our ultimate purpose is to study the role of bank distress and government 
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intervention on availability of corporate credit, in this section we date the banking crises based on 
the evolution of the bank credit market, an observable outcome of bank distress. The top part of 
Panel A in Table 1 synthesizes the information provided while discussing Figure 1; it shows that 
based on bank C&I credit growth, the early crisis started in the last quarter of 1989 and lasted 51 
months, more than twice the 24 months the late crisis lasted. Despite the noticeably different 
duration of these crises, the total changes in stock of C&I loans remained comparable across crises, 
with falls of respectively 21.9% and 26.4% for the early and late crises. Speed of change in the 
stock of loans is the key to differentiate both crises. While the annualized growth rate of C&I loans 
during the early crisis was -5.8%, that rate almost tripled to reach -15.3% during the 2000s crisis.  
Since both crisis events partially overlap with economic contractions, it is a necessary to 
account for the extent to which demand could have potentially driven the fall in bank credit. A 
straightforward strategy to address this issues is to maintain a reference point in an alternative 
credit market, such as the public debt market. Thus in Panel A we present data on new issues of 
both syndicated bank loans and non-convertible bonds, two relatively close substitute sources of 
credit. In the early 1990s crisis, syndicated loan issuances fell by 54.8% while non-convertible 
bond issuances rose by 13.8%, suggesting that it is unlikely demand explains the changes in the 
bank debt market. Similarly, while syndicated loan issuances fell by 75.4% during the late 2000s 
crisis, non-convertible bond issuances increased by 63.1%. Barraza, Lee, and Yeager (2014) have 
documented that the bank credit rationing observed in the recent financial crisis actually induced 
firms with unsatisfied demand for credit to migrate from the bank to the public debt market. 
At this point, it is worth noticing the different timing of credit market conditions we can 
observe from debt issuances and stocks of debt. While loan issuances can quickly reflect changes 
in the credit market conditions, stocks of loans will necessarily display a lag with respect to such 
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changes. This is so because a considerable part of bank lending is made under commitments, and 
the customers’ choice to draw down on their existing credit lines –thus modifying stocks of loans- 
will not necessarily reflect the current supply conditions. Hence, for instance, given a contraction 
in the credit supply, stock of loans could still grow if there was a fast enough pace of drawdowns 
on existing lines. Ivashina and Scharstein (2010) have already made this point arguing that the 
increase in stocks of C&I observed during 2008 was likely due to drawdowns on existing 
commitments. The increase in the pace of drawdowns is typically fueled by borrowers’ fear of 
lacking funding alternatives in the near future. Using data on generation of syndicated loans both 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Barraza, Lee, and Yeager (2014) have shown that the bank 
credit generation indeed dropped markedly during the entire 2008, after peaking in late 2007.  
Data on new issuances indicate that for the early crisis loan creation started falling in 
1988:Q4, reaching a trough in 1991:Q1. In the recent crisis, loan creation started falling in 
2007:Q3, reaching a trough in 2009:Q229. This means that new issuances fell during 30 and 24 
months in the early and late crisis, respectively. Loan issuances in the early crisis, however, only 
reached the 1988:Q3 level five years later, in 1993:Q3, showing again a very slow recovery in the 
bank credit market. 
We report next the size of government intervention during both crises using data from 
Laeven and Valencia (2013) and (2014). As we have mentioned, during the early 1990s there was 
                                                 
29 The year 2007 as a whole was still a year of bank credit expansion though. This aspect is 
relevant to our analysis below on borrower migration. 
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no government intervention30. In stark contrast, the government response to the recent financial 
crisis was massive. Laeven and Valencia (2013) estimate liquidity support to have amounted to 
4.7%31, and programs with impact on fiscal costs to have amounted to 4.5% of the GDP32. In 
addition, asset purchases programs amounted to 9.0% of the GDP –Laeven and Valencia (2014). 
Based on data from stocks of C&I loans, the pace of recovery from both crises seem 
comparable. C&I loans grew at 7.6% in the first two years of recovery starting on January 1994 
and December 2010. 
For robustness purposes, Panel B of Table 1 shows similar statistics to Panel A using data 
from the levels of nonfinancial corporate liabilities on the Z.1 release of the Board of Governors. 
Nonfinancial corporate bank debt is the quarterly stock of loans from depository institutions. 
                                                 
30 Laeven and Valencia (2013) report as a borderline banking crisis the year 1988 though. For this 
year, they register a small government intervention of 0.1% and some more sizeable programs 
which amounted to 3.7% of the GDP. 
31 Liquidity support indicates liquidity support from the central bank, measured as the ratio of 
central bank claims on deposit money banks (line 12 in IFS) and liquidity support from the 
Treasury to total deposits and liabilities to nonresidents. Total deposits are computed as the sum 
of demand deposits (line 24), other deposits (line 25), and liabilities to nonresidents (line 26). 
32 Fiscal costs are defined as the component of gross fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of 
the financial sector. They include fiscal costs associated with bank recapitalizations but exclude 
asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury. 
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Nonfinancial corporate market debt is the quarterly stock of corporate bonds and commercial 
papers. As before, we transform the series to real terms. Our estimate of duration for the early 
crisis is now 45 months -15 quarters, in fact-, and for the latest crisis it is 21 months –i.e. 7 quarters, 
closely matching our previous estimates. We also find that (1) the speed of bank credit fall during 
the recent crisis was almost four times that of the early crisis, (2) the fall in bank credit was 
accompanied by a rise in public market credit, and (3) the recovery pace after two years following 
the trough was close to 8%. 
There is yet another dimension on which we can compare government intervention across 
crises, namely the interest rate on the Federal Funds market, where the Federal Reserve exerts its 
monetary policy. While the effective federal funds rate averaged 5.29% between October 1989 
and December 1993, it average 0.17% between December 2008 and November 2010. This reflects 
again a clearly more aggressive strategy to facilitate bank credit recovery from the recent financial 
crisis when compare with the credit crunch of the early 1990s. 
E. DEMAND VS. SUPPLY: EVIDENCE FROM BORROWING MIGRATIONS 
1. Steady States and Conditional Probabilities of Borrowing Outcomes 
The persistence of the credit crunch in the early 1990s crisis results evident in Hancock, 
Laing, and Wilcox (1995) where, using impulse-response analysis, the authors show that loan 
portfolios adjusted to shocks more slowly than capital did. The economic interpretation is that of 
a long-lived credit crunch when compared to the duration of the capital crunch. Our evidence in 
this section, derived from both steady states of credit markets and borrowing transition matrices 
following Barraza, Lee, and Yeager (2014), is consistent with the long-lived credit crunch.  
Table 2 presents results of Markov migration analysis for firms that borrow from either the 
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syndicated loans or the public debt market. In panel A, the column header reading 1989-1990, for 
instance, represents the steady state distribution of firms’ borrowing outcomes should the credit 
market dynamics observed between 1989 and 1990 last for a long enough period of time. To 
construct the steady state, we observe each firm’s borrowing outcome in both 1989 and 1990. Each 
year, a firm can borrow (1) no debt, (2) bank debt, (3) public debt, or (4) both bank and public 
debt. The aggregate of firms’ borrowing outcomes in 1989 and 1990 are captured by two column 
vectors representing the proportion of firms in each borrowing outcome each year. These two 
vectors are linked by a four-by-four migration matrix that describes the passage of firms from a 
borrowing outcome in year t towards a borrowing outcome in year t+1. Operating with the 
migration matrix, we derive the steady state vector of borrowings for the 1989-1990 period.33 This 
vector can then be thought of as the long-term credit market equilibrium under the 1989-1990 
credit market conditions. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
The first four steady state vectors in panel A of Table 2 show that between 1990 and 1993 
the proportion of firms borrowing exclusively bank loans averaged 33.75% of the firms in the debt 
market, well below the 43% average in the rest of the 1990s and historical average of 42% between 
1989 and 2011. Concurrently, the proportion of firms securing public debt rose to an average 17% 
between 1991 and 1993, evidence of firms substituting public for bank debt at the time. And this 
is consistent with the fall in bank debt issuances being driven by supply factors, as opposed to 
demand factors. The first four columns in panel B show consistently low probabilities of securing 
                                                 
33 See for details Barraza, Lee, and Yeager (2014). 
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bank debt conditional on securing public debt during the period 1990-1993 -23.5% in average, 
compared to 41.8% for the entire sample period- and consistently high probabilities of securing 
public debt conditional on securing bank debt between 1991-1993 -14.5%, compared to 9.8% 
average for the entire sample period-, further evidence of debt substitution. 
The steady states corresponding to the 2000s financial crisis depict a shorter duration of 
the fall in bank credit. First, it must be noted that the 2006-2007 steady state vector does not present 
signs of bank credit contraction. That is to say, from 2006 to 2007 firms migrated between debt 
choices without visible constrains on an annual aggregate basis. The 46% of firms not borrowing 
is very close to the 47% all-time average, and the same is true for firms borrowing bank debt -45% 
vs. 42%- or both bank and public debt -5% vs. 5%-. The fall in bank credit in late 2007 mentioned 
above seems to be offset by a rise in bank credit early that year. 
The bank credit contraction is indeed noticeable between 2008 and 2009 –that is, vectors 
labeled 2007-2008 and 2008-2009. The most noticeable aspect of 2008 is the high level of firms 
securing no debt, whose 58% is significantly higher than both the preceding year and the historical 
average. Furthermore, the proportion of firms securing only bank debt drops to just 32% from 45% 
in the previous year, while the portion of firms securing only public debt almost doubles to 7% 
from 4% in the previous year. The steady state shows two noticeable aspects of the 2009 
equilibrium, which is the all-time record low 25% of firms securing only bank debt, and the 17-
year high proportion of firms securing only public debt, at 15% of the market.  
The conditional probability analysis on panel B shows, accordingly, a very high likelihood 
of securing public debt conditional on securing bank debt during this during 2009 and 2010, and 
a very low probability of securing bank debt conditional on securing public debt, particularly in 
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2008 and 2009. In 2010, the moderate probability of securing bank debt conditional on securing 
public debt together with the relatively high probability of securing public debt conditional on 
securing bank debt are consistent with firms diversifying their funding sources in the post-crisis, 
as observed in Barraza, Lee, and Yeager (2014). 
2. Market Dynamics: Borrowing Migrations 
We would like to gain next a better insight into the dynamics of the bank and public credit 
markets during both crises. To that effect, we present in Table 3 the average transition matrices for 
the crisis periods 1989-1993 in panel A, 2007-2009 in panel B, as well as the combined non-crisis 
periods 1993-2007 and 2009-2011 in panel C, and the entire sample period 1989-2011 in panel D. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
We want to highlight first the striking similarities between the dynamics of both crisis 
periods. Both crises were characterized by noticeable bank credit rationing and high levels of 
migration from bank debt to public debt. As much as 73% and 75% of the firms migrated from 
bank debt to no debt in the early and recent crisis, respectively, in comparison with a 60% average 
during the non-crisis periods. Similarly, those firms initially borrowing both bank and public debt, 
migrated to public debt exclusively in a 29% and 31% of the cases during both crises, in contrast 
with an average 13% in non-crisis periods, noticeably leaving the bank credit market in search for 
funding from the public. Both crises were also characterized by a high persistence of public debt 
borrowers. For the early and late crises, respectively 47% and 43% of those clients initially 
borrowing only public debt remained exclusively in the same market during the next year, in 
contrast with an average 27% during the non-crisis years. 
All in all, the dynamics of the credit markets provide strong and consistent evidence of 
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bank credit contraction and funding substitution, and a particularly lengthy duration of the credit 
crunch in the 1990s crisis. 
F. FINANCIAL DISINTERMEDIATION AS A RESULT OF BANKING CRISES 
The ability of FI to efficiently channel funds from investors to firms depends on their own 
solvency conditions. In particular, arm’s length lending becomes relatively more attractive to 
investors than intermediated lending when FI find themselves under distress. Thus, during periods 
of banking crisis, it should be preferable for investors to bypass FI and fund non-financial firms 
directly. We show below that banking crises indeed propitiate financial disintermediation. 
Figure 4 presents the percentage of public debt issuances by firms in the banking sector34 
and non-financial firms over time, from SDC Platinum data on non-convertible bonds. The graph 
shows that during both the 1990s and the 2000s crises investors were more prone to lend directly 
to non-financial firms than in previous years, bypassing FI. For the latest crisis, disintermediation 
peaked in 2009, and started decreasing after that. Hence it seems plausible a byproduct of banking 
crises is a temporary disintermediation process that tends to revert once FI are back to stable 
conditions. 
[Insert Figure 4 here.] 
G. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have analyzed the severity of the banking crises of early 1990s and late 
                                                 
34 Industry number 45 in the Fama and French 49-industry classification, excluding Federal credit 
agencies such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Fama and French (1997). 
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2000s. We have shown that the former was moderate yet protracted and carried a total fall in bank 
credit that is comparable to that observed in the most recent crisis. We have argued that the recent 
financial crisis was more severe in terms of the size and systemic importance of the banks under 
distress, despite the comparability of the number of distress institutions. The systemic risk posed 
by the recent crisis led to quick and massive government responses, which rapidly curved banking 
distress and promoted a swift recovery in the bank credit market. This point highlights the 
importance of decisive government interventions. While it remains plausible that government 
intervention poses the risk of engendering future moral hazard, it also remains safe to assume that 
it can have a powerful healing effect on bank credit markets and economic activity. 
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Table 1: Banking Crises Statistics 
This table presents statistics on the duration and severity of the early 1990s and late 2000s 
banking crises. C&I Loans is the monthly stock of outstanding commercial and industrial 
loans, from all commercial banks, provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. Syndicated loan issuances are new U.S. dollar denominated loans with 
maturity of at least 1 year, secured by U.S. nonfinancial corporations and marketed in the 
U.S., from Thomson Reuters DealScan. Non-convertible bonds are new issuances of U.S. 
dollar denominated bonds with maturiy of at least 1 year, secured by U.S. nonfinancial 
corporations and marketed in the U.S., from SDC Platinum. Volumes of syndicated loans 
and non-convertibles bonds are computed quarterly. In order to smooth out seasonal effects, 
volumes are converted to centered rolling windows; that is, the volume for quarter t is the 
average volume between t-1 and t+1. This centering technique is meant to conserve the time-
related properties of the series. All series have been transformed to 2010 U.S. dollars, using 
the consumer price index: total all items for the United States, from the OECD. Data on 
government intervention are from Laeven and Valencia (2013) -liquidity support and fiscal 
cost (%GDP)- and Laeven and Valencia (2014) -asset purchases-. In Laeven and Valencia 
(2013) Fiscal costs are defined as the component of gross fiscal outlays related to the 
restructuring of the financial sector. They include fiscal costs associated with bank 
recapitalizations but exclude asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury. 
Liquidity support indicates liquidity support from the central bank, measured as the ratio of 
central bank claims on deposit money banks (line 12 in IFS) and liquidity support from the 
Treasury to total deposits and liabilities to nonresidents. Total deposits are computed as the 
sum of demand deposits (line 24), other deposits (line 25), and liabilities to nonresidents (line 
26). 
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Table 1: Banking Crises Statistics (Cont.) 
Panel A: Data from C&I Loans, Syndicated Loan Issuances, and Non-Convertible Bond 
Issuances 
 Early 1990s Late 2000s 
Start and Duration   
First Fall in C&I Loans Oct-89 Dec-08 
Last Fall in C&I Loans Dec-93 Nov-10 
Months of Fall in C&I Loans 51 24 
Total Bank Credit Percentage Change, Peak to Trough   
C&I Loans -21.9 -26.4 
Pace of Bank Debt Fall: Annualized Growth Rate, Cont. Comp. 
C&I Loans -5.8 -15.3 
Pace of Recovery: Annualized Growth Rate, Cont. Comp.  
C&I Loans during the First Year 7.2 5.1 
C&I Loans during the First Two Years 7.6 7.6 
Comparative: Total Percentage Change, by Credit Market, Peak to Trough 
Syndicated Loan Issuances -54.8 -75.4 
Non-Convertible Bonds Issuances 13.8 63.1 
Government Intervention   
Liquidity Support 0.0 4.7 
Fiscal Costs (%GDP) 0.0 4.5 
Asset Purchases (%GDP) 0.0 9.0 
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Table 1: Banking Crises Statistics (Cont.) 
Nonfinancial corporate bank debt is the quarterly stock of loans from depository institutions 
on the liabilities of nonfinancial corporate business, from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System Z.1 report. Nonfinancial corporate market debt is the quarterly stock 
of corporate bonds and commercial papers on the liabilities of nonfinancial corporate business, 
from the Z.1 release. All series have been transformed to 2010 U.S. dollars, using the consumer 
price index: total all items for the United States, from the OECD.  
Panel B: Data from BoG FRS Z.1 Release 
 Early 1990s Late 2000s 
Start and Duration   
First Fall Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt 1990:Q1 2009:Q1 
Last Fall Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt 1993:Q3 2010:Q3 
Months of Fall in Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt 45 21 
Total Bank Credit Percentage Change, Peak to Trough   
Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt -27.7 -43.4 
Pace of Bank Debt Fall: Annualized Growth Rate, Cont. Comp.  
Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt -8.6 -32.6 
Pace of Recovery: Annualized Growth Rate, Cont. Comp.  
Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt during First Year 4.1 8.9 
Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt during First Two Years 7.8 8.8 
Comparative: Total Percentage Change, by Credit Market, Peak to Trough  
Nonfinancial Corporate Bank Debt during First Year -27.7 -43.4 
Nonfinancial Corporate Market Debt during First Year 16.3 13.1 
 
 
  
105 
 
Table 2:  Steady States of Credit Markets 
Panel A presents the steady state distributions of syndicated bank loans and public debt issues 
imputed from transition matrices computed for each of the six overlapping two-year periods 
between 2004 and 2010.  Loans are syndicated bank loans to publicly traded firms.  Bonds are 
public debt issues.  In each year, we classify firms into one of four groups depending on whether 
the firm obtained: (i) no debt; (ii) loans only; (iii) bonds only; or (iv) both bank and public debt.  
The proportions of firms in each group at the beginning and end of each two-year period 
characterize an initial and a final state vector, and a Markov transition matrix describes the 
passage of firms to state i in period t+1 from state j in period t. The steady state distributions are 
the long-run equilibriums implied by each set of two-year market dynamics.  Panel B presents 
the conditional probabilities of securing bank (public) debt conditional on securing public (bank) 
debt. * denotes the value is significantly different from the average steady states between 1989 
and 2011 at 10% or better. 
Panel A: Steady State Dynamics of Aggregate Debt Financing 
  
1989-
1990 
1990-
1991 
1991-
1992 
1992-
1993 
1993-
1994 
1994-
1995 
1995-
1996 
1996-
1997 
No Debt 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.44 
Loans only 0.39 0.28* 0.33 0.35 0.46 0.40 0.45 0.49 
Bonds only 0.05 0.20* 0.16* 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 
Loans & Bonds 0.01* 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Firms 1,454 1,510 1,678 1,916 2,197 2,308 2,608 3,014 
  
1997-
1998 
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
No Debt 0.49 0.55 0.52 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.42 
Loans only 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.54 0.52 
Bonds only 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Loans & Bonds 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 
Firms 3,176 3,014 2,706 2,582 2,645 2,565 2,455 2,328 
  
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
Avg. 
1989-
2011 
SD 
1989-
2011 
No Debt 0.44 0.46 0.58* 0.55 0.46 0.37* 0.47 0.05 
Loans only 0.48 0.45 0.32 0.25* 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.08 
Bonds only 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.15* 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Loans & Bonds 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09* 0.05 0.02 
Firms 2,268 2,106 1,995 1,783 1,595 1,686 49,589 49,589 
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Table 2:  Steady States of Credit Markets (Cont.) 
Panel B: Conditional Probabilities of Funding Choice 
  
1989-
1990 
1990-
1991 
1991-
1992 
1992-
1993 
1993-
1994 
1994-
1995 
1995-
1996 
1996-
1997 
P(Bonds|Loans) 0.030 0.163 0.131 0.141 0.062 0.090 0.095 0.066 
P(Loans|Bonds) 0.194 0.214 0.240 0.291 0.506 0.365 0.496 0.466 
  
1997-
1998 
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
P(Bonds|Loans) 0.076 0.066 0.067 0.140 0.091 0.108 0.049 0.064 
P(Loans|Bonds) 0.318 0.489 0.629 0.663 0.723 0.680 0.662 0.636 
  
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
Avg. 
1989-
2011 
P(Bonds|Loans) 0.086 0.106 0.080 0.169 0.152 0.160 0.098 
P(Loans|Bonds) 0.570 0.561 0.288 0.249 0.434 0.718 0.418 
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Table 3: Average Borrowing Transition Matrices 
This table shows average transition matrices by periods. Panel A covers the banking crisis 
period 1989-1993. The notation 1989-1993 means that it covers the four transition matrices 
from 1989 to 1990, from 1990 to 1991, from 1991 to 1992, and from 1992 to 1993. 
Panel A: Crisis Average Transition Matrix (1989-1993) 
Final \ Initial No Debt Loans only Bonds only Loans & Bonds 
No Debt 0.37 0.73 0.39 0.35 
Loans only 0.51 0.23 0.06 0.13 
Bonds only 0.10 0.02 0.47 0.29 
Loans & Bonds 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.22 
Firms 889 563 144 44 
Panel B: Crisis Average Transition Matrix (2007-2009) 
Final \ Initial No Debt Loans only Bonds only Loans & Bonds 
No Debt 0.52 0.75 0.41 0.32 
Loans only 0.38 0.19 0.07 0.14 
Bonds only 0.07 0.03 0.43 0.31 
Loans & Bonds 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.23 
Firms 960 743 104 84 
Panel C: Non-Crisis Average Transition Matrix (1993-2007, 2009-2011) 
Final \ Initial No Debt Loans only Bonds only Loans & Bonds 
No Debt 0.35 0.60 0.38 0.24 
Loans only 0.59 0.35 0.20 0.32 
Bonds only 0.03 0.01 0.27 0.13 
Loans & Bonds 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.31 
Firms 1,184 1,061 109 99 
Panel D: All-Time Average Transition Matrix (1989-2011) 
Final \ Initial No Debt Loans Bonds L & B 
No Debt 0.37 0.64 0.39 0.27 
Loans only 0.56 0.31 0.16 0.27 
Bonds only 0.05 0.02 0.32 0.18 
Loans & Bonds 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.28 
Firms 1,110 942 115 88 
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Figure 1. Banking Industry Distress. This figure shows three measures of banking system 
distress. Commercial Banks Failure Index is the number of FDIC failed or assisted commercial 
banks divided by the number of FDIC insured commercial banks. FDIC Failed/Assisted 
Commercial Banks TA% is the total assets of FDIC failed or assisted banks scaled by the total 
assets of all FDIC-insured commercial banks. CPST Financial Firms Asset-Weighted EDF is the 
asset-weighted average EDF of financial firms in the Compustat Annual database (on the right 
scale). 
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Figure 2. Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks. The figure plots the 
monthly stock values of commercial and industrial loans, from all commercial banks. The volumes 
are deflated and expressed in 2010 US dollars, using the consumer price index series. The shaded 
areas depict recession periods in the United States. 
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Figure 3. Real Gross Domestic Product. This figure plots quarterly real gross domestic product 
in billions of chained 2009 US dollars. Series GDPC1 from FRED. The shaded areas depict 
recession periods in the United States. 
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Figure 4. Financial Intermediation: Percentage of Public Debt Issuances by Banking Sector 
and Non-Financial Borrowers. This figure plots the percentage of U.S. dollar-denominated non-
convertible bond issuances that correspond to the U.S. banking sector and to U.S. non-financial 
firms in the U.S. public market, from SDC Platinum. The banking sector is the industry number 
45 in the Fama and French 49-industry classification, excluding Federal credit agencies, such as 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Non-financial firms are those with standard industry code less than 
6000 or greater than 6999. 
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 ESSAY 3: ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND THE MATURITY OF DEBT35 
J. Santiago E. Barraza 
A. ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the relationship between aggregate economic distress and the maturity 
of debt. I argue that lenders would prefer shorter maturity of debt during periods of economic 
distress. I develop two lines of argument based on debt contracting to support this prediction, and 
the rationales rely heavily on the role that default risk and screening plays in lending transactions. 
In the first line of argument, a lender chooses the debt contract tenor that maximizes her expected 
profits. In doing so, she weighs the role of capital rotation with the expected margin on each 
transaction and the probability that the borrower defaults. The probability of the borrower 
defaulting depends on the aggregate economic conditions. As a result, a shock that reduces 
economic stability leads the lender to prefer shorter maturities on new debt contracts. The second 
argument builds on the concept of the lender’s rollover option, which is her opportunity to relend 
her loanable funds after collection. During times of economic distress this option is more valuable 
to the lender, who increases her number of options by shortening the maturity of new contracts. 
Finally, I test these predictions empirically using over twenty years of U.S. bank and public debt 
issues to show a significant negative relationship between aggregate economic riskiness and 
maturity of new debt contracts. Moreover, shortening maturities result in changes in the temporal 
financial structure of public nonfinancial corporations. 
                                                 
35 I am grateful to Amy Farmer, Salar Jahedi, Alexey Malakhov, and Kangzhen Xie for insightful 
comments and lengthy discussions on the early ideas of this paper. All errors remain solely mine. 
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Keywords: debt maturity, credit supply, economic distress, probability of default, 
survivorship. 
JEL Codes: G12, G21. 
B. INTRODUCTION 
The financial literature has recently highlighted the importance of debt maturity in 
corporate finance, particularly during financial crises. Some of the most interesting findings in this 
area are due to Almeida et al. (2011), who document the threat that maturing debt can pose on 
corporate investment when facing a shock on the supply of credit. He and Xiong (2012) have 
shown that an increase in assets’ fundamental volatility can induce further distress on financial 
intermediaries and spur runs on them. Fan et al. (2012) have also documented that the maturity of 
corporate debt is, to a great extent, a function of the economic setup – as opposed to the economic 
activities of the firm itself – in a study of the cross section of thirty nine countries. Similarly, 
Gopalan et al. (2014) have shown that changes to improve contract enforcement lead to longer 
debt maturity, which, in turn, bolster long-term investment. 
Theoretical works on the role of aggregate economic distress on nonfinancial firms as well 
as empirical tests in this regard remain relatively scarce, though. In this paper, I explore why and 
how the riskiness in the economic environment can shorten the debt maturity to the cross-section 
of firms, paying particular attention to tests on nonfinancial firms. From a perspective of cash-flow 
matching and financial frictions, the issue bears significant relevance to the financial literature, 
provided that shorter maturities on the firm liabilities impose restrictions on the portfolio of 
investment opportunities viable to the firm. 
The dominant theoretical approaches to determinants of debt contract maturity in the 
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financial literature rely on a principal-agent setup. In Flannery (1986), firms issue the type of 
security the markets overvalue the most. Investors know that firms act strategically and react 
accordingly. In a market with costly transactions, a separating equilibrium between good and bad 
(safest and riskiest, respectively) firms is possible. Good firms, considering their long-term debt 
relatively undervalued, issue short-term debt, and signal their quality to the market. Bad firms 
issue overpriced long-term debt. 
Diamond (1991) develops a model with asymmetric information where, in choosing the 
optimal maturity, borrowers trade off their preference for short-term maturity due to an expected 
credit rating improvement with their preference for liquidity (risk). Good borrowers choose to 
issue short-term debt, somewhat riskier borrowers choose to issue long-term debt, and the riskiest 
ones are constrained to issue short-term debt. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of increases in aggregate economic 
distress on the maturity of corporate debt. While new debt issues constitute the main thread of the 
argument and tests, additional tests on the maturity of balance-sheet liabilities from nonfinancial 
public firms demonstrate how far-reaching these effects are. 
I develop a model of debt contracting that accounts for perhaps the single most important 
change observed during an economic crisis, i.e., an increase in the probability of default and failure 
of borrowers. An implicit assumption of this model is that lenders are powerful enough to set the 
maturity conditions on the new contracts. Although this assumption might look slightly strong at 
first sight, it is not necessarily detached from reality. Consider, for instance, that banks publish 
their required rates for given maturities and that, in doing so, they can effectively induce borrowers 
to choose the maturities of their preference. Further, firms issuing new public debt will typically 
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scout credit markets in advance, in order to adapt the offerings to the current investors’ preferences. 
The analysis herein is then focused on the supply side of the credit market, and it assumes 
perfect information among the contracting agents. The main intuition -which I develop in two 
alternative yet complementary manners- is that lenders prefer shorter maturities when faced with 
increased levels of economic riskiness because the value they provide, in the form of flexibility 
and screening opportunities, increases with the uncertainty of future results. I show that increases 
in aggregate economic risk bring about shorter maturities not only in new credit contracts –bank 
loans and non-convertible bond issues- but also on the stock of liabilities on the balance-sheet of 
nonfinancial corporations. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In sections II and III, I explore the reasons why, during 
periods of economic distress, we should expect to observe shorter maturities on new debt 
issuances. Section II develops a model of the lender’s profit maximization problem, where the 
lender chooses the optimal contract tenor, given that her expected profit is a function of the margin 
on each lending transaction, the rotation of her stock of loanable funds, and the probability that 
borrowers pay back their loans.  Section III further develops the intuition of the relationship 
between riskiness and maturity by focusing on the rollover option a lender has when lending 
repeatedly over time.  
In section IV, I provide empirical evidence on the shortening of the maturity during periods 
of economic distress, using over twenty years of data on both debt contracts and stocks of corporate 
liabilities. Graphs, correlations, and multivariate tests all provide robust evidence consistent with 
the main hypothesis of this paper. Section V discusses the findings and possible extensions to this 
paper, and section VI concludes. 
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C. THE LONG-RUN LENDING PROFITABILITY IS A FUNCTION OF THE 
BORROWERS’ PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL, WHICH IS A FUNCTION OF 
THE CONTRACT TENOR 
This section develops a model wherein a lender who expects to have a long enough 
economic life maximizes her profits by choosing the optimal tenor of each contract she gives. The 
lender’s profitability is a function of the expected transaction margin multiplied by the rotation of 
her loanable funds. While loan rotation is desirable, issuing new contracts repeatedly carries 
transaction costs that make higher rotation -and shorter maturities- less attractive. 
Borrowers face a non-zero random probability of bankruptcy at any point in the future. 
Hence, the probability of borrower survival36 is decreasing in time, which makes shorter maturities 
more desirable. Shorter maturities reduce the lender’s credit risk exposure and give her further 
screening opportunities.  
One can safely argue that the probability of a business success or failure is determined, to 
a large extent, by the aggregate economic conditions. Hence, in this analysis the probability of a 
borrower’s failure is a function of a parameter that accounts for the general economic riskiness. 
Thus the optimal contract maturity can be affected by an exogenous shock to this parameter. 
In the next subsection, I set up the lender’s problem and find the optimal contract tenor. 
Next, I estimate the comparative statics that derive from an exogenous shock to the risk in the 
economic environment. Crucially, the results show that the lender’s optimal response to an 
increase in the riskiness in the economic environment is the shortening of the new contract 
                                                 
36 Assuming any firm that goes bankrupt does not survive. 
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maturities. 
1. Lender’s Profit Maximization Problem 
Consider a lender whose profit maximization problem is a function of the expected 
profitability of each contract multiplied by the number of contracts she generates throughout her 
economic life. The profit maximization function is as follows: 
 𝜋 = 𝑛[𝐴𝜃(𝑙, 𝑧) − 𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿] (1) 
With:  
𝑛 = 𝑉/𝑙 (2) 
Where:  
π: profits. 
n: number of contracts issued by the lender during her economic life. 
V: lender’s expected economic life. 
l: contract tenor. 
A: amount to be repaid by the borrower at maturity, which she will pay if her business has 
survived until that point in time37. 
                                                 
37 Notice that, in this setup, the lender receives, at maturity, either A or nothing. This is a 
simplification that does not necessarily restrict generality. As a matter of fact, A can be thought of 
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θ(l, z): the cumulative distribution function of borrowers’ probability of survival. 
z: a non-negative parameter representing the riskiness of the economic conditions. 
Importantly, the effect on firms of a positive change in z is a decrease in their probability of 
survival -or an increase in their probability of failure. Given that the cumulative distribution of the 
borrower’s failure F(l, z) = 1 – θ(l, z) and provided z > 0, we have that ∂θ(l, z)/∂z < 0  ∂F(l, 
z)/∂z > 0, where F(l, z) is the cumulative distribution function of borrowers’ failure. 
L: total amount loaned. 
c: cost to the lender of issuing a loan. 
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the lender expects to operate for an 
indefinitely long period of time, and we can normalize a lender’s expected economic life to 1. It 
follows that n = l -1. The profit maximization problem for a lender that maximizes her expected 
profits by choosing the optimal contract tenor can be written as follows: 
max
𝑙
𝜋 = 𝑙−1{𝐴[1 − 𝐹(𝑙, 𝑧)] − 𝐿(1 + 𝑐)} (3) 
The first order condition (FOC) of this problem is: 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑙
= −𝐴 + 𝐴𝐹(𝑙, 𝑧) + 𝐿(1 + 𝑐) − 𝐴𝑙
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑙
≡ 0  (4) 
                                                 
as the average recovery rate, pooling both those cases where the full amount is paid with those 
where (partial) default occurs. 
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And the optimal contract maturity derived from the FOC can be written as: 
𝑙∗ =
𝐿(1+𝑐)+𝐴𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)−𝐴
𝐴
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑙
  (5) 
2. Comparative Statics 
We analyze next the impact of a shock to z on the optimal contract tenor, which is the 
central issue of interest in this paper. Consider an exogenous shock to z that makes the survival of 
borrowers up to a future point in time less likely, irrespective of the location of that point in time. 
The total differentiation of the FOC in (4) yields: 
𝐴
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑙
𝑑𝑙 + 𝐴
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
𝑑𝑧 − 𝐴 [
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑙
+ 𝑙
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑙2
] 𝑑𝑙 − 𝐴𝑙
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧𝜕𝑙
𝑑𝑧 ≡ 0  (6) 
And from (6), the effect of a shock to z on the optimal contract maturity can be written 
as: 
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝑧
=
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
−𝑙
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧𝜕𝑙
𝑙
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑙2
  (7) 
The intuition that lenders shall choose shorter maturities when there is a negative shock to 
the economy implies that dl/dz < 0. From (7) we observe that dl/dz < 0 holds iff: 
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧) 𝜕𝑧⁄
𝑙𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧) 𝜕𝑙2⁄
<
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧) 𝜕𝑧𝜕𝑙⁄
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧) 𝜕𝑙2⁄
  (8) 
Testing the validity of (8) requires a particular form of F(l, z). I use an exponential 
distribution to this effect, provided this is arguably the most widely utilized function in survival 
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analysis.38 
Let F(l, z) be an exponential distribution whose probability density function and cumulative 
distribution function, respectively, are as follows: 
𝑓(𝑙, 𝑧) = {
𝑧𝑒−𝑧𝑙, 𝑙 ≥ 0
0, 𝑙 < 0
} (9) 
𝐹(𝑙, 𝑧) = {
1 − 𝑒−𝑧𝑙, 𝑙 ≥ 0
0, 𝑙 < 0
} (10) 
The second derivative of F(l, z) with respect to l 2 is negative for all positive values of z, 
and the inequality sign in (8) flips when cancelling this element on both sides, yielding: 
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
> 𝑙
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧𝜕𝑙
  (11) 
Integrating both sides with respect to dz we have: 
∫
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
+∞
−∞
𝑑𝑧 > 𝑙 ∫
𝜕2𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧𝜕𝑙
+∞
−∞
𝑑𝑧  (12) 
𝐹(𝑙, 𝑧) > 𝑙
𝜕𝐹(𝑙,𝑧)
𝜕𝑙
  (13) 
Substituting (9) and (10) for l ≥ 0 in (13) and operating yields the condition under which 
                                                 
38 Other survival/failure functions could be used alternatively. In particular, the family of Weibull 
distributions, to which the exponential distribution function belongs, offers suitable alternatives. 
Specific restrictions on the parameters of the distributions might be required though. 
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dl/dz < 0, which is as follows: 
1−𝑒−𝑧𝑙
𝑧𝑒−𝑧𝑙
> 𝑙  (14) 
It is readily observable that (14) holds for all l > 0. 
3. Illustration: Aggregate Economic Risk and Optimal Contracts 
Equation (5) provides the solution to the optimal contract tenor for our lender. I give values to the 
parameters in the model to show how the optimal contract tenor changes with different levels of 
economic riskiness ceteris paribus. Figure 1 presents the values of l * for different levels of 
aggregate economic riskiness z assuming the lender uses three alternative setups of transaction 
margin. The loan amount L is fixed at $100, and, under the base transaction margin setup, the 
repayment amount A is $105. The low and high transaction margin setups have repayment amounts 
of $104 and $106, respectively. The transaction cost c is 0.02. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
For the base scenario, the optimal contract maturity ranges between 130 periods when the rate of 
failure is 0.2% per period and 26 periods when the rate of failure is 1% per period, showing that 
the higher the riskiness, the shorter the optimal tenor ceteris paribus. We can also observe in this 
figure that higher transaction margins offer the lender a more sizeable buffer that allows her 
lending longer maturities – and in doing so, to take higher credit risk. 
The result from (14) predicts that the optimal lender’s response to an increase in the level of 
riskiness in the economy –that is, a positive shock to z such that the probability of a borrower’s 
survival is lower than before the shock- is to shorten the maturity of the new lending contracts. An 
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illustration follows.  
Figure 2 shows dl/dz, or the change in the optimal contract maturity given a shock on z. As before, 
the calibrations correspond to three alternative scenarios of base, low, and high transaction margins 
where the initial parameter values common to all scenarios are L = $100, c = 0.02, and z = 0.005. 
In the base, low, and high margin scenarios, A = $105, $104, and $106, respectively. The optimal 
contract tenors for the base, low, and high margin calibrations solve to l * = 52.10, 42.04, and 60.72 
periods, respectively. For the base scenario, an increase of 0.1% in the failure rate – i.e., dz = 
0.001– leads to a shortening of 10.4 periods in the optimal contract maturity. We can also observe 
that the change in the optimal contract tenor is more sensitive for the high transaction margin setup 
–which is also the one with longer initial optimal maturity. 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
D. ROLLOVER OPTION 
1. Intuition 
The rollover option is the opportunity a lender has to extend the period she lends her 
loanable funds by lending again. This rollover option does not necessarily require the loan to be 
granted to an existing customer or to represent the extension of the maturity of an existing loan. It 
suffices for the lender to be able to allocate her funds again among the pool of borrowers with 
funding needs. Notice that this rollover opportunity entails at the same time a screening 
opportunity. This screening opportunity is expected to be more valuable to the lender under 
conditions of aggregate economic distress, when credit risks are heightened. 
For a lender who expects to do business for a long enough period of time relative to the 
tenor of her contracts, shortening the maturity of the loans she offers equates to increasing the 
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number of rollover options she will enjoy – provided demand for credit exists at the time of 
rollover. Assuming these options have positive value – which by definition they do – and absent 
any transactional costs, it would be desirable to have as many options as possible.39 Ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the volatility of the underlying asset will inevitably raise the price of the 
option, which is evident in the effect of variance on equation (13) in Black and Scholes (1973), 
making shortening maturities – and thus creating more screening options – a value-creating 
strategy. For this reason, we should expect to observe shorter maturities in the debt contracts issued 
during periods of economic distress, when volatility increases. 
2. Isoprices 
We can obtain a prediction similar to that on (14) by analyzing the lending problem from 
an option pricing perspective. Consider a call option with strike price $110, given a market price 
of $100 for the underlying asset – with no dividends or other intermediate payments – and a risk-
free interest rate of 5%. Consider next that shocks to the volatility of the underlying asset are 
possible, which is true for virtually all assets in our economy, except for those widely considered 
to be risk-free and intended to be held until maturity.  
Furthermore, consider an investor willing to transact bets of particular sizes on the future 
prices of the assets in the economy. The bets she transacts are options, and the size of each bet is 
                                                 
39 Naturally, there is a limit to the total value added of creating more options, which is a function 
of the non-zero transactional costs of creating and executing the options. In the case of lending 
transactions, there are practical limits to the frequency with which both the lender and the borrower 
would be willing to review and rollover a contract. 
125 
 
the market price of the option she transacts. Holding the strike price constant, given a shock to the 
volatility, the investor can only make choices on the maturity of the contracts she transacts in order 
to keep options of her preferred size (price). 
Using the Black-Scholes formula for European call options on stocks with no dividends, it 
is possible to compute isocurves where the price of the option remains unchanged for different 
combinations of maturity and volatility of the return of the underlying asset, ceteris paribus. Figure 
3 presents simulated isoprices under the conditions described above, for call prices of $10, $20, 
and $30. An investor with a preference for the isoprice of $10, for instance, will choose an option 
contract with a time to maturity of approximately 1 year when the standard deviation of the rate of 
return of the underlying asset is 30%, yet she will choose a maturity of only roughly 5 months if 
the standard deviation rises to 50%. 
[Insert Figure 3 here.] 
Now, assume a lender has a preference for the isoprices (value) underlying her rollover 
options – or her expected return from every lending transaction. Then, given a shock to the 
volatility of the returns on the underlying asset – the firm value that supports the credit repayment, 
for instance – the lender will shorten the maturity of new contracts so that to stay on her preferred 
isoprice. 
E. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section, I provide evidence showing that aggregate economic riskiness is strongly 
associated with shorter debt maturity. In doing so, I use three alternative proxies for riskiness and 
two distinctly different measures of maturity. The first measure of economic riskiness is the 
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Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX), which measures 30-day 
expected volatility of the S&P 500 Index using near-term and next-term call and put SPX options. 
While an important advantage of this measure is its timeliness, a relative drawback, for the purpose 
of this study, is the fact that it reflects volatility of the value of equity ownership of the firm, but 
not directly volatility of the value of assets, which would be a better measure of economic riskiness. 
For this reason, alternatively, I use the market-based implied volatility of assets of U.S. public 
firms, derived from the application of the Merton (1974) option pricing formula, and following 
Bohn and Crosbie (2003), on the data from Compustat Fundamentals Annual and CRSP. This 
measure is also timely, though, additionally, it reflects the volatility of value of productive assets 
– as opposed to that of ownership – which adjusts better to the purpose of this study. Lastly, I use 
the spread between Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield and 10-year Treasury constant 
maturity yield. This measure is aimed at capturing the investors’ consensus on the credit risk of 
relatively healthy corporations. 
The most straightforward and timely measure of debt maturity-revealed preferences comes 
from new issues of bank and public debt. I use syndicated, bilateral, club, and sole-lender bank 
loans from DealScan and non-convertible bonds from SDC Platinum. These issues correspond to 
nonfinancial U.S. firms, were sold in U.S. markets, denominated in U.S. dollars, and had maturities 
over 12 months at issuance. A second measure of debt maturity comes from debt reported in the 
balance-sheet by U.S. nonfinancial public firms included in Compustat Fundamentals Annual. 
Using the temporal structure of debt due at different time intervals, I construct a measure of debt 
duration that is indicative of the maturity of outstanding corporate debt. 
1. Evidence from New Debt Issuances 
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Figures 4 and 5 show how maturity of new debt issues move over time, together with VIX 
for a reference of aggregate economic distress. In Figure 4, periods of relatively low economic 
riskiness, such as the first half of 1990s and the period between 2003 and 2006, display increases 
in the average maturity of new bank debt contracts. In contrast, periods of exacerbated volatility, 
such as 1998-2002, – with the Russian debt crisis, the Long-Term Capital Management bailout, 
the bursting of the dot.com bubble, and the events of 9/11 – and the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
show significant contractions in the maturity of new bank debt. Figure 5 depicts a very similar 
picture using the maturity of non-convertible bonds instead. 
[Insert Figure 4 here.] 
[Insert Figure 5 here.] 
The relationships between economic riskiness and maturity of new debt issues is robust. 
Table 1 reports the correlations between VIX, asset volatility, Baa corporate bond spread over the 
10-year risk-free rate, and the maturity of bank debt and public debt for data series between 1990 
and 2011. We should first notice that all three measures of economic distress are highly correlated. 
VIX has a correlation of .56 with asset volatility and .77 with the Baa corporate bond spread. Asset 
volatility and the Baa corporate bond spread display the lowest value, with .38. All three measures 
show robust negative correlations with both bank and public debt maturities. The correlation of 
bank debt maturity with them ranges between -.74 (asset volatility) and -.43 (VIX), while that of 
public debt maturity ranges between -.73 (asset volatility) and -.31 (Baa corporate bond spread). 
Furthermore, the correlation between bank and public debt is also high, with .46. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
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Next, I test the relationship between economic riskiness and maturity of new debt contracts 
in a multivariate framework. Using the model in (15), below, I run OLS regressions using firm, 
year and industry fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm.  
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 =  𝛼 + η𝐿𝑗 + 𝛾𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑅𝑡 + 𝛱 + 𝛤 + 𝛸 + 𝜀𝑗  (15) 
Where α is an intercept, 𝐿𝑗 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the contract j is 
a bank loan and 0 if it is a bond issue, 𝑪𝑗,𝑡, and 𝑭𝑖,𝑡−1 are vectors of contract and lagged firm 
characteristics, respectively, 𝑅𝑡 is a time-dependent vector of interest rates data, Π, Γ, and Χ are 
vectors of firm, year, and industry fixed effects, respectively, and 𝜺𝒋 is the error term. I use a 
seventeen-industry classification based on Fama and French (1997). Variable definitions can be 
found in the appendix. 
Demand could potentially drive different maturity preferences at times. During periods of 
relatively high interest rates, borrowers could prefer shorter maturities, expecting to roll over debt 
in the near future at lower interest rates. Also, with a steep term structure of interest rates, taking 
the rollover risk of shorter maturities could be preferable to the excessively high cost of debt for 
long-term debt. For these reasons, I control for the level of risk-free interest rates by including the 
1-year Treasury constant maturity rate in the regression models. Additionally, I control for the 
steepness of the term structure of interest rates with the spread between the 10-year and the 1-year 
Treasury constant maturity rate.  
I use six alternative specifications for robustness. In Table 2, Models 1 through 3 show that 
the higher the VIX, the asset volatility, or the Baa spread, the shorter the maturity of new debt 
contracts. These relationships are significant at 5% level or better and, moreover, the specifications 
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can explain between 38 and 39% of the variation in maturity. Models 4 through 6 control, 
additionally, for firm credit risk, using the cross-sectional rank of the expected default frequency. 
As in the first three models, our three proxies for economic riskiness remain statistically 
significant, and the higher the firm credit risk, the lower the maturity of new debt. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
2. Evidence from the Existing Debt on the Balance-Sheet of Nonfinancial Public 
Corporations 
We would expect that shorter tenor in new debt issues result in shorter maturity of the 
balance-sheet debt of corporations. We should then be able to establish a relationship between the 
economic conditions and the maturity of corporate liabilities. Figure 6 and Table 3 explore this 
notion using a graph and correlations. To proxy for corporate debt maturity, I create a measure of 
debt duration. 
The Compustat Fundamentals Annual dataset provides details on the maturity of existing 
corporate debt. The two main data items are Long-term debt and Debt in current liabilities, which 
encompasses the current portion of Long-term debt and Notes payable. I add up Long-term debt 
and Debt in current liabilities to obtain Debt. Long-term debt includes Debt due in Years 2, 3, 4, 
5 and beyond. Using this information I create a measure of the following form: 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1 ∗
𝐷1
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
+ 2 ∗
𝐷2
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
+ 3 ∗
𝐷3
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
+ 4 ∗
𝐷4
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
+ 5 ∗
𝐷5
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
+ 6 ∗
𝐷𝑁
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
  (16) 
Where D1, 2, 3, 4, 5 represent the portion of debt that is due in the next 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
years, respectively, while DN represents the portion of debt that is due beyond the fifth year.  
Figure 6 shows the annual average corporate debt duration in the cross-section of 
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nonfinancial firms available in Compustat Fundamentals Annual, together with the annual average 
month-end  VIX. Consistent with the findings on contract data, there is a significant fall in 
corporate debt duration between 1998 and 2001 and again between 2008 and 2009. The evidence 
on Table 3 shows, correspondingly, a large and negative relationship between economic riskiness 
and the maturity of debt in the corporate balance-sheets. 
[Insert Figure 6 here.] 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
I use the level and change of corporate debt duration as alternative dependent variables to 
run multivariate tests. I run model (17), next, in panel firm-fixed effects regressions, which also 
include year and industry fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm.  
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑅𝑡 + Γ + 𝛸 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  (17) 
Where α is an intercept, 𝑐𝑖 is the firm i fixed effect; 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of lagged firm 
characteristics, 𝑅𝑡 is a time-dependent vector of interest rates, Γ and Χ are vectors of year and 
industry fixed effects, respectively, and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term for firm i at time t. 
Table 4 reports the results of regressing alternative specifications of (17). In Panel A, 
Models 1 through 3 use duration as the dependent variable, while Models 4 through 6 use the 
change in duration instead. Consistent with the findings on the contract-level regressions, higher 
levels of VIX, asset volatility, and Baa spread are associated with decreases in duration of the 
corporate debt, and these results are significant at the 1% level in all specifications. As before, the 
high R-Squared values demonstrate the model’s ability to explain variation in duration. 
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Specifications in Panel B mirror those in Panel A and include, additionally, year fixed effects. 
These are the most stringent tests we can run, provided the year fixed effects are likely to absorb 
part of the aggregate riskiness effect, since the risk variables have only annual values. All results 
are still robust, with the measures of economic riskiness maintaining the right sign and good levels 
of significance. Though the Baa spread coefficients do not report stars, they are respectively 
significant at 13.4% and 11.9% in models 9 and 12. 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
F. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
Sections II and III develop the intuition of how aggregate economic distress should reduce 
the maturity of credit. Section IV provides robust evidence suggesting this intuition is observable 
in new debt issues and its effect extends to firm balance-sheets. Next, I discuss further possible 
extensions of this work. 
The economic model developed in Section II can be extended in at least two meaningful 
manners. A first extension could accommodate a framework where lender and borrower interact 
repeatedly while readjusting the terms of new debt until a new equilibrium is reached. The ideal 
setup for such a model would be a game where agents develop best-response strategies. Assuming 
incomplete and asymmetric information, a Bayesian approach could be adequate. Specific 
assumptions regarding the importance of the lender-borrower relationship should be set up in a 
way that the game can be defined as finite or not, and with known or unknown ending, if finite. 
A second extension of interest for the contractual strand of literature relates to the role of 
covenants at different stages of the economic cycle. Changes in the economic climate can be 
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expected to affect the tightness of covenants of new debt. Hence, a model with asymmetric 
information could develop predictions on the expected changes in covenants and their interaction 
with maturity. 
The fact that the association between aggregate economic riskiness and debt maturity 
reaches the firm balance-sheets has important economic implications. Shorter effective debt 
maturity on the corporate financial structure (i) imposes a restriction on the firm’s portfolio of 
investment opportunities – provided that matching the cash flows from assets and liabilities is, at 
least to some extent, relevant to the firm – and (ii) exposes the firm to higher risks, should it choose 
to accept the higher likelihood of mismatching cash flows.  
Using the establishment of debt recovery tribunals in India, Gopalan et al. (2014) show that 
better contract enforcement leads to longer debt maturity, which, in turn, results in longer-term 
firm investment. Gopalan et al. focus on the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as a measure of 
long-term investment, and this emphasizes the point that longer debt maturity should propitiate 
investment in infrastructure, a key factor to long-term economic development.  
We should also expect longer debt maturity to bolster investment in R&D, another key 
element to long-term economic growth and development which is characterized by temporarily 
distant and uncertain payoffs. All this renders the study of debt maturity and its impact on 
investment of high practical relevance. Hence, another worthy extension of this paper would 
include the role of debt maturity on long-term investments in U.S. firms. The significance of debt 
maturity can be expected to be mitigated by access to multiple funding markets, strong credit 
reputation, borrowing relationships, existing credit lines, liquidity holdings, and low volatility of 
cash inflows, among the most relevant aspects. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the relationship between aggregate economic distress and the maturity 
of debt. I have argued that lenders would prefer shorter debt maturity during periods of economic 
distress, provided heightened borrower default risk and notoriously challenging forecasting 
conditions. Shorter debt maturities give the lender the opportunity to screen prospective borrowers 
more frequently, which is a value-creating policy.  
I develop two lines of argument based on the debt contracting process to support this 
prediction. In the first line of argument, a lender chooses the debt contract tenor that maximizes 
her expected profits. In making this decision, she weighs the role that capital rotation has in her 
profit function, together with the expected margin on each transaction and the probability that a 
borrower defaults. The probability of a borrower defaulting is increasing in the level of aggregate 
economic riskiness. As a result, a shock that reduces economic stability leads the lender to prefer 
shorter maturities on new debt contracts.  
The second argument builds on the concept of the lender’s rollover option, which is her 
opportunity to relend her loanable funds after collection. During times of economic distress this 
option is more valuable to the lender; hence, she increases her number of options by shortening 
the maturity of new contracts.  
I have empirically tested the relationship between aggregate economic distress and debt 
maturity on more than twenty years of U.S. bank and public debt issues and have shown this 
relationship is negative, significant, and robust to different specifications and measures. Moreover, 
the relationship is strong enough to effectively modify the financial structure of public nonfinancial 
corporations. 
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The implications of these findings are economically important, provided the existing 
literature has shown that short debt maturity constrains the maturity of assets firms invest in. Firms 
that can borrow long-term can invest in assets with temporarily more distant cash flows, which 
makes structural investment more feasible. 
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Table 1: Economic Riskiness Maturity of New Debt Issuances – Correlations 
This table presents pairwise correlations between measures of economic riskiness and maturity 
of new debt contracts between 1990 and 2011. VIX is the annual average of monthly adjusted 
close values. Firm-level asset volatility is computed as the implied volatility of assets from the 
application of the Merton (1974) pricing formula for a call option, following Bohn and Crosbie 
(2003). The asset volatility series used to compute the correlation is the annual average of the 
monthly cross-sectional averages for all firms in Compustat and CRSP with data available for 
computation. Baa Corp. Bond Spread is the Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield relative 
to yield on 10-year Treasury constant maturity. The public and bank debt maturity series 
represent the annual average of the monthly average for each contract type. 
  VIX 
Asset 
Volatility 
Baa Corp. 
Bond 
Spread 
Bank Debt 
Maturity 
Public 
Debt 
Maturity 
VIX 1.00     
Assets Volatility 0.56 1.00    
Baa Corp. Bond Spread 0.77 0.38 1.00   
Bank Debt Maturity -0.43 -0.74 -0.58 1.00  
Public Debt Maturity -0.49 -0.73 -0.31 0.46 1.00 
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Table 2: Debt Contract Maturity 
The dependent variable is debt contract maturity at issuances, in months.  The sample 
includes bank and public debt issuances between 1990 and 2011.  Bank Debt is a limited 
dependent variable which takes a value of 1 if Bank Debt, and 0, if Public Debt.  All 
borrower controls are lagged one year, with the exception of the EDF Group, which is 
lagged three months.  See appendix for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 165.00 *** 237.06 *** 212.36 *** 
Bank Debt -99.45 *** -99.15 *** -99.06 *** 
Amount -1.15 * -1.04  -1.04  
Spread 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 
Borrower Controls       
Bounded Q -1.85 * -1.80 * -1.69  
ROA 3.40  2.93  2.64  
Assets 0.07  0.07  0.07  
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 16.67 * 17.69 ** 17.65 ** 
Cash/Total Assets 8.43  9.16  9.22  
Financial Debt/Total Assets -6.87 ** -8.02 ** -8.31 *** 
Debt Maturity 3.81 ** 4.25 *** 4.35 *** 
EDF Group       
Economic Conditions       
Short-Term Rate -0.21  -1.30  -4.54 *** 
Term Structure -2.77 * -4.19 *** -6.37 *** 
VIX -0.25 **     
Asset Volatility   -1.39 ***   
Baa Corp. Bond Spread         -9.65 *** 
Firm F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 25,352  25,916  25,916  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.38   0.39   0.39   
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Table 2: Debt Contract Maturity (Cont.) 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 175.45 *** 250.40 *** 215.63 *** 
Bank Debt -100.49 *** -100.19 *** -100.08 *** 
Amount -1.37 ** -1.22 * -1.22 * 
Spread 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 
Borrower Controls       
Bounded Q -4.21 *** -4.06 *** -4.00 *** 
ROA -0.45  -0.54  -1.41  
Assets 0.02  0.03  0.03  
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 16.07  17.44 * 17.40 * 
Cash/Total Assets 11.31  10.45  10.36  
Financial Debt/Total Assets -5.11  -6.02  -6.34  
Debt Maturity 3.55 ** 3.88 ** 3.84 ** 
EDF Group -0.58 *** -0.58 *** -0.61 *** 
Economic Conditions       
Short-Term Rate -0.56  -1.74  -4.77 ** 
Term Structure -3.03 * -4.47 *** -6.79 *** 
VIX -0.25 **     
Asset Volatility   -1.58 ***   
Baa Corp. Bond Spread         -9.69 *** 
Firm F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 19,735  20,041  20,041  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.38   0.38   0.38   
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Table 3: Economic Riskiness and Balance-Sheet Debt Duration - Correlations 
This table presents pairwise correlations between measures of economic riskiness and maturity 
of new debt contracts between 1990 and 2011. VIX is the annual average of monthly adjusted 
close values. Firm-level asset volatility is computed as the implied volatility of assets from 
the application of the Merton (1974) pricing formula for a call option, following Bohn and 
Crosbie (2003). The asset volatility series used to compute the correlation is the annual 
average of the monthly cross-sectional averages for all firms in Compustat and CRSP with 
data available for computation. Baa Corp. Bond Spread is the Moody's seasoned Baa corporate 
bond yield telative to yield on 10-year Treasury constant maturity. Corp. Debt. Duration is the 
cross-sectional average duration of balance-sheet debt for non-financial firms in the 
Compustat Annual data set. Non-financial firms are defined as those with Standard Industry 
Codes below 6000 or above 6999. 
  VIX 
Asset 
Volatility 
Baa Corp. 
Bond Spread 
Corp. Debt 
Duration 
VIX 1.00    
Assets Volatility 0.56 1.00   
Baa Corp. Bond Spread 0.77 0.38 1.00  
Corp. Debt Duration -0.52 -0.82 -0.61 1.00 
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Table 4: Duration of Debt in the Balance-Sheet 
In models 1 through 3, the dependent variable is change in the duration of debt in the 
balance-sheet; in models 4 through 6, the level of debt duration in the balance-sheet.  The 
sample includes all non-financial firms on Compustat Annual data set between 1988 and 
2011.  All borrower controls are lagged one year, with the exception of the EDF Group, 
which is value in December of the previous year, and the change in Financial Debt/Total 
Assets, which is the difference between the ratio in the current year and the previous year.  
See appendix for variable definitions.  All regressions are panel, fixed effects.  The 
Hausman tests reject the H0 that random effects estimates are consistent. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
 Change in Balance-Sheet Debt Duration 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.80 *** 1.88 *** 1.99 *** 
Debt Duration -0.52 *** -0.52 *** -0.52 *** 
Bounded Q 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 
ROA 0.03  0.03  0.03  
Assets 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.09  0.10  0.07  
Cash/Total Assets 0.07  0.06  0.08  
Financial Debt/Total Assets 0.76 *** 0.77 *** 0.76 *** 
∆(Financial Debt/Total Assets) 1.12 *** 1.07 *** 1.11 *** 
S&P Rated 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 
EDF Group 0.00 ** 0.00  0.00 ** 
Economic Conditions       
Short-Term Rate -0.02 *** 0.00  -0.03 *** 
Term Structure -0.02 *** 0.00  -0.02 *** 
VIX -0.01 ***     
Asset Volatility   -0.01 ***   
Baa Corp. Bond Spread         -0.11 *** 
Firm F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 41,757  41,705  43,286  
R-Squared 0.27   0.27   0.27   
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Table 4: Duration of Debt in the Balance-Sheet (Cont.) 
Panel A (Cont.) 
 Balance-Sheet Debt Duration 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 1.83 *** 1.92 *** 2.03 *** 
Debt Duration 0.45 *** 0.45 *** 0.45 *** 
Bounded Q 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 
ROA 0.03  0.03  0.03  
Assets 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.09  0.10 * 0.07  
Cash/Total Assets 0.07  0.06  0.08  
Financial Debt/Total Assets 0.76 *** 0.77 *** 0.77 *** 
∆(Financial Debt/Total Assets) 1.12 *** 1.08 *** 1.11 *** 
S&P Rated 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 
EDF Group 0.00 ** 0.00  0.00 ** 
Economic Conditions        
Short-Term Rate -0.02 *** 0.00  -0.03 *** 
Term Structure -0.02 *** 0.00  -0.02 *** 
VIX -0.01 ***     
Asset Volatility    -0.01 ***   
Baa Corp. Bond Spread         -0.11 *** 
Firm F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 41,762  41,711  43,292  
R-Squared 0.23   0.23   0.23   
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Table 4: Duration of Debt in the Balance-Sheet (Cont.) 
Panel B 
 Change in Balance-Sheet Debt Duration 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant 1.67 *** 1.99 *** 1.65 *** 
Debt Duration -0.53 *** -0.52 *** -0.52 *** 
Bounded Q 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 
ROA 0.03  0.03  0.03  
Assets 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.07  0.07  0.07  
Cash/Total Assets 0.04  0.05  0.06  
Financial Debt/Total Assets 0.79 *** 0.78 *** 0.79 *** 
∆(Financial Debt/Total Assets) 1.13 *** 1.10 *** 1.12 *** 
S&P Rated 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 
EDF Group 0.00 ** 0.00 * 0.00 ** 
Economic Conditions       
Short-Term Rate 0.00  0.01  0.01  
Term Structure -0.02  0.00  -0.02  
VIX -0.01 ***     
Asset Volatility   -0.01 ***   
Baa Corp. Bond Spread         -0.03   
Firm F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 41,757  41,705  43,286  
R-Squared 0.28   0.27   0.27   
 
  
144 
 
Table 4: Duration of Debt in the Balance-Sheet (Cont.) 
Panel B (Cont.) 
 Balance-Sheet Debt Duration 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Constant 1.70 *** 2.04 *** 1.69 *** 
Debt Duration 0.45 *** 0.45 *** 0.45 *** 
Bounded Q 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 
ROA 0.03  0.03  0.03  
Assets 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0.07  0.07  0.07  
Cash/Total Assets 0.05  0.06  0.06  
Financial Debt/Total Assets 0.79 *** 0.78 *** 0.79 *** 
∆(Financial Debt/Total Assets) 1.13 *** 1.10 *** 1.12 *** 
S&P Rated 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 
EDF Group 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 
Economic Conditions        
Short-Term Rate 0.00  0.01  0.01  
Term Structure -0.02  0.00  -0.02  
VIX -0.01 ***     
Asset Volatility    -0.01 ***   
Baa Corp. Bond Spread         -0.03   
Firm F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 41,762  41,711  43,292  
R-Squared 0.23   0.23   0.24   
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Figure 1. Optimal Contract Tenor l* at Different Levels of Economic Riskiness: Three 
Scenarios of Transaction Margin. This figure plots the optimal contract tenors l* for different 
levels of economic riskiness z, under three levels of margin. The initial parameter values common 
to all scenarios are L: $100 and c: 0.02. In the base, low, and high margin scenarios A: $105, $104, 
and $106, respectively.  
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Figure 2. Comparative Statics: Change in Optimal Contract Tenor Given in Shock to 
Economic Riskiness, dl/dz: Three Scenarios of Transaction Margin. This figure shows the 
change in optimal contract tenor given an increase (decrease) in the economic riskiness changing 
z from 0.005 to 0.006 (0.007) -that is, dz: 0.001 (-0.001)-, for three scenarios with different levels 
of margin. The initial parameter values common to all scenarios are L: $100, c: 0.02, z: 0.005 for 
all scenarios. In the base, low, and high margin scenarios, A: $105, $104, and $106, respectively; 
and l *: 52.10, 42.04, and 60.72, respectively.  
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Figure 3. Isoprices of Three Call Options. Isoprices of three call options with strike price 110 
U$D, price of the underlying asset 100 U$D, risk-free rate 5% and call prices 10, 20, and 30 U$D, 
computed using Black-Scholes formula for a European call option. Along each isoprice the price 
of the option is constant for different combinations of Maturity –the time to strike- and Sigma –
the volatility of the underlying asset-. 
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Figure 4. Economic Volatility and the Maturity of New Bank Debt Contracts. This graph plots 
the annual average maturity of new bank debt contracts from DealScan and the annual average of 
the month-end VIX values.  
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Figure 5. Economic Volatility and the Maturity of New Public Debt Contracts. This graph 
plots the annual average maturity of new non-convertible bonds from SDC Platinum and the 
annual average of the month-end VIX values. 
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Figure 6. Corporate debt duration and annual average of month-end VIX. Corporate debt 
duration is the annual average debt duration across all non-financial corporations in the Compustat 
Annuals database.  
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I. APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Altman's Z-Score Altman's Z-Score = 1.2 (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained 
Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3 (Earnings before Interest and Taxes/Total 
Assets) + 0.6 (Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Liabilities) + 
0.999 (Net Sales/Total Assets). Following Altman (1968). 
Amount Size of the debt issuance in billions of dollars. 
Asset Volatility Monthly cross-sectional average implied volatility of assets derived 
from the application of the Merton (1974) pricing formula for a call 
option, following Bohn and Crosbie (2003). Computed on all firms on 
Compustat Fundamentals data base, and with available pricing data on 
CRSP data base. Expressed in percentage points, unless stated 
otherwise. 
Baa Corp. Bond 
Spread 
Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield minus yield on 10-year 
Treasury constant maturity. 
Bank Debt Borrowings by non-financial publicly traded firms through syndicated, 
bilateral, club deal, or sole lender bank loans, with maturity one year or 
longer, from DealScan. 
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions (Cont.) 
Variable Definition 
Bounded Q Following Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010): BQ = MVA / (0.1 MVA + 0.9 
BVA), with BQ: bounded Q; MVA: market value of assets; BVA: book 
value of assets. MVA = Total Assets + Outstanding Common Shares 
Share Price at Fiscal Year Closing - Book Value of Equity - Deferred 
Taxes.  
Cash Cash and Short-Term Investments.   
Debt Maturity Proportion of the firm's financial debt with maturity over three years.   
EDF Expected default frequency derived from the application of the Merton 
(1974) pricing formula for a call option, following Bohn and Crosbie 
(2003). Using Compustat and CRSP data for computation. 
EDF Group Group of EDF the firm belongs to in a particular month (unless stated 
otherwise). Each month, the cross-sectional EDF distribution from all 
firms in Compustat is partitioned into twenty 5-percentile groups, and 
each firm is assigned to its corresponding group. Group 1 (20) 
represents the safest (riskiest) one. 
Financial Debt Debt in Current Liabilities plus Long Term Debt.   
Fixed Assets Net Property, Plant and Equipment.  
Industry Fama and French (1997) 17-industry classification, based on Standard 
Industry Codes (SIC). 
Maturity The tenor of the issue, measured in months. 
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions (Cont.) 
Variable Definition 
Public Debt Borrowings by non-financial publicly traded firms through new non-
convertible debt issues, with maturity one year or longer, from 
Thomson Reuters Securities Data Commission (SDC) Platinum. 
ROA Ratio of Net Income to Total Assets. 
S&P Rating S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating. 
Short-Term Rate 1-Year Treasury constant maturity rate. 
Spread Difference between the yield on the issuance and the maturity-match 
yield on a Treasury constant maturity, in basis points. Following 
Barraza, Lee, Yeager (2014).  
Term Structure 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate minus the 1-Year Treasury 
Constant Maturity Rate, in basis points 
Total Assets Expressed in billions of US dollars, unless stated otherwise. 
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index. Month-end 
adjusted prices, unless stated otherwise. 
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 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation consists of three essays that relate distress and credit. The single most 
important argument that emerges from it is that heightened risks hinder credit creation, which in 
time leads to falls in investment and aggregate production. Significant distress in the banking 
sector leads to bank credit rationing. Certain transparent and reputable firms are able to substitute 
arms-length credit for bank credit. However, this substitution is incomplete in the aggregate 
economy, leading to a fall in corporate investment and economic activity. Government 
intervention can have substantial impact in mitigating the effects of distress in the financial sector, 
interrupting abrupt falls in loan creation and boosting fast recoveries in the intermediated debt 
markets. 
Aggregate and nonfinancial corporate distress can also affect the market for credits. In 
particular, this dissertation shows that debt maturity shortens with increases in aggregate and 
borrower distress. Shorter debt maturities constrain the portfolio of feasible investment 
opportunities for the firm given the risk that mismatching cash-flows pose, effectively hampering 
investment in long-term assets –which are essential to long-term growth. 
 
 
 
